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EPA-SAB-18-xxx

The Honorable E. Scott Pruitt  
Administrator  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20460

Subject: Review of EPA’s Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and  
Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis

Dear Administrator Pruitt:

The Science Advisory Board (SAB) was asked by EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) to review the EPA draft document entitled, “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis” (Draft Report, May 2017. <https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/rrisk/rtrpg.html>). The draft RTR document describes the Agency’s methods for conducting the Clean Air Act mandated assessment of “residual risk” i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT), pursuant to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) under Title I of the Clean Air Act.

The SAB Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Methods Review Panel deliberated on the charge questions specific to the Agency’s draft RTR methods document during a July 29-30, 2017 face-to-face meeting and discussed its draft report in a subsequent conference call on December 5, 2017. The charge questions focused on eight topics within the Agency’s draft RTR methods document, including: The three-tiered multipathway screening approach used in the RTR analyses; the risk equivalency factor methodology; fishing, lake and pond assumptions; lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data; the gardener scenario; environmental risk screening methodology; inhalation risk assessment enhancements; and the census block receptor check tool. The enclosed report provides the SAB’s consensus advice and recommendations. This letter briefly conveys the major findings.

The SAB commends the Agency on the technical quality of the draft RTR document and the thought and effort it has put into developing the residual risk screening methodology. The SAB finds that the overall methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are reasonable and improve the assessment capabilities. The SAB notes that the Agency’s approach has the potential to achieve the Agency’s goal to quickly screen facilities, and to focus agency time and resources on sites of most concern from a public health point of

1 view.

2

3 The SAB could not assess the overall operational effectiveness such as how many facilities  
4 are screened out by the screening methods due to missing or inadequate case studies. The  
5 SAB recommends the Agency compile RTR analyses applied in regulatory activities for  
6 inclusion in future RTR documents for review. Further, the SAB recommends more  
7 evaluation of specific facilities against data measured in the field in future applications of  
8 the RTR methods. These “ground truthing” studies should be included in the next RTR  
9 methods document and provided to future reviewers for consideration.

10

11 EPA’s empirical correlation is a logical step in creating the read-across approach used by  
12 the Agency. However, the read-across approach for environmental fate is less well-tested  
13 and accepted and thus deserves further consideration. The SAB finds this read-across  
14 extrapolation of environmental fate could benefit substantially from an alternative approach  
15 and has identified two options for the Agency to consider for improving the exposure  
16 equivalency factor (EEF) estimate.

17

18 The SAB makes several additional observations and recommendations. These include the  
19 conclusion that including the gardener scenario is appropriate, though additional evaluation  
20 of how many people this applies to should be conducted to determine the efficacy of the  
21 addition. Incorporation of turbulence in dispersion modeling is appropriate however the  
22 SAB suggests using a different approach. Overall, the SAB found that the method’s  
23 reliance on census block centroid locations was not sufficient to ensure that receptors are  
24 representative of residential areas near the facilities, and there was concern that any manual  
25 placement would be subjective and not reproducible between risk assessors. The SAB  
26 suggests alternative methods using land use data.

27

28 In summary, the SAB supports the framework and direction of refinements EPA has been  
29 making to the screening methodology for the residual risk portion of RTR analyses. The  
30 SAB appreciates the opportunity to provide the EPA with advice on this important subject.  
31 We look forward to receiving the agency’s response.

32

33 Sincerely,

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37 Enclosure

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## NOTICE

This report has been written as part of the activities of the EPA Science Advisory Board, a public advisory group providing extramural scientific information and advice to the Administrator and other officials of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Board is structured to provide balanced, expert assessment of scientific matters related to the problems facing the Agency. This report has not been reviewed for approval by the Agency and, hence, the contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor of other agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal government, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute a recommendation for use. Reports of the EPA Science Advisory Board are posted on the EPA website at <http://www.epa.gov/sab>.

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**U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Science Advisory Board  
Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Method Review Panel**

**CHAIR**

**Dr. Jay Turner**, Associate Professor and Vice Dean for Education, Department of Energy, Environmental and Chemical Engineering, School of Engineering & Applied Science, Washington University, St. Louis, MO

**MEMBERS**

**Dr. Tami Bond**, Nathan M. Newmark Distinguished Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL

**Dr. Tiffany Bredfeldt**, Senior Toxicologist, Toxicology, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Austin, TX

**Dr. Gregory Carmichael**, Professor of Chemical and Biochemical Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA

**Dr. Richard Di Giulio**, Professor, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, NC

**Dr. Charles T. Driscoll, Jr.**, Distinguished Professor and University Professor of Environmental Systems Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, College of Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY

**Dr. David Eastmond**, Professor and Chair, Department of Cell Biology and Neuroscience, Toxicology Graduate Program, University of California - Riverside, Riverside, CA

**Dr. Gary Ginsberg**, Toxicologist, Environmental & Occupational Health, Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, CT

**Dr. Dale Hattis**, Research Professor, Center for Technology, Environment, and Development, George Perkins Marsh Institute, Clark University, Worcester, MA

**Mr. Stanley Hayes**, Principal (emeritus), Ramboll Environ, San Francisco, CA

**Dr. Joseph Irudayaraj**, Professor and Interim Director, Agricultural and Biological Engineering; Toxicology, Agriculture; Engineering; Health and Human Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

**Dr. Abby A. Li**, Senior Managing Scientist, Health Science Practice, Exponent Incorporated, San Francisco, CA,

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**Dr. Slawo Lomnicki**, Assistant Professor, Environmental Sciences, College of Coast and Environment, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA

**Dr. Sidney Marlborough**, Sr. Environmental Coordinator, Noble Energy, Inc, Houston, TX, United States

**Dr P. Barry Ryan**, Professor of Exposure Science and Environmental Chemistry, Environmental and Occupational Health, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, GA

**Dr. James Sadd**, Professor, Environmental Science, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA

**Dr. Veronica Vieira**, Associate Professor of Public Health, Environmental Health Sciences, Program in Public Health, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA

**SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD STAFF**

**Dr. Bryan J. Bloomer**, Designated Federal Officer, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

1		
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3	AERMOD	Atmospheric Dispersion Model
4	AMS	American Meteorological Society
5	ATSDR	Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry minimum risk levels
6	AEGL	Acute Exposure Guidelines Limits
7	ANPRM	Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
8	CalEPA	California Environmental Protection Agency
9	EEF	exposure equivalency factor
10	ERA	Ecological Risk Assessment
11	ERPG	Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
12	HAP	Hazardous Air Pollutant
13	IRIS	Integrated Risk Assessment System
14	LADD	lifetime average daily dose
15	LOAEL	Low Observed Adverse Effect Level
16	MACT	Maximum Achievable Control Technology
17	MTBE	Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
18	MIR	Maximum Individual Risks
19	NATA	National Air Toxics Assessment
20	NEI	National Emissions Inventory
21	NESHAP	National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants
22	NHANES	National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
23	NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
24	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Testing
25	NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
26	NWS	National Weather Service
27	OAQPS	Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
28	OPP	Office of Pesticide Programs
29	OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
30	OEHHA	Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
31	PAH	Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
32	PB-HAP	Persistent Bioaccumulative - Hazardous Air Pollutant
33	POM	Polycyclic Organic Matter
34	REF	risk equivalency factor
35	REL	Reference Exposure Levels
36	RTR	Risk and Technology Review
37	SAB	Science Advisory Board
38	TEF	toxicity equivalency factor
39	TEQ	Toxic Equivalents
40	TRIM.FaTE	Total Risk Integrated Methodology - Fate, Transport and Ecological
41		Exposure
42	TRV	Toxicity Reference Values
43	TWE	Toxicity Weighted Emissions
44	UCL	Upper Confidence Limit
45	USDA	US Department of Agriculture
46	USGS	US Geological Survey

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared by the Science Advisory Board (SAB.) The board convened the Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Methods Review Panel for initial deliberations in response to a request by EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) to review their draft document entitled, “*Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis*” (Draft Report, May 2017. <https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/rrisk/rtrpg.html>). This document (hereafter referred to as the “Agency’s draft RTR methods document” or “the draft RTR methods document”) describes the Agency’s methods for assessing “residual risk” i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT) pursuant to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulations.

The screening methodologies are used to quickly identify those facilities in a source category that have little potential for human health multipathway or environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined multipathway or environmental risk assessment may be needed. The Agency’s draft RTR methods document describes several improvements to the screening methods for the three-tiered multipathway chronic human exposure approach and the approach for environmental risk screening.

The SAB reviewed the draft RTR methods document as requested by considering eight charge questions posed by the Agency. The SAB provides comments on the RTR methods and does not address the regulatory implications of the method or the document. The SAB also notes that no methods were submitted for review regarding the technology portion of the RTR analysis called for by the NESHAP regulations. Nor were charge questions posed regarding the technology review methods to be applied by the Agency.

The SAB Risk and Technology Review Methods Review Panel deliberated on responses to the charge questions specific to the Agency’s draft RTR methods document during a face-to-face meeting on June 29-30, 2017 and discussed its draft report in a subsequent conference call on December 5, 2017. The Chartered SAB conducted a quality review of this document on [insert date]. The charge questions focused on eight topics within the Agency’s draft RTR methods document, including: *The three-tiered multipathway screening approach used in the RTR analyses; the risk equivalency factor methodology; fishing, lake and pond assumptions; lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data; the gardener scenario; environmental risk screening methodology; inhalation risk assessment enhancements; and the census block receptor check tool.* This Executive Summary highlights the SAB’s major findings and recommendations.

The SAB commends the Agency on the technical quality of the draft RTR methods document and the thought and effort it has put into developing the residual risk screening methodology. The SAB finds that the overall methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are reasonable and improve the assessment capabilities.

The SAB recommends that future RTR methods documents be written for a primary

1 audience envisioned as a risk assessor trying to reproduce the results of an Agency RTR  
2 risk assessment screening, and not just for the audience of peer reviewers. The SAB also  
3 finds the case studies to be missing or inadequate for a thorough or detailed assessment of  
4 the application of the methods described. The SAB, therefore, could not assess the  
5 operational effectiveness, in aggregate, such as how many facilities are screened out, or  
6 passed to more detailed analysis, by the screening methods. The SAB recommends the  
7 Agency compile RTR analyses applied in regulatory activities for inclusion in future RTR  
8 documents for review. Further, the SAB recommends more evaluation of specific facility  
9 analyses against data measured in the field for specific cases of industries and facilities  
10 modeled in future application of the RTR methods. These “ground truth” studies should be  
11 included in the next RTR methods document and provided to future SAB reviewers for  
12 consideration.

13  
14 The comments and recommendations offered below are intended to assist EPA staff as they  
15 seek to improve their RTR assessments going forward, and are not meant to detract from  
16 the general quality of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document or the screening and  
17 assessment efforts to date.

18  
19 The SAB agrees that the use of the proposed three-tier multi-pathway risk screening  
20 approach, starting with health protective parameters and moving to more site-specific and  
21 realistic parameters in later tiers, seems reasonable and logical. The SAB finds that the  
22 expansion of the endpoints for the environmental risk screen are reasonable and that the  
23 benchmarks, and the use of a tiered system overall, are justified. The SAB notes that the  
24 proposed approach has the potential to achieve the Agency’s goal to quickly screen  
25 facilities, and to focus agency time and resources on sites of most concern from a public  
26 health point of view.

27  
28 Overarching data quality considerations are important in the assessment. The SAB  
29 recognizes the fundamental importance of accurate input data as a bedrock foundation on  
30 which all RTR risk analyses build. The SAB recognizes EPA’s past efforts to ensure RTR  
31 input data accuracy, and strongly supports and encourages such efforts. The SAB  
32 recommends that analyses be conducted to confirm that the tiers behave as desired.

33  
34 Toward this end, the Agency should apply the three-tiered approach on actual sites, either  
35 new sites or previously evaluated sites, to determine how well the approach performs.  
36 Using actual sites would also help “ground truth” the evaluations. It would also be useful  
37 to know the contribution of each tier in improving the screen. Field measurements with  
38 available monitoring data on relevant persistent bioaccumulative hazardous air pollutants  
39 (PB-HAPs) in atmospheric deposition, soil, water, and fish could also be used in a selective  
40 manner to validate key points in the Tier 3 evaluation. In addition, analysis of the results  
41 by source category may indicate that some types of facilities screen out earlier than others  
42 and it may point out risk drivers, sensitive parameters and key features that could be  
43 refined to do a better screening analysis for particular source categories in the future.

44  
45 The SAB recommends conducting a probabilistic analysis of the distribution of critical  
46 parameters. The use of multiple health-protective assumptions and parameters is likely to

1 overestimate the actual risks, probably by a substantial margin. Many parameters and  
2 assumptions appear to be based on in-house policy decisions. At times, it is unclear what  
3 criteria are decisive in selecting the model inputs and how those criteria are influencing the  
4 screening results. The probabilistic analysis should allow a more accurate and transparent  
5 estimate of the risks including estimating confidence bounds resulting in more efficient  
6 resource expenditures and more transparent decisions by the Agency.

7  
8 Regarding the *risk equivalency factor* (REF) approach the SAB is in agreement with the  
9 toxicity equivalency factor (TEF) approach as it is well accepted for dioxins and  
10 carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).

11  
12 EPA's empirical correlation between the n-octanol water partitioning coefficient ( $K_{ow}$ ) and  
13 lifetime average daily dose (LADD) for chemicals with sufficient data is a logical step in  
14 creating the read-across approach used by the Agency. However,  $K_{ow}$  is an imperfect  
15 predictor of LADD. The read-across approach for environmental fate is less well tested  
16 and accepted for the Agency's RTR screening application and thus deserves further  
17 consideration. The SAB finds this read-across extrapolation of environmental fate could  
18 benefit substantially from an alternative approach and has identified two options for the  
19 Agency to consider for improving the exposure equivalency factor (EEF) estimate.

20  
21 In summary, the SAB finds that the REF method would greatly benefit from better  
22 explanation, documentation and statistical analysis in terms of: a) documentation of TEFs,  
23 including consideration of whether the TEF for carcinogenic activity is appropriate for  
24 certain PAHs not traditionally considered as carcinogens; and b) documentation of the  
25 methods for EEF derivation, especially with respect to better analysis of the relationship  
26 between EEF and key environmental fate characteristics of each chemical ( $K_{ow}$ ,  
27 environmental persistence, and molecular weight) potentially including a probabilistic  
28 analysis, and at a minimum, more complete statistical treatment of the relationship between  
29  $K_{ow}$  and LADD.

30  
31 The SAB is generally supportive of the assumptions used for human fishing behavior in the  
32 refined fishing scenario and offers several specific suggestions for improving the data used,  
33 the model versions used, and how to document studies used by the Agency for data and  
34 modeling methods.

35  
36 EPA could consider the use of plume-rise models other than those described in the  
37 Agency's draft RTR methods document. EPA could test and demonstrate the reliability of  
38 the adjustment for plume rise. The SAB suggest's EPA conduct an evaluation of urban vs.  
39 rural terrain in the inhalation risk assessments by comparing screening results, as  
40 implemented using TRIM.FaTE, to those calculated by a more physically realistic model,  
41 such as the regularly updated AERMOD. The procedure described in the Agency's draft  
42 RTR methods document requires extensive data manipulation yet has not been validated,  
43 whereas with a moderate additional investment the screening could be done with a  
44 validated and accepted model such as AERMOD. For this, and other dispersion and  
45 transport modeling, the SAB recommends that EPA consider the use of meteorological  
46 reanalysis data for both surface-air and upper-air wind speeds.

1  
2 In general, there was agreement among the SAB members that the Gardener Scenario is an  
3 appropriate addition to both Tier 2 and Tier 3 screening evaluation. It is important to  
4 distinguish between the Gardner and the Subsistence Farmer. Inclusion of the Gardener  
5 scenario affords improvement in characterization of the risk in both Rural and Urban  
6 environments for those who take part in this activity, however the SAB urges the Agency  
7 to gather data characterizing the population engaged in this activity, and exposure route,  
8 and evaluate the efficacy of the inclusion.  
9

10 The methodology for identifying the pollutants to be included in the environmental risk  
11 screening activities are clearly stated and the criteria used to prioritize the chemicals are  
12 judged to be appropriate. The SAB is concerned that Selenium is not included as a  
13 chemical to screen and recommends this chemical be added in future RTR screening  
14 analyses.  
15

16 The SAB agrees that incorporating the effects of turbulence as a dispersion modeling input  
17 is appropriate and of significant value, as it avoids the overly conservative assumption of  
18 applying the “rural” assumption to all facilities, but the SAB disagrees with the Agency’s  
19 draft RTR methods document on the procedure of choice. The SAB recommends using a  
20 land use based procedure utilizing national land cover data (NLCD).  
21

22 The SAB finds that not enough information was provided about the census block receptor  
23 check tool, especially regarding criteria that would be used to determine the number and  
24 placement of new receptors. The SAB is concerned that the process would not be  
25 reproducible if another risk assessor were to subsequently model that facility. Overall, the  
26 SAB found that the tool’s reliance on census block centroid locations was not sufficient to  
27 ensure that receptors are representative of residential areas near the facilities.  
28

29 In summary, the SAB supports the framework and direction of refinements EPA has been  
30 making to the screening methodology for the residual risk portion of RTR analyses. By the  
31 Agency’s accounting, for the five most recent RTR analyses conducted, Tier 1 on average  
32 screened out 30% of the affected facilities, and the Tier 2 Fisher and Farmer scenarios on  
33 average screened out 60% and 70%, respectively, of the affected facilities. This  
34 demonstrates a commitment to effectively manage Agency resources and focus attention on  
35 the subset of facilities that are not deemed low-risk based on the screening analysis. In a  
36 few cases, there was insufficient information provided for the SAB to evaluate the  
37 Agency’s methods. In many cases the SAB supports the methodological details used by the  
38 Agency, in other cases the SAB recommends considering refinements or alternative  
39 approaches.  
40

## 2. INTRODUCTION

EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) requested that the Science Advisory Board (SAB) review their draft document, “*Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis*” (U.S. EPA May 2017). This document (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency’s draft RTR methods document”) describes the Agency’s proposed methods for assessing “residual risk” i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT) under Title I of the Clean Air Act (CAA).

The CAA establishes a two-stage regulatory process for addressing emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from stationary sources. In the first stage, the CAA requires EPA to develop technology-based standards based on Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) for categories of industrial sources. EPA must review each MACT standard at least every eight years and revise them as necessary. In the second stage of the process, EPA is required to assess the health and environmental risks that remain after MACT has been applied. EPA must develop standards to address these remaining risks if necessary to protect the public health with an ample margin of safety or to prevent adverse environmental effects. This second stage of the process is known as the residual risk review, and must be completed within eight years of promulgation of the initial MACT standards for each source category.

The Agency, in order to streamline and standardize the residual risk review for the large number of source categories at issue, has developed a process by which it (1) conducts a risk assessment using currently available source and emissions data; (2) requests public comment on the source and emissions data, along with preliminary risk assessment results, through an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM); (3) addresses comments received on the ANPRM; and (4) revises the risk assessment as needed. The results of the revised risk assessment are intended to support proposals and promulgation of technology- and risk-based regulatory decisions through a transparent, science based, notice-and-comment rulemaking process.

The Agency’s draft RTR methods document under review by the SAB describes the Agency’s draft methodologies for conducting the risk portion of the Risk and Technology Review assessments as required by the CAA. These assessments evaluate the effects of industrial emissions of HAPs on public health and the environment. The screening methodologies are used to quickly identify, for a particular RTR source category, those facilities that have little potential for human health risk via multipathway exposure or little potential for environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined multipathway or environmental risk assessment may be needed. The Agency’s draft RTR methods document also describes the potential addition of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables, as well as describing several improvements to EPA’s chronic inhalation risk assessment methodology.

1 Previous internal Agency and external peer review panels have reviewed aspects of the  
2 RTR methodology, as documented in the following reports:

- 3  
4 1) The *Residual Risk Report to Congress*, a document describing the Agency’s overall  
5 analytical and policy approach to setting residual risk standards, was issued to  
6 Congress in 1999 (U.S. EPA 1999) following an SAB peer review. Many of the  
7 design features of the RTR assessment methods were described in this report,  
8 although individual elements have generally been improved over the techniques  
9 described in that document.
- 10 2) Individual residual risk assessments – several internal peer reviews and one external  
11 peer review were conducted on risk assessments for individual source categories,  
12 including Coke Ovens ([http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/coke/coke\\_rra.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/coke/coke_rra.pdf)),  
13 Perchloroethylene Dry Cleaning ([http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/dryperc/11-14-](http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/dryperc/11-14-05riskassessment.pdf)  
14 [05riskassessment.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/dryperc/11-14-05riskassessment.pdf)), and Halogenated Solvent Cleaners (downloadable from:  
15 <http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/degrea/halopg.html>). Each of these assessments used  
16 emission estimates from the National Emissions Inventory (NEI), human exposure  
17 modeling at the census block level, dose-response methodologies, and risk  
18 characterization that are like those for the ongoing and planned RTR assessments.
- 19 3) The National Air Toxics Assessment, or NATA, for 1996 was peer-reviewed by the  
20 SAB in 2001-2002 (U.S. EPA SAB 2001) NATA 1996 was a comprehensive and  
21 cumulative risk assessment designed to include all mobile sources, small and large  
22 industrial sources, as well as background contributions of air toxics. Because of  
23 significant uncertainties, the SAB did not believe that it was appropriate for  
24 regulatory purposes. The assessment at that time did not carry a census block-level  
25 resolution, but rather was performed at the census tract level. For this reason, on  
26 EPA’s NATA website (<http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/natamain/>), the estimated risks  
27 are characterized as "starting points" for developing refined assessments.
- 28 4) AERMOD, a source-to-receptor air quality dispersion model, was the subject of  
29 significant interagency cooperation and peer review. It is now EPA’s preferred  
30 local-scale air dispersion model for industrial sources of air pollution.  
31 ([http://www.epa.gov/scram001/dispersion\\_prefrec.htm#aermod](http://www.epa.gov/scram001/dispersion_prefrec.htm#aermod))
- 32 5) The individual dose-response assessment values used in the RTR assessment have  
33 themselves been the subject of peer reviews through the agencies that developed  
34 them (including EPA, through its Integrated Risk Information System, or IRIS; the  
35 California Environmental Protection Agency, or CalEPA, and the Agency for Toxic  
36 Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR). EPA proposes to select dose-  
37 response values for long-term exposures from these sources in the same priority  
38 order it used for NATA (*i.e.*, IRIS, then ATSDR, then CalEPA). For acute exposure  
39 toxicity, EPA arrays several indices without prioritization. This area is a source of  
40 significant, usually unquantifiable uncertainty. (IRIS -  
41 <http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/index.cfm>, ATSDR - <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mrls/>,  
42 CalEPA - [http://www.oehha.org/air/toxic\\_contaminants/index.html](http://www.oehha.org/air/toxic_contaminants/index.html))
- 43 6) An earlier peer review of multi-pathway risk assessment methodologies was  
44 conducted by the EPA’s SAB in 2000 (U.S. EPA SAB 2000).
- 45 7) A consultation on EPA’s updated methods for developing emissions inventories and  
46 characterizing human exposure was conducted by SAB in 2006. The final SAB

1 letter to Administrator Johnson included comments of the review.(U.S. EPA SAB  
2 2007)

3 8) A review of the updated and expanded risk assessment approaches and methods  
4 used in the RTR program was completed in 2009 (U.S. EPA SAB 2010). This  
5 methodology was highlighted to the SAB utilizing two RTR source categories:  
6 Petroleum Refining Sources MACT I and Portland Cement Manufacturing.  
7

8 Of primary interest to this review of the Agency’s RTR method document are several  
9 updates and enhancements from the previous versions reviewed as documented above. The  
10 most important revisions and enhancements since the last SAB review include the  
11 following:

- 12
- 13 • A tiered multipathway screening methodology that determines whether the  
14 potential for multipathway human health risk from persistent and bioaccumulative  
15 HAP (PB-HAP) emitted from RTR source categories is low or whether more  
16 analysis is needed.
- 17 • A tiered environmental screening methodology that determines whether the  
18 potential exists for adverse ecological effects from PB-HAP and the acid gases  
19 hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) emitted from RTR source  
20 categories.
- 21 • The potential use of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can be used to  
22 estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume  
23 contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables.
- 24 • Enhancements to the previously reviewed inhalation risk assessment that allows  
25 more accurate modeling of air concentrations where populations actually reside and  
26 to better characterize the air dispersion in the vicinity of sources.  
27

28 The SAB was asked to review the current draft RTR method document by considering  
29 eight charge questions posed by the Agency. The SAB provided comments on the RTR  
30 methods and did not address the regulatory implications of the method or the report. The  
31 SAB Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Methods Review Panel met in a public meeting  
32 on June 29 – 30, 2017 in Arlington, VA, to review the Agency’s draft RTR method  
33 document. The SAB Panel held a subsequent teleconference call on December 5, 2017 to  
34 discuss its draft advisory report. The Chartered SAB conducted a quality review of this  
35 report on [insert date TBD]. The responses that are contained in this report represent the  
36 views of the SAB. The specific charge questions to the SAB are presented in the next  
37 chapter, along with the SAB’s responses.



1 HAPs in atmospheric deposition, soil, water, and fish could also be used in a selective  
2 manner to validate key points in the Tier 3 evaluation. In addition, analysis of the results  
3 by source category may indicate that some types of industrial facilities screen out (i.e.,  
4 eliminated) earlier than others and it may point out risk drivers, sensitive parameters and  
5 key features that could be refined to do a better screening analysis for particular source  
6 categories in the future.

7  
8 *Key Recommendations:*  
9

10 EPA's tiered approach appears to be geared towards potentially protecting the most highly  
11 exposed subpopulations, combined subsistence fishers and farmers, and their children who  
12 also ingest soil. EPA indicated that the first tier is "so health protective that the potential  
13 risk for individual facilities was greatly overestimated, indicating the approach was not  
14 effectively screening out low-risk" facilities (p. 7 Agency's draft RTR methods document).  
15 SAB concurs that the first Tier is quite conservative and that individual assumptions should  
16 be evaluated within the context of all the assumptions combined together. Some of these  
17 assumptions need to be clarified and/or made more transparent as outlined below.  
18

- 19 • Page 15 of the Agency's draft RTR methods document highlights some of the more  
20 health-protective assumptions in the Tier 1 screening scenario. EPA should list the  
21 key assumptions used in the watershed characteristics that enhance chemical  
22 loading to the lake and farm via erosion and runoff because this does not change in  
23 any of the tiers. For example, assumptions are made about the lake and whether the  
24 chemical is loaded into the lake without the water that might be moving the  
25 chemical into the lake. Many assumptions are not transparent in the Agency's draft  
26 RTR methods document, making it impossible to assess if there are opportunities  
27 for refinement of those assumptions based on more realistic scenarios.
- 28 • TRIM.FaTE (U.S. EPA 2002) is used to model air dispersion. EPA should indicate  
29 if this model has been updated since 2002, and why EPA chose this model over  
30 AERMOD, which has been continuously improved and updated many times over  
31 the years (as recently as January 2017). It may be useful for EPA to compare  
32 estimates based on TRIM.FaTE and AERMOD for a relevant range of  
33 representative scenarios.
- 34 • Although there is refinement in the air modeling at Tiers 2 and 3, there is no  
35 comparable refinement of available chemical runoff and erosion from the  
36 watershed. EPA does not provide any information on parameters and assumptions  
37 made (including the pond scenario) and thus the SAB cannot provide detailed  
38 comments on potential refinements to these models.
- 39 • There is an apparent imbalance between refining lake and farm location information  
40 for Tiers 2 and 3 with the addition of specific lake locations relative to source but  
41 with no specific farm locations added.
- 42 • If Tier 1 is not effectively screening out low risk facilities, EPA might want to  
43 reconsider combining exposures for farming and fishing on top of other  
44 unrealistically conservative assumptions regarding weather conditions, deposition  
45 and runoff. It seems highly unlikely that the same person consumes all food

1 categories from media located close to the facility and these media receive  
2 unrealistically high-end chemical loading rates day after day.

- 3 • There appears to be very complicated reasoning for sustainable fishing used for Tier  
4 2 that requires multiple assumptions. For the purposes of Tier 2, it seems that  
5 simpler worst-case (perhaps even unlikely) assumptions could be made that  
6 simplify the approach yet acknowledge the assumptions. Perhaps, EPA found it  
7 necessary to introduce such details at Tier 2 to be able to screen out low risk  
8 facilities. The SAB recommends that the EPA consider other data available to make  
9 more realistic assumptions, such as the most recent National Health and Nutrition  
10 Examination Survey (NHANES) results, to estimate fish consumption and/or to  
11 consider focusing on representative land use for subsistence farming based on U.S.  
12 Department of Agriculture (USDA) databases on agricultural uses.
- 13 • In Tiers 2 and 3, accounting for deposition from multiple facilities in a specific  
14 facility assessment appears to be considered (e.g., page. 44 line 15). The SAB  
15 understands that the Agency is prohibited by law from considering emission sources  
16 from another source category but it is unclear what happens if another source  
17 category facility is nearby. It would be helpful to understand how frequently this  
18 occurs. As currently constituted, the tiered approach was established without  
19 consideration of multiple source categories beyond the facilities in the specific  
20 industry under RTR analysis. It is unclear what the impact is on the final risk  
21 conclusion given that there may be significant amounts of the pollutants present in  
22 the environment from other industries' facilities.

23  
24 Many of the pathways are related to those used by EPA Office of Pesticide Program (OPP),  
25 which are based on USDA Cropland Data Layer and more recent (2005-2010) NHANES  
26 dietary consumption data. These could be used to inform EPA's RTR screening  
27 approaches (e.g., <https://websoilsurvey.sc.egov.usda.gov/App/HomePage.htm>;  
28 [https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online\\_Resources/Ag\\_Atlas\\_Maps/](https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Ag_Atlas_Maps/);  
29 [https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/deem-user-guide-sep30-  
30 14.pdf](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/deem-user-guide-sep30-14.pdf)); [https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-  
31 05/documents/public\\_webinar\\_overview\\_of\\_the\\_draft\\_bes\\_final.pdf](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/public_webinar_overview_of_the_draft_bes_final.pdf)).

32  
33 There is concern about the specific values selected for the parameters, both individually  
34 and in combination. The use of multiple high-end health protective parameters can result in  
35 an excessive overestimate of risk. While each health-protective assumption on its own may  
36 seem reasonable, combining or overlaying multiple health protective assumptions can  
37 introduce a very high degree of conservatism into the result, perhaps more than is intended.  
38 An unintentionally high and unnecessary degree of conservatism is likely to render the  
39 tiered risk screening ineffective, or at best inefficient. EPA should consider possible  
40 refinements to Tier 1 if the overestimation of risk is such that obviously low-risk sites are  
41 not getting screened out.

42  
43 The SAB recommends that the EPA consider the use of probabilistic analyses of the  
44 various parameters and their combinations. This could allow the Agency to more  
45 accurately estimate overall risks at the various tiers. The SAB recommends that analyses

1 be conducted to verify that the tiers behave as desired. Care should be taken that none of  
2 the assumptions, by their nature, unduly drive risk-screening results. Sensitivity analyses  
3 might be helpful in evaluating the effect of assumptions, both individually and in  
4 combination. As one example, the Agency could conduct a sensitivity analysis on the  
5 impact of runoff assumptions in driving modeled human health risk and consider refining  
6 the health-protective Tier 1 runoff parameters as the screen moves to Tier 2 and to Tier 3.  
7 As the Agency conducts these evaluations, it should have the flexibility to adjust its  
8 methods and the parameters as needed to ensure health-protective RTR screening occurs in  
9 future RTR screening analyses.

10  
11 Regarding some of the individual parameters, from the documentation provided, it wasn't  
12 clear whether the breastfeeding exposure or other early life pathways would adequately  
13 cover these sensitive early life stages. The potential impact of seasonal changes in food-  
14 sourcing should also be considered although it was recognized that fishing and  
15 gardening/farming can be year-round activities in certain parts of the country.

16  
17 The SAB recognizes the fundamental importance of accurate input data as a bedrock  
18 foundation on which all RTR risk analyses build. The Agency should continue to make  
19 meaningful efforts to ensure the validity of the data used. The possibility of errors should  
20 be considered in doing the analysis and in interpreting the results.

21  
22 The focus only on cancer risk for dioxins and benzo[a]pyrene may underestimate early life  
23 (e.g., breastfeeding) risks given that these are short-term exposures whose lifetime average  
24 daily dose (LADD) will be diluted by the rest of the lifetime at lower exposure. Table 3.2  
25 indicates that non-cancer endpoints are "not critical" for these chemical classes, which is a  
26 pre-judgement that should be further explored, especially for early life exposures. We note  
27 that benzo[a]pyrene has a very recent RfD on IRIS that is based upon an early life  
28 developmental effect

29 ([https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris2/chemicalLanding.cfm?substance\\_nmbr=136](https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris2/chemicalLanding.cfm?substance_nmbr=136)).

30 Furthermore, a number of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) with TEFs are not  
31 generally considered carcinogens and so the TEF approach for pyrene, phenanthrene,  
32 fluorene, fluoranthene, acenaphthalene and several others should be reconsidered.

33  
34 Some additional items for consideration:

- 35
- 36 • The draft RTR methods document should be modified to be more explicit about  
37 decision-making on transitioning from Tier 1 to Tier 2, and from Tier 2 to Tier 3,  
38 particularly with regards to evaluating the risks associated with multiple chemicals  
39 and combining hazard quotients and risks. In addition, the basis for the inclusion  
40 and exclusion of particular chemicals, for example lead, should be more clearly  
41 stated.
  - 42 • On page 16, the draft RTR methods document indicates that “dermal absorption of  
43 originally airborne chemicals similarly has been shown to be a relatively minor  
44 exposure pathway compared with other pathways” and cites one report from 2000  
45 and another from 2006 to support the statement. The Agency should investigate if

1 the evidence still supports that conclusion and applies to all classes of chemicals.  
2 More recently, there have been several studies (Weschler and Nazaroff, 2012, 2014;  
3 Morrison et al., 2016) that have suggested that dermal absorption of certain classes  
4 of chemicals in indoor air can contribute significantly to a person’s overall dose.

- 5 • The SAB supports the EPA’s decision to separate subsistence farmers and  
6 subsistence fishers in Tier 2.
- 7 • The SAB notes that by conducting the analysis on a chemical by chemical basis,  
8 limited by law to the industrial category under RTR evaluation, multiple sources of  
9 a particular chemical emitted nearby from other industrial source categories may  
10 contribute to cumulative effects and interactions due to multiple exposures. The  
11 cumulative risk may be missed by the human health risk screening conducted  
12 following the RTR method being reviewed.

### 13 14 15 **3.2. Risk Equivalency Factor Methodology**

16  
17 *Charge Question 2. Does the SAB find that the risk equivalency factor methodology*  
18 *appropriately accounts for differences in the environmental fate and transport among*  
19 *polycyclic organic matter (POM) and dioxin congeners?*  
20

21 Previously the RTR screening methods did not account for differences in environmental  
22 fate and transport among polycyclic organic matter (POM) or dioxin congeners in the Tier  
23 1 screening approach. For example, all POM congeners were assumed to move, partition,  
24 and degrade in the environment identical to BaP does, and all dioxins were assumed to  
25 exhibit the same fate and transport as 2,3,7,8-TCDD. Since 2009 when the RTR  
26 Methodology was last reviewed by the SAB the Agency has progressed significantly in its  
27 approach. Section 3.1.2 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document describes a new risk  
28 equivalency factor (REF) approach that includes an exposure-equivalency factor (EEF) that  
29 reflects an individual chemical’s fate and transport relative to the index chemical for each  
30 group (i.e., BaP for POM and 2,3,7,8-TCDD for dioxin).  
31

32 The Risk Equivalency Factor (REF) Methodology has been incorporated as a screening  
33 tool into the residual risk assessment of stationary sources. It grapples with a common  
34 problem when dealing with complex mixtures, the evaluation of components that are not  
35 well characterized in terms of environmental fate and toxic effects. The SAB appreciates  
36 that when data gaps preclude inclusion of a chemical component of POM in a risk  
37 assessment, this component is assumed to contribute zero exposure and risk. Rather than  
38 create such an underestimation, EPA has provided a screening methodology to fill such  
39 data gaps and thus include the full array of targeted POM constituents.  
40

1 The REF Methodology consists of two read across approaches<sup>1</sup>, one to handle toxicology  
2 data gaps, and the second to handle information gaps regarding environmental fate and  
3 transport. The SAB agrees with the toxicity equivalency factor (TEF) approach as it is well  
4 accepted for dioxins and carcinogenic PAHs. We have not checked all the values for  
5 accuracy but note that some of the PAHs given TEF factors by EPA are not typically  
6 considered to be carcinogenic (e.g., fluorene, fluoranthene, acenaphthylene, B(e)P,  
7 perylene). The selection of TEFs for these and other PAHs is not provided in the  
8 Agency’s draft RTR methods document and should be documented with adequate  
9 references in Table 3.4.

10  
11 The read across approach for environmental fate is less well tested and accepted and thus  
12 deserves further consideration. EPA’s proposed exposure equivalency factor (EEF) is  
13 based upon a fundamental chemical property, the octanol to water partition coefficient  
14 ( $K_{ow}$ ). This property helps determine certain aspects of environmental fate such as uptake  
15 into fish, beef and dairy, but there are numerous other fate behaviors which it does not  
16 predict, such as metabolism, biodegradation, environmental half-life and various types of  
17 phase transitions and partitioning. Thus, it is optimistic to expect  $K_{ow}$  by itself to have high  
18 concordance with exposure dose.

19  
20 EPA’s empirical correlation between  $K_{ow}$  and lifetime average daily dose (LADD) for  
21 chemicals with sufficient data (Figure 3.2) is a logical step in creating the read - across  
22 approach. However, as suggested above,  $K_{ow}$  is an imperfect predictor of LADD. Figure  
23 3.2 shows the relationship between  $K_{ow}$  and LADD for 14 POM analytes for which there is  
24 more complete data. There is considerable variability around the regression line in Fig 3.2  
25 with this variability currently unexplored but may have to do with uncertainty and  
26 variability in the underlying parameters used to calculate LADD including  $K_{ow}$ ,  
27 intermedia partition coefficients, molecular weight, half-life, potential for biodegradation,  
28 etc. The variability around the regression line is two orders of magnitude in the most  
29 variable region suggesting that the calculated EEF may yield a substantial underestimate of  
30 LADD for some undefined members of data poor chemical classes.

31  
32 The SAB finds this read across extrapolation of environmental fate could benefit  
33 substantially from an alternative approach and has identified two options for improving the  
34 EEF estimate as follows:

- 35  
36
- Conduct further statistical evaluation of the relationship between  $K_{ow}$  and LADD to  
37 yield an upper bound on the regression slope and then apply this to derive EEFs for  
38 data poor chemicals;
  - Conduct further evaluation of the underlying fate and transport parameters to  
39 develop distributions for each influential parameter and then perform a probabilistic  
40

<sup>1</sup> Physicochemical, human health and/or environmental properties may be predicted from information from tests conducted on reference substance(s) within the group, referred to as source substance(s), by interpolation to other substances in the group, referred to as target substance(s). This approach is called “read-across.” ([https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf\\_en.pdf](https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf_en.pdf))

1 analysis that replaces the Fig 3.2 regression slope; EPA can then make a transparent  
2 choice of which percentile of the distribution of LADDs for a given  $K_{ow}$  (and/or  
3 additional parameters) will be used in evaluating exposure and risk for data poor  
4 POMs.  
5

6 The SAB also finds that the current documentation of key parameter inputs to this fate,  
7 transport and bioaccumulation model for PB-HAPs is not adequately described. The range  
8 of potential values and key citations should be presented in an appendix for all of the  
9 modeled PB-HAPs. The document states that the EEF will change based upon  
10 environmental and geospatial conditions (e.g., Page 19, paragraph 1) but examples of this  
11 dynamic relationship are not provided, which further precludes a full review. For example,  
12 how are the effects of age/weathering incorporated to account for the loss of lighter dioxin  
13 congeners over time or with distance?  
14

15 The SAB notes that in Table 3.4, the product of the EEF and TEF columns do not always  
16 equal the corresponding REF. While close, it appears that rounding prior to the  
17 multiplication may cause the difference. Whatever the reason, the product of column  
18 multiplication should be mathematically correct to avoid the impression that the table  
19 contains incorrect calculations.  
20

21 The Agency's draft RTR methods document does not indicate which parameters have the  
22 greatest influence on LADD and how influential the  $K_{ow}$  is relative to everything else. It  
23 may be that a combination of fate parameters would provide a better modeling basis to  
24 address this part of the REF.  
25

26 In summary, the SAB finds that the REF would benefit from better explanation,  
27 documentation and statistical analysis in terms of: (a) documentation of TEFs (Table 3.4),  
28 including consideration of whether the TEF for carcinogenic activity is appropriate for  
29 certain PAHs not traditionally considered as carcinogens; and (b) documentation of the  
30 methods for EEF derivation, especially with respect to better analysis of the relationship  
31 between EEF and key environmental fate characteristics of each chemical ( $K_{ow}$ ,  
32 environmental persistence, molecular weight, etc.) potentially including a probabilistic  
33 analysis, and at a minimum, more complete statistical treatment of the relationship between  
34  $K_{ow}$  and LADD (Figure 3.2).  
35  
36

### 37 **3.3. Fishing, lake and pond assumptions**

38

39 *Charge Question 3: Does the SAB find that the assumptions for human fishing*  
40 *behavior used in the refined fisher scenario, the assumptions about PB-HAP*  
41 *deposition to lakes, and the assumptions on the ability of ponds and lakes to sustain*  
42 *populations of fish are appropriate?*  
43

44 Going beyond the Tier 1 screen, the Tier 2 multipathway screening scenario replaces some  
45 of the assumptions in the Tier 1 screen. The replacements are considered more health-  
46 protective than Tier 1. Replacements include more site-specific information. Specifically,

1 in the Tier 2 assessment, site-specific information is used for the locations of potentially  
2 fishable lakes and for meteorology. In addition, the Tier 2 assessment includes: a screening  
3 configuration that assesses the fisher and farmer exposure scenarios separately (see  
4 Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3); and an estimation of lake productivity (see Section 3.2.2.2).  
5 The consideration is that a fisher might catch and consume fish from more than one nearby  
6 contaminated lake, because more than one lake might be needed to catch enough fish for  
7 subsistence living (see Section 3.2.2.3). The approach at this level of screening analysis  
8 also attempts to account for PB-HAP deposition into a lake from multiple facilities in the  
9 same RTR source category (see Section 3.2.2.3).

10  
11 The SAB is generally supportive of the assumptions used for human fishing behavior in the  
12 refined fishing scenario. Assuming all of the parameters such as size of the lake needed to  
13 support fish of a given size, assumptions about fish populations, etc. are correct, the  
14 approach used seems reasonable. The equations seem appropriate and the assumptions  
15 appear to be properly managed. However, the SAB finds that most of the  
16 assumptions/parameters are quite health-protective, possibly too conservative. Since the  
17 overall scenario indicated by the EPA is highly unlikely, the SAB suggests that more  
18 realistic ingestion rates and model parameters be considered. For example, the assumption  
19 that the subsistence fisher is the only fisher taking fish from the lake seems excessively  
20 protective. With some of the contaminants examined, fish will not take up 100% of the  
21 chemical. Likewise, the chemicals considered will have different toxicodynamic and  
22 toxicokinetic properties in the fish, making the half-life of some chemicals (PABs/dioxins)  
23 much shorter than values assumed. These issues will likely affect exposure estimates in the  
24 fisher population.

25  
26 There is considerable heterogeneity in lakes. The SAB has concerns with the presumed  
27 universality of some of the assumptions invoked for the analysis. For example, the analysis  
28 assumes: 21% of the fish biomass as piscivores; benthic fish accounting for 17.5% and  
29 pelagic fish accounting for 3.5% of total fish biomass; humans consume 50:50% from  
30 benthic and pelagic piscivores (note some people consume pan fish); and total fish biomass  
31 is 40 g fish ww/m<sup>2</sup>. It seems likely that rather than fixed values these parameters have a  
32 wide range of occurrence in actual lakes. Also as explained in the appendix of the  
33 Agency's draft RTR methods document, benthic fish collection is usually higher than  
34 pelagic species (although pelagic are preferred) due to the general species abundance. At  
35 the same time, majority of POMs and dioxins partition preferentially to the sediments and  
36 benthic organisms are often enriched in pollutants compared to the water column species.  
37 Even when considering one trophic level difference, this does not account properly for  
38 ingestion exposure.

39  
40 The SAB encourages the EPA to consider other data available to make more realistic  
41 assumptions such as using as the most recent NHANES data to estimate fish consumption.  
42 Additionally, the EPA could refine the assumptions on chemical runoff and erosion from  
43 the watershed by using relevant USGS data that is available for the region in interest. This  
44 approach would result in a more balanced approach for tiers 2 and 3, since there are  
45 refinements in air modeling at these tiers.

1 The SAB struggled with understanding model inputs/assumptions. This process may  
2 become more transparent if the data are presented as a systematic review with elucidation  
3 of how studies were included or excluded, how data were prioritized and selected for use,  
4 how the evidence was weighted, etc. The appendices to the EPA report achieve this goal to  
5 a certain extent, but are incomplete. Greater efforts to systematize transparency may reduce  
6 this uncertainty and confusion.

7  
8 Dispersion models recommended by EPA, such as AERMOD, have been continuously  
9 improved and updated many times over the years (as recently as January 2017). Such  
10 models have been employed by many users in a variety of regulatory applications, and have  
11 been subject to rigorous performance evaluation by EPA and the scientific community to  
12 test and demonstrate their accuracy. The SAB recommends clarification of the extent to  
13 which TRIM.FaTE has been updated since 2002, when its technical support document was  
14 released and the most recent scientific paper cited by EPA on the TRIM.FaTE website was  
15 published. The authors of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document may want to consult  
16 with EPA Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) Environmental Fate and Effects Division  
17 (EFED) since they have developed models with different tiered assumption about runoff  
18 into ponds.

19  
20 It is unclear how accurately PB-HAP deposition is calculated by such a simplified model.  
21 Additional information is needed to demonstrate the accuracy (or for a screening  
22 methodology, to evaluate how conservative the assumptions are) of such deposition  
23 estimates and to evaluate the implications of that accuracy for the reliability of fish  
24 consumption exposure estimates. EPA should test and demonstrate for a relevant range of  
25 representative scenarios the reliability of TRIM.FaTE air concentration and deposition  
26 estimates.

27  
28 Finally, the SAB recommends conducting a probabilistic analysis of the distribution of  
29 critical parameters. The use of multiple health-protective assumptions/parameters is likely  
30 to overestimate the actual risks, probably by a substantial margin. Many parameters and  
31 assumptions appear to be methodological or based on EPA policy decisions. At times, it is  
32 unclear what is actually driving the model inputs. The probabilistic analysis should allow a  
33 more accurate and transparent estimate of the risks.

#### 34 35 36 **3.4. Lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data**

37  
38 *Charge Question 4: Does the SAB find the methods used for evaluations of (1) lake*  
39 *data, (2) plume rise, and (3) time-series meteorological and time-series plume-rise*  
40 *data are appropriate?*

41  
42 When the Tier 2 screening analysis indicates that further evaluation is warranted the  
43 Agency undertakes an analysis following the Tier 3 screening approach described in  
44 Section 3.3 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document. The method includes three  
45 individual refinements to the Tier 2 methods that are conducted in a step-wise fashion. The  
46 refinements include further analysis of the affected lakes identified in the Tier 2 screen

1 (Section 3.3.1). The refinements also include analysis of plume rise resulting in PB-HAPs  
2 lost to the upper atmosphere (Section 3.3.2) and the use of time-series meteorology from  
3 meteorological data stations and modeled effective chemical release heights (Section  
4 3.3.3).

5  
6 *Lake data*

7  
8 The SAB supports the use of up-to-date land-use data to more accurately represent  
9 exposures that occur through lake media. EPA should consider relying less on analyses that  
10 are time-intensive and that depend on analysts' subjective judgments. Web or GIS  
11 searches, as described in the Agency's draft RTR methods document, may be useful to  
12 produce input data. However, terms such as "accessible" should be carefully defined before  
13 being used in data analysis.

14  
15 EPA should consider the use of data streams that can be automated so that ongoing land  
16 use changes can be incorporated. Widely available data sets include the National Land  
17 Cover Database (NLCD) and USGS Digital Elevation Model (DEM). The SAB cautions  
18 EPA against *a priori* exclusion of swampy lakes, which may host fish.

19  
20 *Plume rise*

21  
22 EPA could consider the use of plume-rise models other than those described in the  
23 Agency's draft RTR methods document screening procedure. An example is Briggs (1984);  
24 documentation of AERMOD (Cimorelli *et al.* 2004) thoroughly discusses plume rise and  
25 contains other citations.

26  
27 For this and other dispersion and transport modeling, the SAB recommends that EPA  
28 consider the use of meteorological reanalysis data for both surface-air and upper-air wind  
29 speeds. These data can overcome some uncertainties when weather stations are far from the  
30 modeled site.

31  
32 *Escape of contaminants from the mixed layer*

33  
34 The SAB believes that the hour-by-hour response treatment is not yet justified for the  
35 following two reasons.

36  
37 First, EPA should be cautious about undue oversimplification of complex atmospheric  
38 processes. Full or partial penetration of a plume through the top of the mixed layer depends  
39 on many complex factors, including plume momentum, plume buoyancy, stack release  
40 height and exit conditions, depth of the mixed layer, inversion strength, and atmospheric  
41 stability. These processes may vary with time, as meteorological factors evolve over the  
42 course of a day, possibly causing plume re-entrainment or rapid fumigation. Atmospheric  
43 processes governing plume penetration are more complex than can be adequately  
44 represented by a simple comparison of inversion height with effective plume height (which  
45 includes plume rise).

1 Second, the Agency’s draft RTR methods document indicates use of hour-by-hour data  
2 from the closest meteorological station. These data do not reflect specific microclimatic  
3 conditions at the site, including geological formation, directional valley orientations, and  
4 specific inversion conditions that can differ from those at the station. For accurate  
5 screening, these local conditions should be taken into account.

6  
7 EPA could test and demonstrate the reliability of the proposed adjustment by comparing  
8 screening results as implemented using TRIM.FaTE to those calculated by a more  
9 physically realistic model, such as AERMOD. Indeed, the SAB cautions EPA to evaluate  
10 carefully the additional perceived accuracy proposed to result from implementing hour-by-  
11 hour adjustments in light of the time investment. The suggested procedure requires  
12 extensive data manipulation yet has not been validated, whereas with a moderate additional  
13 investment the screening could be done with a validated and accepted model such as  
14 AERMOD.

15  
16 The SAB also has two overarching recommendations addressing issues which were not  
17 specifically called out in the charge questions.

18  
19 EPA should consider that the quantity of emissions in the National Emission Inventory  
20 (NEI) may differ from reality, either because of upset conditions, or because self-reporting  
21 does not always suffice. The location of emissions may also be different than reported.  
22 These inaccuracies may have important effects on predicted exposures.

23  
24 The SAB recommends that EPA consider probabilistic analysis to determine the parameters  
25 and assumptions that most greatly affect predicted exposures. Identification of factors that  
26 dominate risk and uncertainty could guide future screening analyses by providing  
27 justification to obtain detailed input data for those factors. Probabilistic analysis could also  
28 assist in estimating confidence bounds.

### 31 **3.5. The gardener scenario**

32  
33 *Charge Question 5: Does the SAB find the assumptions and approaches laid out for*  
34 *application in the gardener scenario to be appropriate? Does the SAB find that*  
35 *adding the gardener scenario to Tier 3 would improve our ability to characterize*  
36 *ingestion risks for urban and rural environments?*

37  
38 The Agency’s draft RTR methods document includes a new exposure pathway added to the  
39 Agency methods (Section 3.4). The new pathway is a gardening exposure scenario added  
40 to the Tier 3 multipathway screen. The gardening exposure scenario is intended to better  
41 characterize multipathway risk for the Agency during its analysis. The Agency suggested  
42 this pathway will significantly improve the screening for locations where the presence of a  
43 subsistence farm is either unlikely (in urban areas) or difficult to confirm based on the  
44 characterization of land use surrounding a facility.

1 The Gardener scenario is described on pages 59-62 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods  
2 document. EPA is proposing to implement this scenario as part of Tiers 2 and 3 in locations  
3 where at least some individuals are likely to consume homegrown produce. The SAB was  
4 asked to comment on the assumptions used and whether the addition of the scenario to Tier  
5 3 would improve characterization of ingestion risk in both urban and rural environments.

6  
7 In general, the SAB finds that the Gardener Scenario is an appropriate addition to both Tier  
8 2 and Tier 3 evaluation thereby developing a more useful model system for screening.

9  
10 When considering the assumptions and approaches part of the Charge Question the first  
11 component addresses the media ingested by the Gardener. EPA has selected ingestion  
12 components similar to those experienced by subsistence farmers. These include direct  
13 ingestion of soil, ingestion of exposed fruits and vegetables, ingestion of protected fruits  
14 and vegetables and ingestion of root vegetables, and finally, ingestion of breastmilk,  
15 although intake rates for the latter are not presented in Tables 3-18 and 3-19. These appear  
16 to be appropriate and sufficiently different categories that would afford coverage of the  
17 appropriate sources of soil ingestion and contaminants contained in soil. EPA presents a  
18 Table 3-17 distinguishing intake of Gardeners from Farmers by noting that meat products  
19 and dairy products are not likely to be sources for the Gardeners.

20  
21 The SAB suggests including chicken eggs in the Gardener Scenario as many Gardeners  
22 also keep egg-laying chickens. The SAB also notes that the gardening scenario appears to  
23 use many of the same assumptions about diet as the Subsistence Farmer, suggesting that the  
24 gardening scenario does not add much to the tiered approach. The SAB therefore suggests  
25 that it is especially important to distinguish between the Gardner and the Subsistence  
26 Farmer.

27  
28 EPA has elected to separate Gardeners into two categories, Rural and Urban. The approach  
29 seems reasonable, especially given differing intake rates for Urban and Rural Gardeners.  
30 The assumption being that a rural Gardener would have enough land to develop a  
31 subsistence, or near-subsistence, garden, while the urban Gardener would not, seems, on  
32 the its face, to be valid. Following this reasoning, EPA has elected to use an upper (90<sup>th</sup>)  
33 percentile estimate for intake rate of home-grown vegetables for the Rural Gardener but a  
34 central tendency home-grown vegetables intake rate for Urban Gardeners (See Table 3-19  
35 for the intake ratios.) Both intake rates are taken from the Exposure Factors Handbook and  
36 appear to be justified as EPA’s best assessment of such rates.

37  
38 With regard to soil intake rates, Gardener soil intake rates were matched to those of  
39 Farmers, consistent with the notion that gardens in both rural and urban settings must be  
40 tended, affording gardeners with intimate soil contact and thus intake. Further, in the rural  
41 setting, the farmer-specific rates for surface runoff-related contamination would be used  
42 while this term would not be used in urban settings. The latter is less “health-protective” in  
43 the sense that it focuses only on agricultural runoff. In urban settings, runoff may occur  
44 from other sources, e.g., industrial facility, roadways, etc., and might well be considered  
45 important. The SAB suggests that these additional urban sources be considered and  
46 matched with those of the rural settings.

1  
2 With the exception of the surface runoff component, the assumptions made above are  
3 “health-protective,” but not unreasonably so, even when compared to earlier assumptions  
4 (e.g., Charge Question 3). The SAB notes that including the same assumptions for multiple  
5 tiers likely results in little effective screening. Further, the assumptions may offer too much  
6 “health protection” and thereby reduce the screening utility of the tool. In addition, the  
7 SAB suggests alternative- and higher- soil intake rates for the adult Gardner (See  
8 discussion below for both Adults and Children).

9  
10 With regard to the second component of this charge question, it is clear that inclusion of the  
11 gardener scenario would afford improvement in characterization of the risk in both rural  
12 and urban environments for those who take part in this activity.

### 13 14 15 **3.6. Environmental risk screening methodology**

16  
17 *Charge Question 6. Does the SAB find that the environmental risk screening*  
18 *approach is appropriate for identifying facilities whose PB-HAP emissions may have*  
19 *the potential to cause adverse environmental effects? Specifically, does the SAB find*  
20 *that the pollutants (Section 4.2.1), ecological assessment endpoints (Section 4.2.2),*  
21 *and benchmarks (Section 4.3) that are included in the environmental risk screen are*  
22 *appropriate? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement with regard to*  
23 *any aspect of this environmental risk screening methodology?*

24  
25 Chapter four of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document describes the environmental  
26 risk screen used by the Agency to screen for potential adverse environmental effects  
27 associated with emissions of HAPs from facilities in the RTR source category being  
28 assessed. The screen’s indicated design goals include minimal additional data gathering,  
29 and rapid application for robust and credible screening results. The attempt to achieve  
30 these goals relies on drawing from existing data, models, and modeling results, including  
31 those developed for the human health multipathway risk screen.

32  
33 The revised environmental risk screen presented in the Agency’s draft RTR methods  
34 document builds on and enhances the methods the SAB reviewed in 2009. The Agency  
35 included modeled environmental concentrations to compare with ecological benchmarks, in  
36 contrast to using human health thresholds, for all pollutants included in the screen. The  
37 revised methods apply systematic evaluation of HAPs for potential inclusion in the screen  
38 and the environmental risk screen was expanded to include additional environmental  
39 HAPs: cadmium, hydrogen fluoride, lead, arsenic, and additional POMs. The number of  
40 ecological endpoints and effect levels that we evaluated was also expanded. Additional  
41 Tiers were added to the environmental risk screen for PB-HAP that are parallel to the tiers  
42 in the multipathway screen.

43  
44 Charge Question 6 addresses the information provided in Chapter Four of the Agency’s  
45 draft RTR methods document (and supporting appendices) that describes the environmental  
46 risk screen that was developed to provide a systematic, scientifically defensible, and

1 efficient approach that EPA can use to screen for potential adverse environmental effects  
2 associated with emissions of HAPs from facilities in RTR source categories. It is designed  
3 so that the screen can be run quickly and with minimal additional data gathering by  
4 drawing on existing data, models, and modeling results, including those developed for the  
5 human health multipath way risk screen. The overall methodology was reviewed by the  
6 SAB in 2009. The material in Chapter Four of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document  
7 focused on those aspects that have been refined/revised since the last review. The revised  
8 aspects include:

- 9
- 10 • Modeled environmental concentrations are compared to ecological benchmarks, not
- 11 human health thresholds, for all pollutants included in the screen;
- 12 • An evaluation of HAPs for potential inclusion in the screen was conducted;
- 13 • The environmental risk screen was expanded to include the following additional
- 14 environmental HAPs: cadmium, hydrogen fluoride, lead, arsenic, and additional
- 15 POMs;
- 16 • The number of ecological endpoints and effect levels that are evaluated was
- 17 expanded;
- 18 • A literature review was conducted to identify the most up-to-date ecological
- 19 benchmarks; and
- 20 • Tiers were added to the environmental risk screen for PB-HAP that are parallel to
- 21 the tiers in the multipath way screen.
- 22

23 The SAB’s findings and comments regarding the methodology are presented below.  
24 The SAB finds that the overall methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are  
25 reasonable and improve the ecological assessment capabilities. It represents a  
26 comprehensive approach that builds upon, and uses, the screening tools used in the health  
27 assessment/screening (i.e., TRIM.FaTE, AERMOD).

28

29 The methodology for identifying the pollutants to be included in the screening activities are  
30 clearly stated and the criteria used to prioritize the chemicals are judged to be appropriate.  
31 The SAB is concerned that Selenium is not included as a chemical to screen. Given its  
32 potentially important role in ecological impacts we recommend that it be considered to be  
33 added to the list. In addition, it is not clear that BaP is the most appropriate chemical to use  
34 in the ecological analysis. There may be more important POM molecules (lower molecular  
35 weights) to use in this screening. Further analysis is recommended. In addition, the  
36 emission rates presented in Table 4.1 are for base year 2005. They need to be updated to  
37 reflect recent emissions data. Also on page 67 line 21 there is reference to “99.9% of  
38 national emissions” but the basis is not clear (mass, toxicity or some other basis.)

39

40 The SAB finds that the expansion of the ecological assessment endpoints is reasonable and  
41 that the benchmarks, and the use of a tier system, are justified and a nice overall approach.  
42 The Agency’s draft RTR methods document and appendices do a good job in documenting  
43 the processes and assumptions used to identify the endpoints and benchmarks. Overall the  
44 calculation of risks is robust and follows current scientific methodologies. As the amount  
45 and diversity of information analyzed in identifying the endpoints and benchmarks is vast,

1 it would be helpful to clarify when most sensitive or most exposed species are used. In  
2 addition, the SAB notes that the overall approach would be strengthened by allowing site-  
3 specific variables to be added during the assessments, as some sites may have very specific  
4 sensitive species. Using a less sensitive receptor in a screening methodology runs the risk  
5 of underestimating the impact to the environment in those regions.

6  
7 Tables 4.2 (endpoints) and 4.3 (benchmarks) are critical to the screening process. Values in  
8 these tables are likely to change over time as new information becomes available so it is  
9 important that they be viewed as tables requiring continuous development and a process  
10 should be identified by the Agency to continuously review and update them. Furthermore,  
11 many of the studies listed are from the 1980's - 1990's and are compilation reviews from  
12 earlier publications. Notations should be made in the table or the text as to why the  
13 benchmark value was chosen. Many of the benchmarks have multiple studies (chronic /  
14 acute) with varying methodologies and results. The SAB notes that studies can be graded  
15 based on Klimisch score, a method of assessing the reliability of toxicological studies,  
16 mainly for regulatory purposes. Some additional text describing the reasoning behind the  
17 value chosen is recommended.

18  
19 The SAB finds that the general methodology of the Tiered approach and the use of  
20 TRIM.FaTE and AERMOD are appropriate. The SAB notes the simplicity of the air  
21 dispersion in TRIM.FaTE and encourages the advancement of the incorporation of  
22 AERMOD analysis within the TRIM.FaTE framework. The consideration of multi-source  
23 contributions to the soils is also recommended, though the SAB recognizes the Agency  
24 comment that inclusion of other industrial source categories in the analysis of risk in RTR  
25 screening analysis is prohibited. The use of reanalysis meteorological data is recommended  
26 to improve the meteorological fields used in the analysis. As stated elsewhere in this report,  
27 the analysis would also benefit from considering implementing a probabilistic approach.

28  
29 Furthermore, the receptors (i.e., organisms) may not be the best target organisms in specific  
30 cases so consideration should be given to add capability to modify in a site-specific  
31 manner. Finally, the SAB notes that analysis elements performed under the environmental  
32 risk screen may also be useful in the farmer screen (e.g., utilizing the deposition to soils).

33  
34 Additional Specific comments regarding endpoints and benchmarks include:

- 35  
36
- 37 • The Agency could consider indirect HCl effects by evaluating the concentrations of  
38 chloride from a facility relative to background chloride concentrations contributing  
39 to loss of surface water acid neutralizing capacity or soil base saturation. Critical  
40 loads of acidity have been developed (<http://nadp.sws.uiuc.edu/committees/clad/>)  
41 for the U.S. and the acidity associated with estimated chloride deposition could be  
42 compared to these critical load values.
  - 43 • Hg targets may need to be updated or expanded to protect communities of predator  
44 animals associated with bioaccumulation of methylmercury and to reflect broader  
45 wildlife impacts (e.g., song birds)  
<http://www.briloon.org/uploads/Library/item/265/file/Hidden%20Risk.pdf>

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- 4 • The water quality and soil criteria (Table 4-1) for mercury are very high. This is  
5 particularly true for water where concentrations are typically on the order of  
6 nanograms per liter (ng/L). To give an example, the sediment clean-up values for  
7 Onondaga Lake, NY, a mercury contaminated site are 2.2 µg/g for probable  
8 effective concentration based on macroinvertebrate toxicity testing and 0.8 µg/g for  
9 bioaccumulation based sediment quality. The Agency could consider criteria values  
10 for water and sediment/soil for contaminants that have been established for  
11 hazardous waste clean-up at sites around the U.S. for a number of contaminants.

### 12 13 14 **3.7. Inhalation risk assessment enhancements**

15  
16 *Charge Question 7: Does the SAB find that the Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection*  
17 *Enhancement Tool is an appropriate procedure for identifying facilities to be modeled*  
18 *using the urban option in AERMOD?*  
19

20 In previous chronic inhalation risk assessments, the Agency assumed the land surrounding  
21 each facility was rural. The 2009 SAB review (U.S. EPA SAB 2010) indicated additional  
22 development was appropriate. Chapter 5 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document is  
23 an enhancement to the chronic inhalation risk assessment that the Agency contends  
24 accounts for the variation in urban to rural characteristics of the land surrounding each  
25 evaluated facility. The goal of the improvement is to better characterize the dispersion of  
26 pollutants near sources.  
27

28 The selection enhancement tool provides a way to specify atmospheric turbulence within a  
29 model domain, to allow AERMOD to more accurately model pollution dispersion. The  
30 tool currently provides two options. The Agency’s draft RTR methods document evaluates  
31 the differences in model results using these two methods, and proposes using the Census-  
32 based designation of "urban" based on population density ("HEM default procedure ") as  
33 the preferred method to make decision for each modeled site. The report rejects the use of  
34 the land cover method, citing that the comparison of the methods summarized in the  
35 Agency’s draft RTR methods document show results that “matched well (about 90percent)  
36 with those made with the land use procedure or from application of the AERMOD  
37 Implementation Guide” and “in most cases where they did not match, the difference in  
38 modeled concentrations was small”.  
39

40 The SAB agrees that incorporating the effects of turbulence as a model input is appropriate  
41 and of significant value, as it avoids the overly conservative assumption of applying the  
42 “rural” assumption to all facilities, but the SAB disagrees with the Agency’s draft RTR  
43 methods document on the procedure of choice. The National Land Cover Database  
44 (NLCD) land cover metric produced by the land use procedure best captures the intended  
45 characteristic - land cover characteristics that induce turbulence, and a more accurate model  
46 result provides better input for the next tier of risk assessment. The land use procedure

1 provides a more accurate assessment for the selection, and the Agency’s draft RTR  
2 methods document does not offer a compelling explanation of the benefits of using the  
3 HEM default procedure.

4  
5 As reported in the results of the comparison between these two methods, the land use  
6 procedure identifies fewer areas as "urban" than the HEM default procedure (67 vs. 82);  
7 this is not surprising because these two approaches are measuring two different (but  
8 related) characteristics - land cover surfaces systemically sampled at a high (30m) spatial  
9 resolution, vs. population density which is measured at a much lower spatial resolution  
10 using non-random samples (census polygons).The Agency’s draft RTR methods document  
11 notes that just over half of the facilities evaluated using these two methods qualify as “at  
12 least 50% urban”, resulting in a difference in modeled concentrations using the two  
13 methods. However, the Agency’s draft RTR methods document uses an arbitrary threshold  
14 of 20% difference in making its determination that the HEM default procedure is  
15 sufficiently accurate. Table 5-1 summarizes the results of testing these two procedures on  
16 petroleum refineries, with a column listing “percent difference in modeled concentrations”,  
17 yet there is no entry for many of those facilities where the land use procedure would call  
18 for the “urban” specification. Two facilities on page 129 have no percent difference  
19 reported. The footnote explaining these missing values limits reporting only to those  
20 “clearly located in large urban areas”. The meaning of this description and why it calls for  
21 no reported values for these facilities are both unclear.

22  
23 The land use procedure directly measures the phenomenon that controls turbulence, unlike  
24 the HEM default procedure which relies on a secondary effect, an aggregated population  
25 density metric, that may not correlate well in highly industrialized areas with dense  
26 concentrations of buildings, pavement and other structures, and little residential land. The  
27 land use procedure also more directly addresses EPA’s 2005 Guidelines on Air Quality  
28 Models as stated on page 121 (last paragraph) in the Agency’s draft RTR methods  
29 document, which lists specific land use types to be considered, rather than population  
30 density.

31  
32 Using the land use procedure is not significantly more difficult or time/resource intensive  
33 than the HEM default procedure, so any logistical advantage of the HEM default procedure  
34 is minimal. Analysis can be easily automated using ModelBuilder or Python scripting in  
35 ArcGIS. Problems described in the Agency’s draft RTR methods document associated with  
36 the land use procedure misclassifying facilities with significant coverage by water bodies  
37 inside the model domain are easily addressed in the GIS procedures, and the SAB  
38 recommends that this be included in the procedure to avoid misclassifying heavily  
39 developed areas near large water bodies as “rural”.

40  
41 Because inhalation risk assessment is a location-based estimate using modelled ambient  
42 concentrations and is not population-weighted, the use of population density via the HEM  
43 default procedure is less appropriate than using land use. In addition, the land use  
44 procedure finds fewer urban areas than the HEM default procedure, indicating that the  
45 latter misclassifies turbulence in some cases.

46

1 The SAB also noted that the quality of the NLCD data makes it possible to easily express  
2 the "urban nature" of the model domain as a continuous variable, rather than a binary  
3 "yes/no" value. Such a calculation adds little to the time and difficulty of the GIS  
4 procedures used to calculate variable value, and provides a measure of the intensity of  
5 "urban" character for each area considered, and could also be used to characterize the  
6 geographic variation of turbulence within a given model domain. There are different ways  
7 to use this type of metric in modelling; it is not certain whether EPA modeling tools can  
8 use that variation, but it might be useful in future versions of the modeling and represents a  
9 "best practices" approach for gathering input data, particularly if it is only a little more  
10 difficult or expensive to do so. Using this approach with successive versions of the NLCD,  
11 which is updated every four years, allows for tracking land cover change over time.

12  
13 If EPA adopts this more nuanced use of the NLCD, the SAB suggests the Agency consider  
14 including NLCD class 22 (low intensity developed) in identifying "urban" in this context -  
15 this class is defined as 20-44% impervious surfaces and it correlates very well with  
16 residential land use when compared to other high resolution datasets. In fact, the  
17 differences in definition of these three NLCD classes is arbitrary, with thresholds at 80%  
18 and 50% impermeable land cover surfaces. Class 22 is used in screening methods in  
19 California, and has been shown to be of value in characterizing or measuring fine scale  
20 heterogeneity in other contexts (Chabaeva and Civco, 2004; Smith et al, 2010).

21  
22 Another alternative is the use of a regular NLCD derivative product - percent impervious  
23 surface data layer which is produced for each NLCD generation, as is a measure of the net  
24 change in imperviousness between NLCD generations. Use of these metrics are generally  
25 as cost effective as using population density, and have the advantage of being updated more  
26 often than the census.

### 27 28 29 **3.8. The census block receptor check tool**

30  
31 *Charge Question 8: Does the SAB find that the Census Block Receptor Check Tool*  
32 *and associated enhancements are an appropriate method for identifying and adjusting*  
33 *model receptors to ensure the receptors are representative of residential locations?*  
34

35 In the 2009 review conducted by the SAB (U.S. EPA SAB 2010) it was noted that census  
36 block centroids might not always be an appropriate surrogate for residential locations. For  
37 example, when the census block centroid is located on industrial property ("on-site"), or  
38 when a census block is large and the centroid is far from where populations actually reside,  
39 using the centroid may not be appropriate. In response the Agency developed the census  
40 block receptor enhancement (documented in Section 5.2 of the Agency's draft RTR  
41 methods document) The Agency contends that the improvement allows for the modeling of  
42 air concentrations more accurately where populations actually reside. Specifically, the  
43 Agency suggests that the new enhancement automatically identifies census block centroids  
44 that might be located on-site at a facility being analyzed. The revised method is also  
45 expected to identify census blocks that are very large and hence analysis results may be  
46 questionable. When onsite or large blocks are identified, the revised method adds new

1 receptors, delete census block centroids, or moves census block centroids to represent  
2 residential locations. The goal is to develop a more accurate representation of receptors for  
3 analysis.

4  
5 An enhancement that was made to the chronic inhalation risk assessment is the addition of  
6 the Census Block Receptor Check tool. The rationale for the new tool is that the block  
7 centroid does not always represent residential locations. The HEM-3 model calculates  
8 ambient air concentrations at census block centroid locations as surrogates for population  
9 exposure. If the centroid is located outside of the block polygon, then the U.S. Census  
10 Bureau provides the longitude and latitude of an internal point near the geometric centroid  
11 that falls inside the block polygon. The points are not weighted or reflective of the  
12 population distribution. Census blocks vary in size depending on population density. In  
13 urban areas, a census block may be equivalent to a city block bounded on all sides by a  
14 street. In sparsely populated areas, a census block is often irregularly shaped with streams,  
15 property lines, and rural roads as boundaries. The assumption is that the centroids represent  
16 a residential area, but this may not always hold true. The Census Block Receptor Check  
17 Tool was developed to address this concern. The new tool identifies two examples when  
18 internal centroid points may not be a good surrogate for where populations reside and  
19 provides options to address this.

20  
21 The first scenario is for block centroids located within 300 meters of emission points,  
22 which may be within the facility grounds and not where there are residents. The tool user  
23 would be able to view these receptors and delete them if they are on the facility property.  
24 The second scenario focuses on large and irregularly shaped census blocks, where the  
25 centroid may be further away from population centers. If blocks with an area greater than  
26 2.6 km<sup>2</sup> are identified within 1 km of a facility, aerial images of the blocks can be examined  
27 using the tool to determine if the centroid receptor needs to be relocated and other receptors  
28 added to represent multiple residential locations.

29  
30 The SAB finds the EPA report does not provide enough information about the tool,  
31 especially regarding criteria that would be used to determine the number and placement of  
32 new receptors. For example, the statement “If residential locations cannot be represented  
33 by a single receptor (that is, the residences are spread over the block), additional receptors  
34 are added for residences nearer to the facility than the centroid” (page 140, lines 15-17) is  
35 vague and ad hoc. The SAB is concerned that the process would not be reproducible if  
36 another risk assessor were to subsequently model that facility. The choice of a 300-meter  
37 buffer from an emission source is also somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, the impact of  
38 these changes is not obvious. The Agency’s draft RTR methods report should include more  
39 detailed examples of how risk estimates change based on these enhancements compared to  
40 the default block centroid method.

41  
42 Overall, the SAB finds that the tool’s reliance on census block centroid locations is not  
43 sufficient to ensure that receptors are representative of residential areas near the facilities.  
44 One approach to address this problem would be to review satellite imagery within 1km of  
45 all facilities, not just those in identified large census blocks, and manually add receptors as  
46 needed to appropriately represent population centers. However, any manual placement

1 would be subjective and not reproducible between risk assessors. An alternative approach  
2 could employ the same 2011 National Land Cover data used for the Urban/Rural  
3 Dispersion Selection Enhancement tool to automate the process of identifying population  
4 centers. The NLCD data is available at a high spatial resolution (30 m) and receptors could  
5 be placed in areas of developed land use classes 22-24. Aerial photos (e.g., Google  
6 Earth™) can then be used to check that the land use data population receptor placement is  
7 appropriate.

8  
9




Figure 1. Use of polygon facility area for clipping receptor points in GIS  
(satellite image from Google Earth™)

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46

If the EPA prefers to continue using census block centroids as nearby exposure receptors, then the SAB suggests additional enhancements to make the tool less ad hoc. Facilities are better represented as polygons than points. Satellite imagery can be used to delineate the facility area and then GIS could easily exclude receptor points that were located within that area. Figure 1 shows the blue facility property outline with blue emission points, nearby blocks in red outline with the centroid as a red square intersecting the blue facility boundary, and large blocks in yellow outline with the centroid as a yellow square. For facility areas that do have an included census block centroid, then satellite imagery should be used for adding alternative receptors to replace the deleted centroid and ensure nearby residences are represented. It is worth noting that this would not be needed if receptors were placed at actual population locations as recommended previously.

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## **Appendix A: Charge to the SAB**

May 26, 2017

### **MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT:** Request for SAB Peer Review of the document: “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis”

**FROM:** Erika N. Sasser, Director /s/  
Health and Environmental Impacts Division  
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (C504-02)

**TO:** Christopher Zarba, Director  
EPA Science Advisory Board Staff Office (1400F)

EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards is requesting a peer review by the Science Advisory Board (SAB) on the document: “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis.” This report describes specific screening methodologies that have evolved since the SAB last reviewed the RTR risk assessment methods in 2009. The screening methodologies are used to quickly identify those facilities in particular RTR source categories that have little potential for human health multipathway or environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined multipathway or environmental risk assessment may be needed. This report also describes the potential addition of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables, as well as several improvements to EPA’s chronic inhalation risk assessment methodology. The application of the updated risk assessment screens and methodologies is highlighted in this report through the presentation of example facilities emitting hazardous air pollutants.

The case study analysis and accompanying documentation were prepared by staff in the EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. The document is being made publicly available on the Agency’s website at the following address:

<https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/risk/rtrpg.html>.

Attached is the charge to the Science Advisory Board. It includes background information on the screening methodologies and identifies the questions and issues we would like the Science Advisory Board to address in their peer review of the methods.

**Attachment:**  
Peer Review Charge

## **Attachment**

### ***Charge to the Science Advisory Board for their review of the “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis”***

#### **Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Office of Air and Radiation**

#### **Background:**

The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a two-stage regulatory process for addressing emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAP) from stationary sources. In the first stage, the CAA requires the EPA to develop technology-based standards for categories of industrial sources. We have largely completed the required Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards with about 112 MACT standards being issued to date for stationary major sources of HAP. In the second stage of the regulatory process, EPA must review each MACT standard at least every eight years and revise them as necessary, “taking into account developments in practices, processes and control technologies.” We call this requirement the “technology review.” EPA is also required to complete a one-time assessment of the human health and environmental risks that remain after sources come into compliance with MACT. If additional risk reductions are deemed necessary to protect public health with an ample margin of safety or to prevent adverse environmental effects that are judged to be “significant and widespread”, EPA must develop standards to address these remaining risks. For each source category for which EPA issued MACT standards, the residual risk stage must be completed within eight years of promulgation of the initial MACT standard. Since the initial technology review requirement coincides in deadline with the risk review requirement, EPA generally combines these two requirements into one rulemaking activity, calling this the “risk and technology review” process, or simply RTR. In this way, the results of the risk review can be potentially informative to the technology review process, and vice versa.

Because RTR assessments are used for regulatory purposes, and because components of our screening analyses have evolved over time, EPA periodically seeks the Science Advisory Board’s (SAB) review (see below). For the current review, we seek the SAB’s input on the specific enhancements made to our risk assessment methodologies, particularly with respect to multipathway and environmental screening methodologies, since the last SAB review was completed in 2009. Facilities that do not screen out may be the subject of refined multipathway risk assessments, which 1) are conducted for a single facility at a time; 2) are very costly; 3) and can take several months to complete. Thus, we consider these screens to be an important step in the RTR risk assessment process that helps the agency to maximize the use of its resources and, when appropriate, to facilitate its communication with stakeholders.

## Previous Relevant Peer Reviews

Previous peer reviews have covered various elements associated with the RTR process. A brief summary of each peer review is provided:

- 1) The *Residual Risk Report to Congress*, a document describing the Agency’s overall analytical and policy approach to setting residual risk standards, was issued to Congress in 1999 following an SAB peer review. Many of the design features of the RTR assessment methodology were described in this report, although individual elements have been improved over time. The final SAB advisory is available at [http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/risk\\_rep.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/risk_rep.pdf).
- 2) A peer review of multipathway risk assessment methodologies for RTR was conducted by the EPA’s SAB in 2000. The final SAB advisory is available at [http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/1F1893E27059DB55852571B9004730F7/\\$File/ecadv05.pdf](http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/1F1893E27059DB55852571B9004730F7/$File/ecadv05.pdf).
- 3) A consultation on EPA’s updated methods for developing emissions inventories and characterizing human exposure was conducted by SAB in 2006. The final SAB advisory is available at [https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5Csabproduct.nsf/33152C83D29530F08525730D006C3A\\_BF/\\$File/sab-07-009.pdf](https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5Csabproduct.nsf/33152C83D29530F08525730D006C3A_BF/$File/sab-07-009.pdf).
- 4) A review of the updated and expanded risk assessment approaches and methods used in the RTR program was completed in 2009. This methodology was highlighted to the SAB utilizing two RTR source categories: Petroleum Refining Sources MACT I and Portland Cement Manufacturing. The final SAB advisory is available at <https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/b031ddf79cfded38525734f00649caf!OpenDocument&TableRow=2.3#2>.
- 5) The individual dose-response assessment values used in the RTR assessment have themselves been the subject of peer reviews through the agencies that developed them (including EPA, through its Integrated Risk Information System, or IRIS; the California Environmental Protection Agency, or CalEPA; and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR).

We are not asking the SAB panel to duplicate or comment on previously reviewed methodologies, but rather to evaluate whether the specific enhancements to previously reviewed methodologies as described below are appropriate and scientifically credible.

## Goals of This Review

We are seeking a scientific peer review of the updated screening methodologies. We are also seeking a scientific peer review of several specific enhancements to our chronic inhalation risk assessment that serve to reduce some of the uncertainties identified by EPA in the last SAB review. These updates and enhancements are outlined in the report: “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis” (the report).

The most important revisions and enhancements to our methodologies since the last SAB review include the following:

- 1) A tiered multipathway screening methodology that determines whether the potential for multipathway risk from persistent and bioaccumulative HAP (PB-HAP)<sup>2</sup>1 emitted from RTR source categories is low or whether more analysis is needed.
- 2) A tiered environmental screening methodology that determines whether the potential exists for adverse environmental effects from PB-HAP and the acid gases hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) emitted from RTR source categories.
- 3) The potential use of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can be used to estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables.
- 4) Enhancements to our previously reviewed inhalation risk assessment that allow us to more accurately model air concentrations where populations actually reside and to better characterize the dispersion of the air in the vicinity of sources.

<sup>2</sup> Dioxins and Furans, Polycyclic Organic Matter, Mercury (Divalent and Methyl), Cadmium, Lead, and Arsenic.

## **Charge questions for the Panel’s consideration:**

There are eight charge questions for this peer review, each of which has been placed in a box below. These eight questions concern three topic areas that cover the most important revisions and enhancements to our methodology since the last SAB review.

### ***Multipathway Human Health Risk Screening Methodology (Chapters 2 and 3):***

In RTR assessments, EPA considers ingestion risks using a multipathway approach, in which we model the dispersion, transport, and fate of HAPs emitted from facilities in specific source categories in the environment and estimate human health risks resulting from the ingestion of HAPs from food products, such as vegetables, fruit, meat, and fish.

Since the 2009 SAB review of RTR methods, we refined our original one-tier multipathway screen to include a three-tiered multipathway screening approach that progressively replaces health-protective default assumptions with location-specific data. Since full-scale facility-specific multipathway assessments are time consuming and expensive, the tiered screening approach “screens out” low-risk facilities for which no additional analysis is needed, so that only facilities with potentially higher risk remain in the pool for further analysis.

Chapter 2 of the report provides an overview of the tiered multipathway screening methodology, including a brief description of each multipathway screening tier. The technical detail on each tier of the multipathway screen is laid out in Chapter 3 of the report.

Charge Question 1: Does the SAB find that the three-tiered multipathway risk screening approach appropriately eliminates from further consideration those facilities unlikely to emit PB-HAP in concentrations resulting in appreciable multipathway risk and identifies those facilities where additional multipathway analysis may be warranted? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement of the risk screening methodology?

#### ***Tier 1***

The multipathway screen previously reviewed by SAB did not account for differences in environmental fate and transport among POM or dioxin congeners (i.e., all POM congeners were assumed to move, partition, and degrade in the environment as BaP does, and all dioxins were assumed to exhibit the same fate and transport as 2,3,7,8-TCDD). Section 3.1.2 of the Report describes the new risk equivalency factor (REF) approach that includes an exposure-equivalency factor (EEF) that reflects an individual chemical’s fate and transport relative to the index chemical for each group (BaP for POM and 2,3,7,8-TCDD for dioxin).

Charge Question 2: Does the SAB find that the risk equivalency factor methodology appropriately accounts for differences in the environmental fate and transport among polycyclic organic matter (POM) and dioxin congeners?

### Tier 2

Section 3.2 of the report describes the Tier 2 multipathway screening scenario, in which some of the health-protective assumptions in the Tier 1 screen are replaced with more site-specific information. Specifically, in the Tier 2 assessment, site-specific information is used for the locations of potentially fishable lakes and meteorology. In addition, the Tier 2 assessment includes:

- A screening configuration that assesses the fisher and farmer exposure scenarios separately (see Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3).
- An estimation of lake productivity (see Section 3.2.2.2).
- The consideration that a fisher might catch and consume fish from more than one nearby contaminated lake, because more than one lake might be needed to catch enough fish for subsistence living (see Section 3.2.2.3).
- An approach that accounts for PB-HAP deposition into a lake from multiple facilities in the same RTR source category (see Section 3.2.2.3).

Charge Question 3 Does the SAB find that the assumptions for human fishing behavior used in the refined fisher scenario, the assumptions about PB-HAP deposition to lakes, and the assumptions on the ability of ponds and lakes to sustain populations of fish are appropriate?

### Tier 3

The Tier 3 screening approach described in Section 3.3 of the report consists of three individual refinements to Tier 2 that are conducted in a step-wise fashion. These refinements include:

- Further analysis of the affected lakes identified in the Tier 2 screen (Section 3.3.1).
- Analysis of plume rise resulting in PB-HAPs lost to the upper atmosphere (Section 3.3.2).
- The use of time-series meteorology and effective release heights (Section 3.3.3).

Section 3.4 of the report describes a gardening exposure scenario we are considering adding to the Tier 3 multipathway screen. The gardening exposure scenario could help us to better characterize multipathway risk in some instances, especially in locations where the presence of a subsistence farm is either unlikely (e.g., in urban areas) or difficult to confirm based on the characterization of land use surrounding a facility.

Charge Question 4 Does the SAB find the methods used for evaluations of (1) lake data, (2) plume rise, and (3) time-series meteorological and time-series plume-rise data are appropriate?

Charge Question 5 Does the SAB find the assumptions and approaches laid out for application in the gardener scenario to be appropriate? Does the SAB find that adding the gardener scenario to Tier 3 would improve our ability to characterize ingestion risks for urban and rural environments?

#### ***Environmental Risk Screening Methodology (Chapter 4):***

Chapter 4 of the report describes the environmental risk screen that was developed to provide a systematic, scientifically defensible, and efficient approach that EPA can use to screen for potential adverse environmental effects associated with emissions of HAPs from facilities in RTR source categories. The screen can be run quickly and with minimal additional data gathering by drawing on existing data, models, and modeling results, including those developed for the human health multipathway risk screen.

The revised environmental risk screen presented in the report builds on and enhances the methods the SAB reviewed in 2009 as follows:

- Modeled environmental concentrations are compared to ecological benchmarks, not human health thresholds, for all pollutants included in the screen.
- A systematic evaluation of HAPs for potential inclusion in the screen was conducted.
- The environmental risk screen was expanded to include the following additional environmental HAPs: cadmium, hydrogen fluoride, lead, arsenic, and additional POMs.
- The number of ecological endpoints and effect levels that we evaluate was expanded.
- A comprehensive literature review was conducted to identify the most up-to-date ecological benchmarks.
- Tiers were added to the environmental risk screen for PB-HAP that are parallel to the tiers in the multipathway screen.

Charge Question 6 Does the SAB find that the environmental risk screening approach is appropriate for identifying facilities whose PB-HAP emissions may have the potential to cause adverse environmental effects? Specifically, does the SAB find that the pollutants (Section 4.2.1), ecological assessment endpoints (Section 4.2.2), and benchmarks (Section 4.3) that are included in the environmental risk screen are appropriate? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement with regard to any aspect of this environmental risk screening methodology?

## ***Inhalation Risk Assessment Enhancements (Chapter 5):***

### *Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection Tool*

In previous chronic inhalation risk assessments, we assumed the land surrounding each facility was rural. Since the most recent SAB review in 2009, we developed an urban/rural enhancement to the chronic inhalation risk assessment that allows us to account for the urban/rural characteristics of the land surrounding each evaluated facility, and therefore, to better characterize the dispersion of pollutants near sources (Section 5.1).

Charge Question 7: Does the SAB find that the Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection Enhancement Tool is an appropriate procedure for identifying facilities to be modeled using the urban option in AERMOD?

### *Census Block Receptor Check Tool*

In its 2009 review, the SAB noted that census block centroids might not always be an appropriate surrogate for residential locations. For example, when the census block centroid is located on industrial property (“on-site”), or when a census block is large and the centroid is far from where populations actually reside, using the centroid may not be appropriate.

Since 2009, we developed the census block receptor enhancement (Section 5.2) that allows us to model air concentrations more accurately where populations actually reside.

Specifically, the new enhancement automatically identifies census block centroids that might be located on facility, and census blocks that are very large. When onsite or large blocks are identified, we add new receptors, delete census block centroids, or move census block centroids to represent residential locations more accurately.

Charge Question 8: Does the SAB find that the Census Block Receptor Check Tool and associated enhancements are an appropriate method for identifying and adjusting model receptors to ensure the receptors are representative of residential locations?