



**UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY**  
**WASHINGTON D.C. 20460**

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR  
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DATE

1 EPA-SAB-18-xxx

2

3 The Honorable E. Scott Pruitt

4 Administrator

5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

6 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

7 Washington, D.C. 20460

8

9 Subject: Review of EPA's Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews  
10 (RTR): A Case Study Analysis

11

12 Dear Administrator Pruitt:

13

14 The Science Advisory Board was asked by EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards to  
15 review the EPA draft document titled, *Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology*  
16 *Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis* (May 2017). The draft RTR methods document describes the  
17 EPA's methods for conducting initial risk screening analyses in the Clean Air Act mandated assessment  
18 of "residual risk", i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology  
19 pursuant to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants under Title I of the Clean Air  
20 Act.

21

22 The SAB Risk and Technology Review Methods Review Panel deliberated on the charge questions  
23 specific to the Agency's draft RTR methods document during a July 29-30, 2017 face-to-face meeting  
24 and discussed its draft report in a subsequent conference call on December 5, 2017. The charge  
25 questions focused on eight topics within the Agency's draft RTR methods document, including: a three-  
26 tiered multipathway screening approach used in the RTR screening analyses; a risk equivalency factor  
27 methodology; fishing, lake and pond assumptions; lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data; a  
28 gardener scenario; environmental risk screening methodology; inhalation risk assessment enhancements;  
29 and the census block receptor check tool. The enclosed report provides the SAB's consensus advice and

1 recommendations in response to the charge questions. This letter briefly conveys the major findings.

2  
3 The SAB commends the EPA on the technical quality of the draft RTR document and the effort it  
4 has put into developing the residual risk screening methodology. The SAB finds that the overall  
5 methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are reasonable and improve the assessment  
6 capabilities. The SAB notes that the EPA's approach has the potential to achieve the Agency's goal to  
7 rapidly and effectively screen facilities, and to focus EPA time and resources on sites of most concern  
8 from a public health point of view.

9  
10 The SAB suggests the EPA explore a transition for its screening methodology from using single-point  
11 estimates of uncertain input values to using distributions for these values. Probabilistic analyses  
12 combining the effects of distributions of multiple input values would result in a coherent analysis from  
13 which arithmetic means and "conservative fractiles" (e.g., a 90<sup>th</sup> percentile) could be derived. While in  
14 the interim sensitivity analyses on uncertain input values could be performed, the shift to a probabilistic  
15 analysis framework would provide a more robust foundation for the screening methodology in higher  
16 tiers.

17  
18 Insufficient detail was provided in Agency's draft RTR methods document for the SAB to assess the  
19 overall operational effectiveness of the screening methodology such as how many facilities are screened  
20 out by each of the three tiers. Some data was provided later by the EPA that did help the SAB to  
21 understand the screening efficacy. The SAB recommends the EPA compile summaries of RTR analyses  
22 applied in regulatory activities for inclusion in future RTR methodology report documents. Furthermore,  
23 in future screening analyses the EPA should compare, for specific facilities, the screening model output  
24 to field data where available. These "ground truthing" studies should be included in the next RTR  
25 methods document and provided to future reviewers for consideration.

26  
27 Concerning the lifetime average daily dose estimates when calculating exposure equivalency factors,  
28 EPA's empirical correlation is a logical step in creating the read-across approach used by the Agency.  
29 However, the read-across approach for environmental fate is less well-tested and accepted and thus  
30 deserves further consideration<sup>1</sup>. The SAB notes that this read-across extrapolation of environmental fate  
31 could be refined and has identified two options for the EPA to consider for improving the LADD  
32 estimates.

33  
34 The SAB finds that the inclusion of the gardener scenario is appropriate, though an evaluation of how  
35 many people this applies to should be conducted to determine the efficacy of the addition. The accuracy  
36 of dispersion and deposition results from the TRIM.FaTE model should be evaluated by comparing  
37 them with the results from a more technically robust dispersion model, such as AERMOD. In addition,

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<sup>1</sup> Physicochemical, human health and/or environmental properties may be predicted from information from tests conducted on reference substance(s) within the group, referred to as source substance(s), by interpolation to other substances in the group, referred to as target substance(s). This approach is called "read-across."

([https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf\\_en.pdf](https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf_en.pdf))

1 while incorporation of turbulence in determining urban/rural selection in dispersion modeling is  
2 appropriate, the SAB recommends a different approach suggesting a more physically-based model such  
3 as AERMOD and the use of meteorological reanalysis data for both surface-air and upper-air wind  
4 speeds. Finally, the SAB finds that the EPA's reliance on census-block centroid locations as surrogates  
5 for where people live might not always be sufficient to ensure that receptors are representative of  
6 residential areas near facilities, and thus the SAB recommends that additional, reproducible methods  
7 should be evaluated.

8  
9 In summary, the SAB supports the framework and direction of refinements EPA has been making to the  
10 screening methodology for the residual risk portion of RTR analyses. The SAB appreciates the  
11 opportunity to provide the EPA with advice on this important subject. We look forward to receiving the  
12 EPA's response.

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15  
16 Sincerely,

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19  
20 Enclosure

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**NOTICE**

This report has been written as part of the activities of the EPA Science Advisory Board, a public advisory group providing extramural scientific information and advice to the Administrator and other officials of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Board is structured to provide balanced, expert assessment of scientific matters related to the problems facing the Agency. This report has not been reviewed for approval by the Agency and, hence, the contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor of other agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal government, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute a recommendation for use. Reports of the EPA Science Advisory Board are posted on the EPA website at <http://www.epa.gov/sab>.

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Science Advisory Board  
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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**Acronyms and Abbreviations .....1**

**1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....2**

**2. INTRODUCTION.....7**

**3. RESPONSE TO INDIVIDUAL CHARGE QUESTIONS: .....10**

    3.1. THE THREE-TIERED MULTIPATHWAY SCREENING APPROACH.....10

    3.2. RISK EQUIVALENCY FACTOR METHODOLOGY .....14

    3.3. FISHING, LAKE AND POND ASSUMPTIONS .....17

    3.4. LAKE DATA, PLUME RISE, AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA.....19

    3.5. THE GARDENER SCENARIO .....21

    3.6. ENVIRONMENTAL RISK SCREENING METHODOLOGY.....23

    3.7. INHALATION RISK ASSESSMENT ENHANCEMENTS .....25

    3.8. THE CENSUS BLOCK RECEPTOR CHECK TOOL.....27

**4. REFERENCES.....30**

**Appendix A: Charge to the SAB..... A-1**

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

1		
2		
3	AERMOD	AMS/EPA Regulatory [Dispersion] Model
4	AMS	American Meteorological Society
5	ATSDR	Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry minimum risk levels
6	AEGL	Acute Exposure Guidelines Limits
7	ANPRM	Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
8	CalEPA	California Environmental Protection Agency
9	EEF	exposure equivalency factor
10	ERA	Ecological Risk Assessment
11	ERPG	Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
12	HAP	Hazardous Air Pollutant
13	$K_{ow}$	the <i>n</i> -octanol/water partition coefficient
14	IRIS	Integrated Risk Assessment System
15	LADD	lifetime average daily dose
16	MACT	Maximum Achievable Control Technology
17	MTBE	Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
18	NATA	National Air Toxics Assessment
19	NEI	National Emissions Inventory
20	NESHAP	National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants
21	NHANES	National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
22	NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
23	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Testing
24	NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
25	NWS	National Weather Service
26	OAQPS	Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
27	OPP	Office of Pesticide Programs
28	OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
29	OEHHA	Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
30	PAH	Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon
31	PB-HAP	Persistent Bioaccumulative - Hazardous Air Pollutant
32	POM	Polycyclic Organic Matter
33	REF	risk equivalency factor
34	REL	Reference Exposure Levels
35	RTR	Risk and Technology Review
36	SAB	Science Advisory Board
37	TEF	toxicity equivalency factor
38	TEQ	Toxic Equivalents
39	TRIM.FaTE	Total Risk Integrated Methodology - Fate, Transport and Ecological
40		Exposure
41	UCL	Upper Confidence Limit
42	USDA	US Department of Agriculture
43	USGS	US Geological Survey

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared by the U.S. EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB.) The Board convened the Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Methods Review Panel for initial deliberations in response to a request by EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) to review their draft document entitled, “*Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis*” (Draft Report, May 2017.). This document (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency’s draft RTR methods document”) describes portions of the methods used to assess “residual risk” i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT) pursuant to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulations.

Screening methodologies are used to quickly identify those facilities in a source category that have little potential for human health multipathway or environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined multipathway or environmental risk assessment may be needed. The Agency’s draft RTR methods document describes several improvements to the screening methods.

The SAB reviewed the draft RTR methods document as requested by considering eight charge questions posed by the EPA (See Appendix A). The SAB provides comments on the RTR screening methods and does not address the regulatory implications of the methods or the document. The SAB also notes that no methods were submitted for review regarding the technology portion of the RTR analysis called for by the NESHAP regulations, nor were charge questions posed regarding the technology review methods to be applied by the EPA.

The SAB RTR Methods Review Panel deliberated on responses to the charge questions specific to the Agency’s draft RTR methods document during a face-to-face meeting on June 29-30, 2017 and discussed its draft report in a subsequent conference call on December 5, 2017. The Chartered SAB conducted a quality review of this document on [insert date]. The charge questions focused on eight topics within the Agency’s draft RTR methods document, including: *the three-tiered multipathway screening approach used in the RTR analyses; the risk equivalency factor methodology; fishing, lake and pond assumptions; lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data; the gardener scenario; environmental risk screening methodology; inhalation risk assessment enhancements; and the census block receptor check tool.*

This Executive Summary highlights the SAB’s major findings and recommendations. The SAB commends the EPA on the technical quality of the draft RTR methods document and the thought and effort it has put into developing the residual risk screening methodology. The SAB finds that the overall methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are reasonable and should improve the EPA’s assessment capabilities. The comments and

1 recommendations offered below are intended to assist EPA staff as they seek to improve  
2 their RTR assessments going forward and are not meant to detract from the screening and  
3 assessment efforts to date.

4  
5 The SAB recommends that future RTR methods documents be written for a primary  
6 audience envisioned as a risk assessor trying to reproduce the results of an EPA RTR risk  
7 assessment screening, rather than for the audience of peer reviewers. The SAB also finds  
8 the case studies to be missing from the report or inadequate for a comprehensive  
9 assessment of the application of the methods described. For example, the SAB could not  
10 assess the overall operational effectiveness of the screening methods, such as how many  
11 facilities are screened out compared to passed on for more detailed analysis. The SAB  
12 recommends the EPA compile summaries of RTR analyses applied in regulatory activities  
13 for inclusion in future RTR documents. In addition, analysis of the results by source  
14 category may indicate that some types of facilities screen out earlier than others and it may  
15 point out risk drivers, sensitive parameters and key features that could be refined to  
16 improve the screening analysis for particular source categories in the future.

17  
18 In future screening analyses the EPA should compare, for specific facilities, the screening  
19 model output with field data, where available. For example, field measurement data on  
20 relevant persistent bioaccumulative hazardous air pollutants (PB-HAPs) in atmospheric  
21 deposition, soil, water, and fish could be used to validate key screening model outputs,  
22 especially in the Tier 3 evaluation. These “ground truth” studies should be included in the  
23 next RTR methods document and provided to future SAB reviewers for consideration.

24  
25 The SAB agrees that the three-tier multipathway risk screening approach, starting with  
26 health protective parameters and moving to more site-specific parameters in later tiers, is  
27 reasonable and logical. The SAB finds the expansion of the endpoints for the  
28 environmental risk screen is reasonable and the benchmarks and use of a tiered screening  
29 system are justified. Overall, the screening methodology has the potential to achieve the  
30 EPA’s goal to quickly screen facilities, and to focus Agency time and resources on sites of  
31 most concern from a public health point of view.

32  
33 Data quality considerations are important in RTR assessments. Experience has shown that  
34 significant errors can occur in RTR input data, which in turn, can skew risk results,  
35 sometimes by material, policy-relevant margins. Accurate input data are the bedrock  
36 foundation on which all RTR risk analyses build. The SAB recognizes EPA’s past efforts  
37 to ensure RTR input data accuracy, and strongly supports and encourages such efforts.  
38 Building on the substantial efforts that EPA staff have already made, EPA could further  
39 develop and expand its affirmative efforts to ensure RTR input data accuracy. The  
40 possibility of such errors and their policy implications should continue to be considered  
41 when conducting RTR risk analyses and interpreting results.

42

1 The SAB recommends the EPA examine refinements to the tiered screening methodology  
2 by conducting sensitivity studies to identify the key input values that drive the risk  
3 estimates. EPA also should evaluate the use of probabilistic analyses to estimate more  
4 accurately the overall risks. In cases where these input values are uncertain but appropriate,  
5 distributions for these parameters could be constructed; probabilistic analysis would  
6 provide a more robust foundation for the screening methodology.

7  
8 Regarding the risk equivalency factor (REF) calculation, the SAB supports the toxicity  
9 equivalency factor (TEF) read-across approach as it is well accepted for dioxins and  
10 carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). For the exposure equivalency  
11 factor (EEF) estimate, the read-across approach, for environmental fate and transport, is not  
12 as well tested and thus deserves further consideration. EPA's empirical correlation between  
13 the *n*-octanol/water partition coefficient ( $K_{ow}$ ) and lifetime average daily dose (LADD) for  
14 chemicals with sufficient data is a logical step in creating the read-across approach used by  
15 the EPA. However,  $K_{ow}$  is an imperfect predictor of LADD and incorporation of other  
16 factors (e.g., environmental persistence and molecular weight) may improve the estimates.  
17 The SAB finds this read-across extrapolation approach could be refined and has identified  
18 two options for the EPA to consider for improving the EEF estimates.

19  
20 The SAB also finds the REF method would greatly benefit from better explanation,  
21 documentation and statistical analysis in terms of: (a) documentation of TEFs, including  
22 consideration of whether assigning a TEF for carcinogenic activity is appropriate for  
23 certain PAHs not traditionally considered as carcinogens; and (b) documentation of the  
24 methods for the EEF derivation.

25  
26 The SAB is generally supportive of the assumptions used for human fishing behavior in the  
27 refined fishing scenario and offers several specific suggestions for improving the data used,  
28 the model versions used, and how to document studies used by the EPA for the data and  
29 modeling methods.

30  
31 Tier 3 screening introduces refinements to the treatment of air pollutant dispersion and  
32 deposition. EPA should consider the use of plume-rise models other than those described in  
33 the Agency's draft RTR methods document and could test and demonstrate the reliability  
34 of plume rise adjustments. The accuracy of dispersion and deposition results from the  
35 TRIM.FaTE model should be evaluated by comparing them with the results from a more  
36 technically robust dispersion model, such as AERMOD. The SAB suggests EPA evaluate  
37 the selection of urban vs. rural terrain in the inhalation risk assessments by comparing  
38 TRIM.FaTE-derived screening results to those calculated by a more physically-based  
39 model such as the regularly updated AERMOD. For this and other air dispersion and  
40 transport modeling, the SAB recommends that EPA consider the use of meteorological  
41 reanalysis data for both surface-air and upper-air wind speeds.

42

1 The SAB agrees that the proposed gardener scenario is an appropriate addition to both Tier  
2 2 and Tier 3 screening evaluation. However, it is important to distinguish between the  
3 gardener and the subsistence farmer. The gardener scenario improves the characterization  
4 of risk in both rural and urban environments for those who take part in this activity,  
5 however the SAB urges the EPA to gather data characterizing the population engaged in  
6 this activity and the primary exposure routes in order to evaluate the efficacy of this  
7 scenario.

8  
9 The Agency should consult with colleagues across the EPA who have data and models for  
10 addressing parameters used in the screening analysis. For example, the SAB understands  
11 the Agency has data or models available for parameters such as lake outflow, chemical  
12 runoff and erosion.

13  
14 The methodology for identifying the pollutants to be included in the environmental risk  
15 screening activities are clearly stated and the criteria used to prioritize the chemicals are  
16 found to be appropriate. The SAB is concerned that selenium is not included as a chemical  
17 to screen and recommends that it be added in future RTR screening analyses.

18  
19 The SAB agrees that incorporating the effects of turbulence as a dispersion modeling input  
20 towards characterizing the terrain as urban versus rural is appropriate. This refinement has  
21 significant value because it avoids the overly conservative assumption of applying the  
22 “rural” assumption to all facilities. However, the SAB disagrees with the Agency’s draft  
23 RTR methods document on the procedure of choice and recommends using a land use-  
24 based procedure utilizing national land cover data (NLCD).

25  
26 The SAB finds that insufficient information was provided about the census block receptor  
27 check tool, especially regarding criteria used to determine the number and placement of  
28 new receptors. The SAB is concerned that the process would not be reproducible if another  
29 risk assessor were to subsequently model a facility. Overall, the SAB finds that, while the  
30 method’s reliance on census block centroid locations may in some cases be sufficient for  
31 screening, care must be taken that receptors are well-placed to be representative of  
32 residential areas near the facilities. To facilitate tool transparency and results  
33 reproducibility, EPA could develop protocols to enable risk assessors to exercise their  
34 professional judgment in verifying the tool-based receptor placements and document the  
35 decision process for placement (e.g., using Google Earth imagery and preliminary risk  
36 calculations) so as to be reproducible by independent expert analysts.

37  
38 In summary, the SAB supports the framework and direction of refinements EPA has been  
39 making to the screening methodology for the residual risk portion of RTR analyses. By the  
40 EPA’s accounting, provided in response to inquiry by the SAB, for the five most recent  
41 RTR analyses conducted, Tier 1 on average screened out 30% of the affected facilities, and  
42 the Tier 2 fisher and farmer scenarios on average screened out 60% and 70%, respectively,  
43 of the affected facilities. This demonstrates a commitment to effectively manage EPA

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1 resources and focus attention on the subset of facilities that are not deemed low-risk based  
2 on the screening analysis. However, insufficient information was provided in the RTR  
3 methodology report for the SAB to evaluate the overall efficacy of the EPA's methods. In  
4 many cases, the SAB supports the methodological details used by the EPA; and in other  
5 cases, the SAB recommends considering refinements or alternative approaches  
6

## 2. INTRODUCTION

EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) requested that the Science Advisory Board (SAB) review the draft document, "*Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis*" (U.S. EPA May 2017). This document (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency's draft RTR methods document") describes the EPA's recent and proposed refinements to the screening methods for assessing "residual risk" i.e., the risks remaining after application of maximum achievable control technology (MACT) under Title I of the Clean Air Act (CAA).

The CAA establishes a two-stage regulatory process for addressing emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from stationary sources. In the first stage, the CAA requires EPA to develop technology-based standards connected to MACT for categories of industrial sources. EPA must review each MACT standard at least every eight years and revise them as necessary. This is the technology review portion of RTR. In the second stage of the process, EPA is required to assess the health and environmental risks that remain after MACT has been applied. EPA must develop standards to address these remaining risks if necessary to protect the public health with an ample margin of safety or to prevent adverse environmental effects. This second stage of the RTR is known as the residual risk review and must be completed within eight years of promulgation of the initial MACT standards for each source category.

The EPA, in order to streamline and standardize the residual risk review for the large number of affected source categories, has developed a process by which it: (1) conducts a risk assessment using currently available source and emissions data; (2) requests public comment on the source and emissions data, along with preliminary risk assessment results, through an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM); (3) addresses comments received on the ANPRM; and (4) revises the risk assessment as needed. The results of the revised risk assessment are intended to support proposals and promulgation of technology- and risk-based regulatory decisions through a transparent, science based, notice-and-comment rulemaking process.

The Agency's draft RTR methods document describes revisions to the screening methods used when conducting the risk portion of Risk and Technology Review assessments. These assessments evaluate the effects of industrial HAPs emissions on public health and the environment. Screening methods are used to quickly identify, for a particular RTR source category, those facilities that have little potential for human health risk via multipathway exposure or little potential for environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined risk assessment may be needed.

Previous internal EPA and external peer review panels have reviewed aspects of the RTR methodology, as documented in the following reports:

- 1  
2 1) The *Residual Risk Report to Congress*, a document describing the EPA’s overall  
3 analytical and policy approach to evaluating residual risk in the context of setting  
4 NESHAP standards, was issued to Congress in 1999 (U.S. EPA 1999) following an  
5 SAB peer review. Many of the design features of the RTR assessment methods  
6 were described in this report, although individual elements have been refined over  
7 the subsequent two decades.
- 8 2) Individual residual risk assessments – several internal peer reviews and one external  
9 peer review were conducted on risk assessments for individual source categories,  
10 including Coke Ovens ([U.S. EPA 2018a](#)), Perchloroethylene Dry Cleaning ([U.S.](#)  
11 [EPA 2018b](#)), and Halogenated Solvent Cleaners (downloadable from: [U.S. EPA](#)  
12 [2018c](#)). Each of these assessments used emission estimates from the National  
13 Emissions Inventory (NEI), human exposure modeling at the census block level,  
14 dose-response methodologies, and risk characterization like those for the ongoing  
15 and planned RTR assessments.
- 16 3) The National Air Toxics Assessment, or NATA, for 1996 was peer-reviewed by the  
17 SAB in 2001-2002 (U.S. EPA SAB 2001). NATA 1996 was a comprehensive and  
18 cumulative risk assessment designed to include all mobile sources, small and large  
19 industrial sources, and background contributions to air toxics. Because of  
20 significant uncertainties, the SAB did not believe that it was appropriate for  
21 regulatory purposes. For example, the 1996 assessment did have census block-level  
22 resolution, but rather was performed at the census tract level. This approach was  
23 refined in subsequent assessments.
- 24 4) The AMS/EPA Regulatory [Dispersion] Model (AERMOD), a source-to-receptor  
25 air quality dispersion model, was the subject of significant interagency cooperation  
26 and peer review. It is now EPA’s preferred local-scale air dispersion model for  
27 industrial sources of air pollution ([U.S. EPA 2018d](#)).
- 28 5) The individual dose-response values used in RTR assessments have been the  
29 subject of peer reviews through the agencies that developed them (including EPA,  
30 through its Integrated Risk Information System, or IRIS; the California  
31 Environmental Protection Agency, or CalEPA; and the Agency for Toxic  
32 Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR). EPA proposes to select dose-  
33 response values for long-term exposures from these sources in the same priority  
34 order it used for NATA (i.e., IRIS, then ATSDR, then CalEPA). For acute exposure  
35 toxicity, EPA arrays several indices without prioritization; this is a source of  
36 potentially significant, yet usually unquantified, uncertainty. (IRIS - [U.S. EPA](#)  
37 [2018e](#), ATSDR - [ATSDR 2018](#), CalEPA -[CalEPA 2018](#))
- 38 6) An earlier peer review of multipathway risk assessment methodologies was  
39 conducted by the SAB in 2000 (U.S. EPA SAB 2000).
- 40 7) A consultation on EPA’s updated methods for developing emissions inventories and  
41 characterizing human exposure was conducted by the SAB in 2006. The final SAB  
42 letter to Administrator Johnson transmitted the Board’s comments (U.S. EPA SAB  
43 2007).

- 1           8) A review of the updated and expanded risk assessment approaches and methods  
2           used in the RTR program was completed in 2009 (U.S. EPA SAB 2010). This  
3           methodology was highlighted to the SAB utilizing two RTR source categories:  
4           Petroleum Refining Sources MACT I and Portland Cement Manufacturing.  
5

6           The focus of this review of the Agency’s RTR methods document is on several updates and  
7           enhancements of the previous versions that were reviewed as documented above. The most  
8           important revisions and enhancements since the last SAB review include the following:  
9

- 10           • a tiered multipathway screening methodology that determines whether the potential  
11           for multipathway human health risk from persistent and bioaccumulative HAP (PB-  
12           HAP) emitted from RTR source categories is low or whether more analysis is  
13           needed;  
14           • a tiered environmental screening methodology that determines whether the potential  
15           exists for adverse ecological effects from PB-HAP and the acid gases hydrogen  
16           chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) emitted from RTR source categories;  
17           • the potential addition to the screening methodology of a new multipathway  
18           exposure scenario to estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural  
19           households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables; and  
20           • enhancements to the previously reviewed inhalation risk screening methodology  
21           that allow more accurate modeling of air concentrations where populations reside  
22           and better characterization of air dispersion in the vicinity of sources.  
23

24           The SAB was asked to review the current draft RTR methods document by considering  
25           eight charge questions posed by the EPA. The SAB provided comments on the RTR  
26           methods and did not address the regulatory implications of the method or the report. The  
27           SAB Risk and Technology Review (RTR) Methods Review Panel met in a public meeting  
28           on June 29 – 30, 2017 in Arlington, VA, to review the Agency’s draft RTR method  
29           document. The SAB Panel held a subsequent teleconference on December 5, 2017 to  
30           discuss its draft advisory report. The Chartered SAB conducted a quality review of this  
31           report on May 31, 2018. The specific charge questions to the SAB are presented in the next  
32           chapter, along with the SAB’s responses.  
33

1                                   **3. RESPONSE TO INDIVIDUAL CHARGE QUESTIONS**

2  
3  
4   **3.1. The Three-Tiered Multipathway Screening Approach**

5  
6       *Charge Question 1. Does the SAB find that the three-tiered multipathway risk*  
7       *screening approach appropriately eliminates from further consideration those*  
8       *facilities unlikely to emit PB-HAP in concentrations resulting in appreciable*  
9       *multipathway risk and identifies those facilities where additional multipathway*  
10       *analysis may be warranted? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement*  
11       *of the risk screening methodology?*

12  
13 RTR risk assessments provide the basis for decision making on whether a more stringent  
14 standard is necessary to protect human health and the environment after implementation of  
15 a NESHAP for a specific source category. The risk assessment process is both time and  
16 resource intensive. Therefore, EPA first screens affected facilities to determine whether a  
17 full-scale facility-specific risk assessment is warranted. Since the 2009 SAB review of RTR  
18 methods, the EPA has developed a three-tiered multipathway screening approach that  
19 progressively replaces health-protective default assumptions with location- and facility-  
20 specific data. The goal is to “screen out” minimal risk facilities such that only potentially  
21 high-risk facilities remain in the pool for further analysis.

22  
23 EPA’s screening methodology for ingestion risks uses a multipathway, tiered approach.  
24 Models are used to simulate the transport and fate of HAPs emitted from specific facilities  
25 in the source category being assessed. Modeling outputs include estimates of contaminants  
26 in the environment and estimates of human health risks primarily from the ingestion of  
27 HAPs from food products such as vegetables, fruit, meat, and fish because the focus of this  
28 tiered screening is on persistent and bioaccumulative toxicants.

29  
30 The SAB agrees that the three-tier multipathway risk screening approach, starting with  
31 generic health protective parameters and moving to more site-specific and realistic  
32 parameters in later tiers, is reasonable and logical. Its general structure is consistent with a  
33 long history of EPA multi-tiered risk screening approaches designed with the intent that:  
34 (a) high-risk facilities are not prematurely screened out (with adverse public health or  
35 environmental implications) and (b) low-risk facilities are not unnecessarily retained for  
36 more detailed analysis (with adverse EPA resource implications). The SAB finds the  
37 proposed approach has the potential to achieve the EPA’s goals but as noted below the  
38 overall effectiveness is not clear.

39  
40 Based on the information presented in the draft RTR methods document, it is not possible  
41 to confirm the effectiveness of the screening methodology. Screening efficacy could be  
42 examined in two ways. First, the operational effectiveness could be evaluated by reviewing  
43 the number of facilities screened out by each tier. While this information was not provided

1 in the Agency’s draft RTR methods document, EPA subsequently reported that for the five  
2 most-recent RTR analyses conducted (at the time of the EPA’s correspondence on  
3 November 9, 2017), Tier 1 on average screened out 30% of the affected facilities, and the  
4 Tier 2 fisher and farmer scenarios on average screened out 60% and 70%, respectively, of  
5 the affected facilities. More information included in the report would have been useful  
6 when assessing the appropriateness of modeling inputs and assumptions. An analysis of the  
7 tier-specific screening efficacy should be conducted for each source category (i.e., an  
8 examination of prior RTRs which used the current approach to screening) to assess whether  
9 some types of industrial facilities screen out earlier than others. This analysis may point out  
10 the risk drivers, sensitive parameters and key features that could be refined to conduct  
11 better screening analysis for particular source categories in going forward. Second, the best  
12 way to evaluate the three-tiered approach in a scientific manner is to “ground-truth” the  
13 evaluations, using monitoring data from either new sites or previously evaluated sites. This  
14 type of validation would require focused and deliberate study, yet it would represent an  
15 improvement in the understanding of screening procedures. For example, available  
16 monitoring data on PB-HAPs in atmospheric deposition, soil, water, and fish could be used  
17 to examine the effectiveness of higher-tiered screening and in particular to validate key  
18 points in the Tier 3 evaluation.

19  
20 EPA’s tiered approach is geared towards protecting the most highly exposed  
21 subpopulations – combined subsistence fishers and farmers and their children who also  
22 ingest soil. The first tier is intended to be quite health protective and SAB concurs that it is  
23 conservative. Page 15 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document highlights some of the  
24 more health-protective assumptions in the Tier 1 screening scenario. However, many  
25 assumptions are not transparent in the Agency’s draft RTR methods document, making it  
26 impossible to assess if there are opportunities for refinement of those assumptions. For  
27 example, EPA should list the key assumptions used for the watershed characteristics that  
28 enhance chemical loading to the lake and farm via erosion and runoff (e.g., it is not clear  
29 how the chemical is loaded into the lake and the assumptions for the volume of water  
30 transporting the chemical into the lake. This is a particularly relevant example because the  
31 scenario does not change across the tiers and there might be opportunities for refinements.

32  
33 There is concern about the specific values selected for the modeling parameters, both  
34 individually and in combination. The use of multiple high-end health protective parameters  
35 can result in an excessive overestimate of risk. While each health-protective assumption on  
36 its own may seem reasonable, combining or overlaying multiple health protective  
37 assumptions can lead to more conservatism than is intended. An unintentionally high and  
38 unnecessary degree of conservatism likely renders the tiered risk screening ineffective, or  
39 at best inefficient. EPA should consider possible refinements to Tier 1 if the overestimation  
40 of risk is such that obviously low-risk sites are not screened out.

41  
42 The SAB recommends the EPA examine refinements to the tiered screening methodology  
43 by conducting sensitivity studies to identify the key input values that drive the risk

1 estimates. This could be used to refine Tier 1 if desired and is particularly relevant to Tiers  
2 2 and 3. As one example, the EPA could conduct a sensitivity analysis on the impact of  
3 runoff assumptions on modeled human health risk and consider refining the health-  
4 protective Tier 1 runoff parameters as the screen moves to Tier 2 and to Tier 3. As the EPA  
5 conducts these evaluations, it should have the flexibility to adjust its methods and the  
6 parameters as needed to ensure health-protective yet efficient RTR screening occurs in  
7 future RTR screening analyses.

8  
9 EPA should evaluate the use of probabilistic analyses, perhaps initially through case studies  
10 on Tiers 2 and 3 analyses, to more accurately estimate overall risks. As previously stated,  
11 sensitivity analyses can be used to identify key input values that drive the risk estimates. In  
12 cases where these input values are also uncertain, probabilistic analysis would provide a  
13 more robust foundation for the screening methodology. This would require assessing  
14 whether enough data are available to construct distributions for the input parameters. If so,  
15 then probabilistic analysis combining the effects of distributions of multiple input values  
16 would result in a coherent analysis from which arithmetic means and operationally-defined  
17 “conservative fractiles” (e.g. a 90<sup>th</sup> percentile) could be derived.

18  
19 Overarching data quality considerations are important in RTR assessments. Errors can  
20 occur in RTR input data which in turn can skew risk results, sometimes by material, policy-  
21 relevant margins. Data errors can be caused by such factors as reporting mistakes by  
22 individual facilities and undetected, incorrect information in publicly-available national,  
23 regional, and local emission inventories. The SAB recognizes the fundamental importance  
24 of accurate input data as a bedrock foundation on which all RTR risk analyses build. The  
25 SAB recognizes EPA’s past efforts to ensure RTR input data accuracy, and strongly  
26 supports and encourages such efforts. Building on the substantial efforts that EPA staff  
27 have already made, EPA could further develop and expand its affirmative efforts to ensure  
28 RTR input data accuracy. Possible approaches to reducing such errors were discussed  
29 during the panel’s public deliberations and are documented in the public records of the  
30 meetings available on the EPA website (EPA 2018f). The possibility of such errors and  
31 their policy implications should continue to be considered when conducting RTR risk  
32 analyses and interpreting results.

33  
34 Additional comments and recommendations are as follows.

- 35
- 36 • If EPA seeks to further refine the Tier 1 screening of low-risk facilities, it might  
37 reconsider the current approach of combining exposures for farming and fishing on  
38 top of other conservative assumptions regarding weather conditions, deposition and  
39 runoff. It is unlikely that the same person consumes all food categories from media  
40 located close to the facility and these media receive the conservative-estimate high-  
41 end chemical loading rates day after day.
  - 42 • Although there are refinements to the air modeling at Tiers 2 and 3, there is no  
43 comparable refinement of chemical runoff and erosion from the watershed. EPA

- 1 does not provide any information on parameters and assumptions made (including  
2 the pond scenario) and thus the SAB cannot provide detailed comments on potential  
3 refinements to these models.
- 4 • TRIM.FaTE (U.S. EPA 2002) is used to model air dispersion. EPA should indicate  
5 if this model has been updated since 2002, and why EPA chose this model over  
6 AERMOD, which has been continuously improved and updated many times over  
7 the years (as recently as January 2017). It may be useful for EPA to compare  
8 estimates based on TRIM.FaTE and AERMOD for a range of representative  
9 scenarios.
  - 10 • As discussed in more detail in the response to Charge Question 3, there is a  
11 complicated reasoning underlying the Tier 2 sustainable fishing scenario. Perhaps  
12 EPA found it necessary to introduce such details at Tier 2 to be able to screen out  
13 low-risk facilities. For the purposes of Tier 2, however, it seems that simpler worst-  
14 case assumptions could be made that simplify the approach. The SAB recommends  
15 the EPA consider other data available to make more realistic assumptions, such as  
16 the most recent National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES CDC  
17 2018.), to estimate fish consumption.
  - 18 • Many of the pathways are related to those used by the EPA Office of Pesticide  
19 Programs (OPP), which are based on U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  
20 Cropland Data Layer and more recent (2005-2010) NHANES dietary consumption  
21 data. These could be used to inform EPA's RTR screening approaches<sup>2</sup>
  - 22 • Regarding some of the individual parameters, from the documentation provided it  
23 wasn't clear whether the breastfeeding exposure or other early life pathways would  
24 adequately cover these sensitive early life stages. The potential impact of seasonal  
25 changes in food-sourcing should also be considered although it was recognized that  
26 fishing and gardening/farming can be year-round activities in certain parts of the  
27 country.
  - 28 • The focus only on cancer risk for dioxins and benzo[a]pyrene may underestimate  
29 early life (e.g., breastfeeding) risks given these are short-term exposures whose  
30 lifetime average daily dose (LADD) will be diluted by the rest of the lifetime at  
31 lower exposure. Table 3.2 indicates that non-cancer endpoints are "not critical" for  
32 these chemical classes; this is a pre-judgement that should be further explored,  
33 especially for early life exposures. The SAB notes that benzo[a]pyrene has a very  
34 recent RfD on IRIS that is based upon an early life developmental effect (U.S. EPA  
35 2018g).
  - 36 • Several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) with TEFs are not generally  
37 considered carcinogens (e.g., pyrene, phenanthrene, fluorene, fluoranthene, and

---

<sup>2</sup> <https://websoilsurvey.sc.egov.usda.gov/App/HomePage.htm>;  
[https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online\\_Resources/Ag\\_Atlas\\_Maps/](https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Ag_Atlas_Maps/);  
<https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/deem-user-guide-sep30-14.pdf>;  
[https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/public\\_webinar\\_overview\\_of\\_the\\_draft\\_bes\\_final.pdf](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/public_webinar_overview_of_the_draft_bes_final.pdf)

1 acenaphthalene). These compounds do not appear on the lists of relative potency  
2 factors used by EPA (U.S. EPA, 1993) nor are they presented in lists published  
3 elsewhere (e.g., Nisbet and Lagoy 1992). These early 1990s references are still  
4 relevant as demonstrated by EPA's 2017 IRIS toxicological review for  
5 benzo(a)pyrene which refers to the EPA's 1993 guidance as the source of PAH  
6 relative potency factors (U.S. EPA 2018h). In addition, the PAHs in question are  
7 not listed as carcinogenic by the International Agency for Research on Cancer  
8 (IARC) or the National Toxicology Program (NTP) of the U.S. Department of  
9 Health and Human Services. The TEF approach for pyrene, phenanthrene,  
10 fluorene, fluoranthene, acenaphthalene and several other PAHs should be  
11 reconsidered.

- 12 • The draft RTR methods document should be modified to be more explicit about the  
13 decision-making on transitioning from Tier 1 to Tier 2, and from Tier 2 to Tier 3,  
14 particularly with regards to evaluating the risks associated with multiple chemicals  
15 and combining hazard quotients and risks. In addition, the basis for the inclusion  
16 and exclusion of particular chemicals, for example lead, should be more clearly  
17 stated.
- 18 • Page 16 of the draft RTR methods document indicates that “dermal absorption of  
19 originally airborne chemicals similarly has been shown to be a relatively minor  
20 exposure pathway compared with other pathways” and cites one report from 2000  
21 and another from 2006 to support the statement. The EPA should investigate  
22 whether the evidence still supports that conclusion and applies to all classes of  
23 chemicals. More recently, several studies have suggested that dermal absorption of  
24 certain classes of chemicals in indoor air can contribute significantly to a person's  
25 overall dose (Weschler and Nazaroff, 2012, 2014; Morrison et al., 2016).
- 26 • The SAB supports the EPA's decision to separate subsistence farmers and  
27 subsistence fishers in Tier 2.
- 28 • The SAB notes that by conducting the analysis on a chemical-by-chemical basis,  
29 limited by law to the industrial category under RTR evaluation, multiple sources of  
30 a chemical emitted nearby from other industrial source categories may contribute to  
31 cumulative effects and chemical interactions because of multiple exposures. The  
32 cumulative risk may be missed by the human health risk screening conducted  
33 following the RTR method being reviewed.

### 35 **3.2. Risk Equivalency Factor Methodology**

36  
37 *Charge Question 2. Does the SAB find that the risk equivalency factor methodology*  
38 *appropriately accounts for differences in the environmental fate and transport among*  
39 *polycyclic organic matter (POM) and dioxin congeners?*  
40

41 Previously the RTR screening methods did not account for differences in environmental  
42 transport and fate among POM or dioxin congeners in the Tier 1 screening approach. All  
43 POM congeners were assumed to be transported, partition, and degrade in the environment

1 identical to benzo(a)pyrene (BaP), and all dioxins were assumed to exhibit the same  
2 transport and fate as 2,3,7,8-TCDD. Since 2009 when the RTR Methodology was last  
3 reviewed by the SAB, the EPA has significantly refined its approach. Section 3.1.2 of the  
4 Agency's draft RTR methods document describes a new risk equivalency factor (REF)  
5 methodology that includes an exposure-equivalency factor (EEF) to reflect an individual  
6 chemical's transport and fate relative to the index chemical for each group (i.e., BaP for  
7 POM and 2,3,7,8-TCDD for dioxin).

8  
9 The REF methodology has been incorporated as a screening tool into the residual risk  
10 assessment of stationary sources. It grapples with a common problem when dealing with  
11 complex mixtures – the evaluation of components with poorly characterized environmental  
12 fate and toxic effects. The SAB appreciates that when data gaps preclude inclusion of a  
13 chemical component of POM in a risk assessment, this component is often assumed to  
14 contribute zero exposure and risk. Rather than create such an underestimation, EPA has  
15 provided a screening methodology to fill such data gaps and thus include the full array of  
16 targeted POM constituents.

17  
18 The REF methodology consists of two read-across approaches<sup>3</sup> – one to handle toxicology  
19 data gaps, and the other to handle information gaps regarding environmental transport and  
20 fate. The SAB agrees with the toxicity equivalency factor (TEF) approach as it is well  
21 accepted for dioxins and carcinogenic PAHs. The SAB has not checked all the tabulated  
22 values for representativeness but notes that some of the PAHs given TEF factors by EPA  
23 are not typically considered to be carcinogenic; this was discussed in the SAB's response to  
24 Charge Question 1. The selection of TEFs for these and other PAHs is not provided in the  
25 Agency's draft RTR methods document and should be documented with references in  
26 Table 3.4.

27  
28 The read-across approach for environmental fate is less well tested and accepted and thus  
29 deserves further consideration. EPA's proposed EEF is based upon a fundamental chemical  
30 property –  $K_{ow}$ . This property helps determine certain aspects of environmental fate such as  
31 uptake into fish, beef and dairy, but there are numerous other fate behaviors which it does  
32 not predict such as metabolism, biodegradation, environmental half-life and several types  
33 of phase transitions and partitioning. Thus, it is perhaps overly optimistic to expect  $K_{ow}$  by  
34 itself to have high concordance with exposure dose.

35  
36 EPA's empirical correlation between  $K_{ow}$  and LADD for chemicals with sufficient data  
37 (RTR methods report Figure 3.2. U.S. EPA 2017) is a logical step in creating the read-  
38 across approach. However, as suggested above,  $K_{ow}$  is an imperfect predictor of LADD.

---

<sup>3</sup> Physicochemical, human health and/or environmental properties may be predicted from information from tests conducted on reference substance(s) within the group, referred to as source substance(s), by interpolation to other substances in the group, referred to as target substance(s). This approach is called "read-across." ([https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf\\_en.pdf](https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13628/raaf_en.pdf))

1 Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between  $K_{ow}$  and LADD for 14 POM analytes for which  
2 there are more complete data. There is considerable variability around the regression line in  
3 Fig 3.2; this variability is currently unexplored but may arise from uncertainty and  
4 variability in the underlying parameters that influence the LADD including not only  $K_{ow}$   
5 but also intermedia partition coefficients, molecular weight, half-life, potential for  
6 biodegradation, etc. The variability around the regression line is up to two orders of  
7 magnitude and thus the calculated EEF may substantially underestimate the LADD for  
8 some undefined members of data-poor chemical classes.

9  
10 The SAB finds this read-across extrapolation of environmental fate could benefit from a  
11 refined approach and has identified two options for improving the EEF estimate as follows.

- 12  
13 • Conduct further statistical evaluation of the relationship between  $K_{ow}$  and LADD to  
14 generate an upper bound on the regression slope and then apply this to derive EEFs  
15 for data poor chemicals.
- 16 • Conduct further evaluation of the underlying transport and fate parameters to  
17 develop distributions for each influential parameter and then perform a probabilistic  
18 analysis that replaces the Fig 3.2 regression slope; EPA can then make a transparent  
19 choice of which percentile of the distribution of LADDs for a given  $K_{ow}$  (and/or  
20 additional parameters) will be used in evaluating exposure and risk for data-poor  
21 POMs.

22  
23 The SAB also finds the current documentation of key parameter inputs to the fate, transport  
24 and bioaccumulation model for PB-HAPs is not adequately described. The range of  
25 potential values and key citations should be presented in an appendix for all the modeled  
26 PB-HAPs. The document states that the EEF will change based upon environmental and  
27 geospatial conditions (e.g., Page 19, paragraph 1) but examples of this dynamic  
28 relationship are not provided, which further precludes a full review. For example, how are  
29 the effects of age/weathering incorporated to account for the loss of lighter dioxin  
30 congeners over time or with distance?

31  
32 The SAB notes that in Table 3.4, the products of the EEF and TEF values do not always  
33 equal the corresponding REF. Perhaps rounding prior to the multiplication causes these  
34 differences. Whatever the reason, the product of column multiplication should be  
35 mathematically consistent to avoid the impression that the table contains incorrect values.

36  
37 In summary, the SAB finds that the REF would benefit from better explanation,  
38 documentation and statistical analysis in terms of: (a) documentation of TEFs (Table 3.4),  
39 including consideration of whether the TEF for carcinogenic activity is appropriate for  
40 certain PAHs not traditionally considered as carcinogens; and (b) documentation of the  
41 methods for EEF derivation, especially with respect to better analysis of the relationship  
42 between EEF and key environmental fate characteristics of each chemical ( $K_{ow}$ ,  
43 environmental persistence, molecular weight, etc.) potentially including a probabilistic

1 analysis and, at a minimum, more complete statistical treatment of the relationship between  
2  $K_{ow}$  and LADD.

3  
4  
5 **3.3. Fishing, lake and pond assumptions**

6  
7 *Charge Question 3: Does the SAB find that the assumptions for human fishing*  
8 *behavior used in the refined fisher scenario, the assumptions about PB-HAP*  
9 *deposition to lakes, and the assumptions on the ability of ponds and lakes to sustain*  
10 *populations of fish are appropriate?*

11  
12 The Tier 2 multipathway screening scenario replaces some of the assumptions in the Tier 1  
13 screen and is considered more realistic than Tier 1. Specifically, site-specific information is  
14 used for the locations of potentially fishable lakes and for meteorology. In addition, the  
15 Tier 2 assessment includes: a screening configuration that assesses the fisher and farmer  
16 exposure scenarios separately; and an estimation of lake productivity. The consideration is  
17 that a fisher might catch and consume fish from more than one nearby contaminated lake  
18 because more than one lake might be needed to catch enough fish for subsistence living.  
19 The approach at this level of screening analysis also attempts to account for PB-HAP  
20 deposition into a lake from multiple facilities in the same RTR source category.

21  
22 The SAB is generally supportive of the assumptions used for human fishing behavior in the  
23 refined fishing scenario. Assuming all the parameters such as size of the lake needed to  
24 support fish of a given size, assumptions about fish populations, etc. are correct, the  
25 approach used seems reasonable. The equations seem appropriate and the assumptions  
26 appear to be properly managed. However, the SAB finds that most of the  
27 assumptions/parameters are possibly too conservative to achieve the objective of effective  
28 risk screening and suggests that more realistic ingestion rates and other model parameters  
29 be considered. For example, the Tier 2 method limits the fish consumption rate from a local  
30 water body due to potential depletion of fish by a single subsistence fisherman. The end  
31 result of a number of assumptions and productivity calculations is that no more than 1 gram  
32 fish/acre of waterbody can be sustainably removed per day (page 40, lines 7-9). In  
33 comparison, in one study the productivity of lakes was 82 kg/hectare/year (N=22 lakes,  
34 Randall et al. 1995) which converts to 90 g/acre/day. This 90-fold difference indicates the  
35 EPA should reconsider lake productivity and how to relate it to fish consumption estimates  
36 for a specific lake. Furthermore, with some of the contaminants examined, fish will not  
37 take up 100% of the chemical. Also, the chemicals considered will have different  
38 toxicodynamic and toxicokinetic properties in the fish, making the half-life of some  
39 chemicals (PABs/dioxins) much shorter than values assumed. These issues will affect  
40 exposure estimates in the fisher population.

41  
42 There is considerable heterogeneity across lakes and the SAB has concerns with the  
43 presumed universality of some of the assumptions invoked for the analysis. For example,

1 the analysis assumes: 21% of the fish biomass are piscivores; benthic fish account for  
2 17.5% and pelagic fish account for 3.5% of total fish biomass; humans consume 50:50%  
3 from benthic and pelagic piscivores (note some people consume pan fish); and total fish  
4 biomass is 40 g fish ww/m<sup>2</sup>. It seems likely that rather than fixed values these parameters  
5 have a wide range of occurrence in actual lakes. Also, as explained in the appendix of the  
6 Agency's draft RTR methods document, benthic fish collection is usually higher than  
7 pelagic species (although pelagic are preferred by consumers) due to the general species  
8 abundance. The SAB recommends that the EPA document and justify these assumptions.  
9

10 The SAB encourages the EPA to consider other data available to make more realistic  
11 assumptions such using as the most recent NHANES data to estimate fish consumption.  
12 Additionally, the EPA might be able to refine the assumptions on chemical runoff and  
13 erosion from the watershed by using relevant U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) data that are  
14 available for the region of interest (U.S.G.S. 2018). As another example, the EPA Risk-  
15 Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) Model is part of the Toxics Release Inventory  
16 (TRI) program and is primarily used as a transport and fate model to estimate  
17 concentrations, hazard level and risk of air pollutants covered by the TRI. However, RSEI  
18 also has a model that estimates transport and fate of TRI releases to water bodies including  
19 both direct releases and transfers between wastewater plants. The primary data product is  
20 toxicity-weighted concentrations downstream of TRI discharges, and it is available by  
21 stream segment. the Office of Pollution and Prevention and Toxics could presumably  
22 prepare data specific to the modeler's needs. However, the RSEI Water Microdata can also  
23 be accessed online (U.S. EPA 2018i).  
24

25 The SAB struggled with understanding some of the RTR modeling inputs/assumptions.  
26 This process may become more transparent if the data are presented with information about  
27 how studies were included or excluded, how data were prioritized and selected for use, how  
28 the evidence was weighted, etc. The appendices to the EPA report achieve this goal to a  
29 certain extent but are incomplete.  
30

31 Regarding PB-HAP transport and deposition, air dispersion models recommended by EPA,  
32 such as AERMOD, have been continuously improved and updated many times over the  
33 years (as recently as January 2017). Such models have been used by many users in a  
34 variety of regulatory applications and have been subject to rigorous performance evaluation  
35 by EPA and the scientific community to test and demonstrate their accuracy. The SAB  
36 recommends clarification of the extent to which TRIM.FaTE has been updated since 2002  
37 when its technical support document was released. Also, the EPA may seek to consult with  
38 EPA Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) Environmental Fate and Effects Division (EFED)  
39 since they have developed models with different tiered assumptions about runoff into  
40 ponds.  
41

42 It is unclear how accurately PB-HAP deposition is calculated by TRIM.FaTE. Additional  
43 information is needed to demonstrate the accuracy (or for a screening methodology, to

1 evaluate how conservative the assumptions are) of such deposition estimates and their  
2 implications to the reliability of fish consumption exposure estimates. EPA should test and  
3 demonstrate for a range of representative scenarios the reliability of TRIM.FaTE air  
4 concentration and deposition estimates.  
5

6 Finally, the SAB recommends conducting a sensitivity analysis of the distribution of  
7 critical parameters at higher tiers. The use of multiple health-protective  
8 assumptions/parameters is likely to overestimate the actual risks, probably by a substantial  
9 margin. Furthermore, a probabilistic analysis should provide a more accurate and  
10 transparent estimate regarding uncertainty of the risks and may be appropriate at higher  
11 tiers.  
12  
13

#### 14 **3.4. Lake data, plume rise, and meteorological data**

15  
16 *Charge Question 4: Does the SAB find the methods used for evaluations of (1) lake*  
17 *data, (2) plume rise, and (3) time-series meteorological and time-series plume-rise*  
18 *data are appropriate?*  
19

20 When the Tier 2 screening analysis indicates that further evaluation is warranted, the EPA  
21 applies the Tier 3 screening approach described in Section 3.3 of the Agency's draft RTR  
22 methods document. The method includes three individual refinements to the Tier 2  
23 methods that are conducted in a step-wise fashion. The refinements include: further  
24 analysis of the affected lakes identified in the Tier 2 screen; analysis of plume rise resulting  
25 in PB-HAPs lost to the upper atmosphere; and the use of time-series meteorology from  
26 meteorological data stations and modeled effective chemical release heights.  
27

##### 28 ***3.4.1. Lake data***

29  
30 The SAB supports the use of up-to-date land-use data to more accurately represent  
31 exposures that occur through lake media. EPA should consider relying less on analyses that  
32 are time-intensive and that depend on analysts' subjective judgments. Web or GIS  
33 searches, as described in the Agency's draft RTR methods document, may be useful to  
34 produce input data. A guiding principle should be "documented and reproducible" such that  
35 independent experts can understand the data and methods applied by EPA analysts and can  
36 reproduce the results.  
37

38 EPA should consider the use of data streams that can be automated so that ongoing land  
39 use changes can be incorporated. Widely available data sets include the National Land  
40 Cover Database (NLCD) and USGS Digital Elevation Model (DEM). The SAB cautions  
41 EPA against *a priori* exclusion of wetland influenced lakes, which may host fish.  
42

1 **3.4.2. Plume rise**

2  
3 EPA could consider the use of plume-rise models other than those described in the  
4 Agency's draft RTR methods document screening procedure. An example is Briggs (1984);  
5 documentation of AERMOD (Cimorelli *et al.* 2004) thoroughly discusses plume rise and  
6 contains other citations.

7  
8 For this and other dispersion and transport modeling, the SAB recommends that EPA  
9 consider the use of meteorological reanalysis data for both surface-air and upper-air wind  
10 speeds. These data can overcome some uncertainties when weather stations are far from the  
11 modeled site.

12  
13 **3.4.3. Time series meteorological and plume-rise data**

14  
15 The SAB believes that the hour-by-hour response treatment is not yet justified for the  
16 following two reasons.

17  
18 First, EPA should be cautious about undue oversimplification of complex atmospheric  
19 processes. Full or partial penetration of a plume through the top of the mixed layer depends  
20 on many complex factors including plume momentum, plume buoyancy, stack release  
21 height and exit conditions, depth of the mixed layer, inversion strength, and atmospheric  
22 stability. These processes may vary with time, as meteorological factors evolve over the  
23 course of a day, possibly causing plume re-entrainment or rapid fumigation. Atmospheric  
24 processes governing plume penetration are more complex than can be adequately  
25 represented by a simple comparison of inversion height with effective plume height (which  
26 includes plume rise).

27  
28 Second, the Agency's draft RTR methods document indicates that hour-by-hour data from  
29 the closest meteorological station should be used. These data may not reflect specific  
30 microclimatic conditions at the site, including topography, directional valley orientations,  
31 and specific inversion conditions that can differ from those at the station. For accurate  
32 screening, these local conditions should be considered.

33  
34 EPA could test and demonstrate the reliability of the proposed adjustment by comparing  
35 screening results as implemented using TRIM.FaTE to those calculated by a more  
36 physically realistic model, such as AERMOD. Indeed, the SAB suggests EPA evaluate the  
37 additional accuracy perceived to result from implementing hour-by-hour adjustments. The  
38 suggested procedure requires extensive data manipulation yet has not been validated,  
39 whereas with a moderate additional investment the screening could be done with a  
40 validated and accepted model such as AERMOD.

1 The SAB also has two overarching recommendations addressing issues which were not  
2 specifically called out in the charge questions.

- 3
- 4 • EPA should consider that the quantity of emissions in the National Emission  
5 Inventory (NEI) may differ from reality, either because of upset conditions, or  
6 because self-reporting does not always suffice. The location of emissions may also  
7 be different than reported. These inaccuracies may have important effects on  
8 predicted exposures.
- 9 • The SAB recommends that EPA consider sensitivity analysis to determine the  
10 parameters and assumptions that have the greatest effect on predicted exposures,  
11 especially at the higher tiers. Identification of factors that dominate risk and  
12 uncertainty could guide future screening analyses by providing justification to  
13 obtain detailed input data for those factors. Furthermore, probabilistic analysis  
14 would provide a framework to estimate confidence bounds.
- 15
- 16

### 17 **3.5. The gardener scenario**

18  
19 *Charge Question 5: Does the SAB find the assumptions and approaches laid out for*  
20 *application in the gardener scenario to be appropriate? Does the SAB find that*  
21 *adding the gardener scenario to Tier 3 would improve our ability to characterize*  
22 *ingestion risks for urban and rural environments?*  
23

24 The Agency's draft RTR methods document includes a new exposure pathway added to the  
25 EPA methods (Section 3.4) – a gardening exposure scenario added to the multipathway  
26 screen. This scenario is intended to better characterize multipathway risk and the EPA  
27 suggested it will significantly improve the screening for locations where the presence of a  
28 subsistence farm is either unlikely (in urban areas) or difficult to confirm based on the  
29 characterization of land use surrounding a facility.

30  
31 The gardener scenario is described on pages 59-62 of the Agency's draft RTR methods  
32 document. EPA is proposing to implement this scenario as part of Tiers 2 and 3 in locations  
33 where at least some individuals are likely to consume homegrown produce. The SAB was  
34 asked to comment on the assumptions used and whether the addition of the scenario would  
35 improve characterization of ingestion risk in both urban and rural environments. In general,  
36 the SAB finds that the gardener scenario is an appropriate addition to both Tier 2 and Tier 3  
37 evaluation thereby developing a more useful model system for screening.

38  
39 Regarding the first component of the charge question – the appropriateness of assumptions  
40 and approaches in the scenario – the SAB's response focuses on the media ingested by the  
41 gardener. EPA has selected ingestion routes like those experienced by subsistence farmers.  
42 These categories include direct ingestion of soil, ingestion of protected fruits and  
43 vegetables, ingestion of root vegetables, and ingestion of breastmilk (although intake rates

1 for the latter are not presented in Tables 3-18 and 3-19). These appear to be appropriate and  
2 sufficiently distinct to provide coverage of the appropriate sources of soil ingestion and  
3 contaminants contained in soil. EPA distinguishes intake of gardeners from farmers by  
4 noting that meat products and dairy products are not likely to be sources for the gardeners  
5 (Table 3-17).

6  
7 The SAB suggests including chicken eggs in the gardener scenario as many gardeners also  
8 keep egg-laying chickens. The SAB also notes that the gardening scenario appears to use  
9 many of the same assumptions about diet as the subsistence farmer, suggesting that the  
10 gardening scenario does not add much value to the tiered approach. The SAB therefore  
11 suggests that it is especially important to distinguish between the gardener and the  
12 subsistence farmer.

13  
14 EPA has separated gardeners into two categories – rural and urban. The approach seems  
15 reasonable, especially given differing intake rates for urban and rural gardeners. The  
16 assumptions that a rural gardener would have enough land to develop a subsistence, or  
17 near-subsistence, garden while the urban gardener would not seem, on face value, to be  
18 valid. Following this reasoning, EPA uses an upper (90<sup>th</sup>) percentile estimate for intake rate  
19 of home-grown vegetables for the rural gardener but a central tendency home-grown  
20 vegetables intake rate for urban gardeners (See Table 3-19 for the intake rates). Both intake  
21 rates are taken from the Exposure Factors Handbook and appear to be justified as EPA’s  
22 best assessment of such rates.

23  
24 Regarding soil intake rates, gardener soil intake rates were matched to those of farmers,  
25 consistent with the notion that gardens in both rural and urban settings must be tended,  
26 affording gardeners with intimate soil contact and thus intake. Further, in the rural setting,  
27 the farmer-specific rates for surface runoff-related contamination would be used while this  
28 term would not be used in urban settings. The farmer-specific rates are less health-  
29 protective in the sense that it focuses only on agricultural runoff. In urban settings, runoff  
30 may occur from other sources (e.g., industrial facilities and roadways) and might well be  
31 considered important. The SAB suggests that these additional urban sources be considered  
32 and matched with those of the rural settings.

33  
34 Except for the surface runoff component, the assumptions made above are health-protective  
35 but not unreasonably so even when compared to earlier assumptions (e.g., Charge Question  
36 3). The SAB notes that including the same assumptions for multiple tiers likely results in  
37 little effective screening. Further, the assumptions may offer too much health protection  
38 and thereby reduce the screening utility of the tool. In addition, the SAB suggests  
39 alternative- and higher- soil intake rates for the adult gardener.

40  
41 Regarding the second component of this charge question, inclusion of the gardener scenario  
42 improves the characterization of the risk in both rural and urban environments for those  
43 who take part in this activity.

1  
2  
3 **3.6. Environmental risk screening methodology**  
4

5 *Charge Question 6. Does the SAB find that the environmental risk screening*  
6 *approach is appropriate for identifying facilities whose PB-HAP emissions may have*  
7 *the potential to cause adverse environmental effects? Specifically, does the SAB find*  
8 *that the pollutants (Section 4.2.1), ecological assessment endpoints (Section 4.2.2),*  
9 *and benchmarks (Section 4.3) that are included in the environmental risk screen are*  
10 *appropriate? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement with regard to*  
11 *any aspect of this environmental risk screening methodology?*  
12  
13

14 Charge Question 6 addresses the information provided in Chapter 4 of the Agency’s draft  
15 RTR methods document (and supporting appendices) that describes the environmental risk  
16 screen that was developed to provide a systematic, scientifically defensible, and efficient  
17 approach that EPA can use to screen for potential adverse environmental effects associated  
18 with emissions of HAPs from facilities in RTR source categories. It is designed so that the  
19 screen can be run quickly and with minimal additional data gathering by drawing on  
20 existing data, models, and modeling results, including those developed for the human  
21 health multipathway risk screen. The overall methodology was reviewed by the SAB in  
22 2009. The material in Chapter 4 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document focused on  
23 those aspects that have been refined/revised since the last review. The revised aspects  
24 include:  
25

- 26 • Modeled environmental concentrations are compared to ecological benchmarks, not  
27 human health thresholds, for all pollutants included in the screen;
- 28 • An evaluation of HAPs for potential inclusion in the screen was conducted;
- 29 • The environmental risk screen was expanded to include the following additional  
30 environmental HAPs: cadmium, hydrogen fluoride, lead, arsenic, and additional  
31 POMs;
- 32 • The number of ecological endpoints and effect levels that are evaluated was  
33 expanded;
- 34 • A literature review was conducted to identify the most up-to-date ecological  
35 benchmarks; and
- 36 • Tiers were added to the environmental risk screen for PB-HAP that are parallel to  
37 the tiers in the multipathway human exposure screen.  
38

39 The SAB finds that the overall methodology and specifically the revisions since 2009 are  
40 reasonable and improve the ecological assessment capabilities. It represents a  
41 comprehensive approach that builds upon, and uses, the screening tools used in the health  
42 assessment/screening (i.e., TRIM.FaTE, AERMOD).  
43

1 The methodology for identifying the pollutants to be included in the screening activities are  
2 clearly stated and the criteria used to prioritize the chemicals are judged to be appropriate.  
3 The SAB is concerned that selenium is not included as a chemical to screen. Given its  
4 potentially important role in ecological impacts, the SAB recommends it be considered. In  
5 addition, it is not clear that BaP is the most appropriate POM chemical to use in the  
6 ecological analysis. There may be more important POM molecules (lower molecular  
7 weights) to use in this screening and further analysis is recommended. Furthermore, the  
8 emission rates presented in Table 4.1 are for base year 2005 and they need to be updated to  
9 reflect recent emissions data. Also, on page 67 line 21 there is reference to “99.9% of  
10 national emissions” but the basis is not clear (mass, toxicity or some other basis).

11  
12 The SAB finds the expansion of ecological assessment endpoints reasonable and that the  
13 benchmarks, and the use of a tier system, are justified. The Agency’s draft RTR methods  
14 document and appendices document the processes and assumptions used to identify the  
15 endpoints and benchmarks. Overall, the calculation of risks is robust and follows current  
16 scientific methodologies. As the amount and diversity of information analyzed in  
17 identifying the endpoints and benchmarks is vast, it would be helpful to clarify when most  
18 sensitive or most exposed species are used. In addition, the SAB notes that the overall  
19 approach would be strengthened by allowing site-specific variables to be added during the  
20 assessments, as some sites may have very specific sensitive species. Using a less sensitive  
21 receptor in a screening methodology runs the risk of underestimating the impact to the  
22 environment in those regions.

23  
24 Tables 4.2 (endpoints) and 4.3 (benchmarks) are critical to the screening process. Values in  
25 these tables are likely to change over time as new information becomes available so it is  
26 important that they be viewed as tables requiring continuous development and a process  
27 should be identified by the EPA to continuously review and update them. Furthermore,  
28 many of the studies listed are from the 1980s-1990s and are compilation reviews from  
29 earlier publications. Notations should be made in the table or the text as to why the  
30 benchmark value was chosen. Many of the benchmarks have multiple studies (chronic /  
31 acute) with varying methodologies and results. The SAB notes that studies can be graded  
32 based on Klimisch score, a method of assessing the reliability of toxicological studies,  
33 mainly for regulatory purposes.

34  
35 The SAB finds that the general methodology of the tiered approach and the use of  
36 TRIM.FaTE and AERMOD are appropriate. The SAB notes the simplicity of the air  
37 dispersion treatment in TRIM.FaTE and encourages the advancement of incorporating  
38 AERMOD analysis within the TRIM.FaTE framework. The use of reanalysis  
39 meteorological data is recommended to improve the meteorological fields used in the  
40 analysis. As stated elsewhere in this report, the analysis would also benefit from  
41 considering the implementation of a probabilistic approach.

42

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1 The SAB notes that analysis elements performed under the environmental risk screen may  
2 also be useful in the farmer screen (e.g., utilizing the deposition to soils).

3  
4 The following additional specific comments regarding endpoints and benchmarks are  
5 provided:

- 6  
7 • The SAB suggests EPA consider indirect HCl effects by evaluating the  
8 concentrations of chloride from a facility relative to background chloride  
9 concentrations contributing to loss of surface water acid neutralizing capacity or  
10 soil base saturation. Critical loads of acidity have been developed (NADP 2018) for  
11 the U.S. and the acidity associated with estimated chloride deposition could be  
12 compared to these critical load values.
- 13 • Mercury targets may need to be updated or expanded to protect communities of  
14 predator animals associated with bioaccumulation of methylmercury and to reflect  
15 broader wildlife impacts<sup>4</sup> (e.g., song birds.)
- 16 • The water quality and soil criteria (Table 4-1) for mercury are very high. This is  
17 particularly true for water where concentrations are typically on the order of  
18 nanograms per liter (ng/L). For example, the sediment clean-up values for  
19 Onondaga Lake, NY– a mercury contaminated site – are 2.2 µg/g for probable  
20 effective concentration based on macroinvertebrate toxicity testing and 0.8 µg/g for  
21 bioaccumulation-based sediment quality. The SAB suggests EPA consider criteria  
22 values for water and sediment/soil for contaminants that have been established for  
23 hazardous waste clean-up at sites around the U.S. for several contaminants.

### 24 25 26 **3.7. Inhalation risk assessment enhancements**

27  
28 *Charge Question 7: Does the SAB find that the Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection*  
29 *Enhancement Tool is an appropriate procedure for identifying facilities to be modeled*  
30 *using the urban option in AERMOD?*

31  
32 In previous chronic inhalation risk assessments, the EPA assumed the land surrounding  
33 each facility was rural. The 2009 SAB review (U.S. EPA SAB 2010) indicated additional  
34 development was appropriate. Chapter 5 of the Agency’s draft RTR methods document is  
35 an enhancement to the chronic inhalation risk assessment that the EPA contends accounts  
36 for the variation in urban to rural characteristics of the land surrounding each evaluated  
37 facility. The goal of the improvement is to better characterize pollutant dispersion near  
38 sources.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.briloon.org/uploads/Library/item/265/file/Hidden%20Risk.pdf>  
<https://www.crcpress.com/Environmental-Contaminants-in-Biota-Interpreting-Tissue-Concentrations/Beyer-Meador/p/book/9781420084054>[https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/assets/docs/a\\_c/bioscience\\_508.pdf](https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/assets/docs/a_c/bioscience_508.pdf)

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The urban/rural dispersion selection enhancement tool provides a way to specify atmospheric turbulence within a model domain to allow AERMOD to more accurately model pollution dispersion. The tool currently provides two options. The Agency’s draft RTR methods document evaluates the differences in model results using these two methods and proposes using the census (population density)-based designation of "urban" ("HEM default procedure ") as the preferred method.

The SAB agrees that incorporating the effects of turbulence as a model input is appropriate and of significant value because it avoids the overly conservative assumption of applying the “rural” assumption to all facilities. However, the SAB disagrees with the Agency’s draft RTR methods document on the procedure of choice. The land use procedure, which uses the National Land Cover Database (NLCD), directly measures the feature that controls turbulence, unlike the HEM default procedure which relies on a secondary effect – an aggregated population density metric – that may not correlate well in highly industrialized areas with dense concentrations of buildings, pavement and other structures yet little residential land. The land use procedure provides a more accurate assessment for the selection, and the Agency’s draft RTR methods document does not offer a compelling explanation of the benefits from using the HEM default procedure. The land use procedure also more directly aligns with EPA’s 2005 Guidelines on Air Quality Models as stated on page 121 (last paragraph) in the Agency’s draft RTR methods document; the guidelines list specific land use types to be considered, rather than population density.

Using the land use procedure is not significantly more difficult or time/resource intensive than the HEM default procedure, so any logistical advantage of the HEM default procedure is minimal. Analysis can be automated using ModelBuilder or Python scripting in ArcGIS. Problems described in the Agency’s draft RTR methods document associated with the land use procedure misclassifying facilities with significant coverage by water bodies inside the model domain can be addressed in the GIS procedures, and the SAB recommends that this be included in the procedure to avoid misclassifying heavily developed areas near large water bodies as “rural.”

Because the inhalation risk assessment is a location-based estimate using modeled ambient concentrations and is not population-weighted, the use of population density via the HEM default procedure is less appropriate than using land use. In addition, the land use procedure finds fewer urban areas than the HEM default procedure, indicating the latter misclassifies turbulence in some cases.

The SAB also notes that the quality of the NLCD data makes it possible to express the "urban nature" of the model domain as a continuous variable, rather than a binary "yes/no" value. Such a calculation adds little to the time and difficulty of the GIS procedures used to calculate the variable. It provides a measure of the intensity of "urban" character for each area considered and could also be used to characterize the geographic variation of

1 turbulence within a given model domain. There are different ways to use this type of metric  
2 in modeling; it is not certain whether EPA modeling tools can use that variation, but it  
3 might be useful in future versions of the modeling and represents a "best practices"  
4 approach for gathering input data, particularly if it is only a little more difficult or  
5 expensive to do so. Using this approach with successive versions of the NLCD, which is  
6 updated every four years, allows for tracking land cover change over time.

7  
8 If EPA adopts this more nuanced use of the NLCD, the SAB suggests the EPA consider  
9 including NLCD class 22 (low intensity developed) in identifying "urban" in this context.  
10 This class is defined as 20-44% impervious surfaces and it correlates very well with  
11 residential land use when compared to other high-resolution datasets. Class 22 is used in  
12 screening methods in California and has been shown to be of value in characterizing or  
13 measuring fine scale heterogeneity in other contexts (Chabaeva and Civco 2004; Smith et  
14 al. 2010).

15  
16 Another alternative is the use of a regular NLCD derivative product – the percent  
17 impervious surface data layer which is produced for each NLCD generation, as is a  
18 measure of the net change in imperviousness between NLCD generations. Use of these  
19 metrics are generally as cost effective as using population density and have the advantage  
20 of being updated more often than the census.

21  
22 Regardless of the urban/rural dispersion selection procedure that is used, the automatically-  
23 generated designation should be manually evaluated with the final choice of urban/rural  
24 dispersion a matter of professional judgment based on ‘facts on the ground.’ In cases where  
25 a material difference in estimated risk exists between urban and rural dispersion and  
26 professional judgement is used to overrule the selection tool’s designation, EPA should  
27 document and justify this decision.

### 28 29 30 **3.8. The census block receptor check tool**

31  
32 *Charge Question 8: Does the SAB find that the Census Block Receptor Check Tool*  
33 *and associated enhancements are an appropriate method for identifying and adjusting*  
34 *model receptors to ensure the receptors are representative of residential locations?*  
35

36 Section 5.2 of the Agency’s draft methods document describes an enhancement made to the  
37 chronic inhalation risk assessment – the addition of the Census Block Receptor Check  
38 Tool. The rationale for the new tool is that the block centroid does not always represent  
39 residential locations. The HEM-3 model calculates ambient air concentrations at census  
40 block centroid locations as surrogates for population exposure. If the centroid is located  
41 outside of the block polygon, then the U.S. Census Bureau provides the longitude and  
42 latitude of an internal point near the geometric centroid that falls inside the block polygon.  
43 The points are not weighted or reflective of the population distribution. Census blocks vary

1 in size depending on population density. In urban areas, a census block may be equivalent  
2 to a city block bounded on all sides by a street. In sparsely populated areas, a census block  
3 is often irregularly shaped with streams, property lines, and rural roads as boundaries. In  
4 the 2009 review conducted by the SAB (U.S. EPA SAB 2010) it was noted that census  
5 block centroids might not always be an appropriate surrogate for residential locations. The  
6 Census Block Receptor Check Tool was developed to address this concern. This new tool  
7 identifies two examples when internal centroid points may not be a good surrogate for  
8 where populations reside and provides options to address this.

9  
10 The first scenario is for block centroids located within 300 meters of emission points,  
11 which may be within the facility grounds and not where there are residents. The tool user  
12 would be able to view these receptors and delete them if they are on the facility property.  
13 The second scenario focuses on large and irregularly shaped census blocks, where the  
14 centroid may be farther away from population centers. If blocks with an area greater than  
15 2.6 km<sup>2</sup> are identified within 1 km of a facility, aerial images of the blocks can be examined  
16 using the tool to determine if the centroid receptor needs to be relocated and other receptors  
17 added to represent multiple residential locations.

18  
19 The SAB finds the EPA report does not provide enough information about the tool,  
20 especially regarding criteria that would be used to determine the number and placement of  
21 new receptors. For example, the statement “If residential locations cannot be represented  
22 by a single receptor (that is, the residences are spread over the block), additional receptors  
23 are added for residences nearer to the facility than the centroid” (page 140, lines 15-17) is  
24 vague and the method appears to be *ad hoc*. The SAB is concerned that the process would  
25 not be reproducible if another risk assessor were to subsequently model that facility. The  
26 choice of a 300-meter buffer from an emission source is also somewhat arbitrary.  
27 Furthermore, the impact of these changes is not obvious. The Agency’s draft RTR methods  
28 report should include more detailed examples of how risk estimates change based on these  
29 enhancements compared to the default block centroid method.

30  
31 Overall, the SAB believes that methods predominantly relying on census block centroid  
32 locations – including cases where the enhancement tool is applied – can in some cases be  
33 reliable, but additional effort is needed to verify that receptors are representative of  
34 residential areas near the facilities. One approach would be to review satellite imagery  
35 within 1 km of all facilities, not just those in identified large census blocks, and manually  
36 add receptors as needed to appropriately represent population centers. However, any  
37 manual placement would be subjective and likely not reproducible between risk assessors.  
38 An alternative approach could use the same 2011 National Land Cover data used for the  
39 Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection Enhancement tool to automate the process of identifying  
40 population centers. The NLCD data is available at a high spatial resolution (30 m) and  
41 receptors could be placed in areas of developed land use classes 22-24. Aerial photos (e.g.  
42 Google Earth™) can then be used to check that the land use-based placement of receptors  
43 is appropriate. If professional judgement is used to select the location then the RTR

1 screening analysis documentation should include sufficient information such that another  
2 expert could follow the reasoning and reproduce the selection.

3

4 If the EPA prefers to continue using census block centroids as nearby exposure receptors,  
5 then the SAB suggests additional enhancements to make the tool less *ad hoc*. For example,  
6 facilities are better represented as polygons than points. Satellite imagery can be used to  
7 estimate the facility boundary and then GIS procedures could be used to exclude centroids  
8 located within the boundary. In such cases, satellite imagery could then be used to add  
9 alternative receptors to replace the deleted centroid and ensure nearby residences are  
10 represented. It is noted that this procedure would not be needed if receptors were placed at  
11 actual population locations using land use data as recommended.

12

13

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## 5. APPENDIX A: CHARGE TO THE SAB

May 26, 2017

### **MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT:** Request for SAB Peer Review of the document: “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis”

**FROM:** Erika N. Sasser, Director /s/  
Health and Environmental Impacts Division  
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (C504-02)

**TO:** Christopher Zarba, Director  
EPA Science Advisory Board Staff Office (1400F)

EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards is requesting a peer review by the Science Advisory Board (SAB) on the document: “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis.” This report describes specific screening methodologies that have evolved since the SAB last reviewed the RTR risk assessment methods in 2009. The screening methodologies are used to quickly identify those facilities in particular RTR source categories that have little potential for human health multipathway or environmental risk, while also identifying those facilities where a refined multipathway or environmental risk assessment may be needed. This report also describes the potential addition of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables, as well as several improvements to EPA’s chronic inhalation risk assessment methodology. The application of the updated risk assessment screens and methodologies is highlighted in this report through the presentation of example facilities emitting hazardous air pollutants.

The case study analysis and accompanying documentation were prepared by staff in the EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. The document is being made publicly available on the Agency’s website at the following address:

<https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/risk/rtrpg.html>.

Attached is the charge to the Science Advisory Board. It includes background information on the screening methodologies and identifies the questions and issues we would like the Science Advisory Board to address in their peer review of the methods.

**Attachment:**  
Peer Review Charge

## **Attachment**

### ***Charge to the Science Advisory Board for their review of the “Screening Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis”***

#### **Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Office of Air and Radiation**

#### **Background:**

The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a two-stage regulatory process for addressing emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAP) from stationary sources. In the first stage, the CAA requires the EPA to develop technology-based standards for categories of industrial sources. We have largely completed the required Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards with about 112 MACT standards being issued to date for stationary major sources of HAP. In the second stage of the regulatory process, EPA must review each MACT standard at least every eight years and revise them as necessary, “taking into account developments in practices, processes and control technologies.” We call this requirement the “technology review.” EPA is also required to complete a one-time assessment of the human health and environmental risks that remain after sources come into compliance with MACT. If additional risk reductions are deemed necessary to protect public health with an ample margin of safety or to prevent adverse environmental effects that are judged to be “significant and widespread”, EPA must develop standards to address these remaining risks. For each source category for which EPA issued MACT standards, the residual risk stage must be completed within eight years of promulgation of the initial MACT standard. Since the initial technology review requirement coincides in deadline with the risk review requirement, EPA generally combines these two requirements into one rulemaking activity, calling this the “risk and technology review” process, or simply RTR. In this way, the results of the risk review can be potentially informative to the technology review process, and vice versa.

Because RTR assessments are used for regulatory purposes, and because components of our screening analyses have evolved over time, EPA periodically seeks the Science Advisory Board’s (SAB) review (see below). For the current review, we seek the SAB’s input on the specific enhancements made to our risk assessment methodologies, particularly with respect to multipathway and environmental screening methodologies, since the last SAB review was completed in 2009. Facilities that do not screen out may be the subject of refined multipathway risk assessments, which 1) are conducted for a single facility at a time; 2) are very costly; 3) and can take several months to complete. Thus, we consider these screens to be an important step in the RTR risk assessment process that helps the agency to maximize the use of its resources and, when appropriate, to facilitate its communication with stakeholders.

## Previous Relevant Peer Reviews

Previous peer reviews have covered various elements associated with the RTR process. A brief summary of each peer review is provided:

- 1) The *Residual Risk Report to Congress*, a document describing the Agency's overall analytical and policy approach to setting residual risk standards, was issued to Congress in 1999 following an SAB peer review. Many of the design features of the RTR assessment methodology were described in this report, although individual elements have been improved over time. The final SAB advisory is available at [http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/risk\\_rep.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/risk_rep.pdf).
- 2) A peer review of multipathway risk assessment methodologies for RTR was conducted by the EPA's SAB in 2000. The final SAB advisory is available at [http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/1F1893E27059DB55852571B9004730F7/\\$File/ecadv05.pdf](http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/1F1893E27059DB55852571B9004730F7/$File/ecadv05.pdf).
- 3) A consultation on EPA's updated methods for developing emissions inventories and characterizing human exposure was conducted by SAB in 2006. The final SAB advisory is available at [https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5Csabproduct.nsf/33152C83D29530F08525730D006C3A\\_BF/\\$File/sab-07-009.pdf](https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5Csabproduct.nsf/33152C83D29530F08525730D006C3A_BF/$File/sab-07-009.pdf).
- 4) A review of the updated and expanded risk assessment approaches and methods used in the RTR program was completed in 2009. This methodology was highlighted to the SAB utilizing two RTR source categories: Petroleum Refining Sources MACT I and Portland Cement Manufacturing. The final SAB advisory is available at <https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/b031ddf79cffded38525734f00649caf!OpenDocument&TableRow=2.3#2>.
- 5) The individual dose-response assessment values used in the RTR assessment have themselves been the subject of peer reviews through the agencies that developed them (including EPA, through its Integrated Risk Information System, or IRIS; the California Environmental Protection Agency, or CalEPA; and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, or ATSDR).

We are not asking the SAB panel to duplicate or comment on previously reviewed methodologies, but rather to evaluate whether the specific enhancements to previously reviewed methodologies as described below are appropriate and scientifically credible.

## Goals of This Review

We are seeking a scientific peer review of the updated screening methodologies. We are also seeking a scientific peer review of several specific enhancements to our chronic inhalation risk assessment that serve to reduce some of the uncertainties identified by EPA in the last SAB review. These updates and enhancements are outlined in the report: "Screening

Methodologies to Support Risk and Technology Reviews (RTR): A Case Study Analysis” (the report).

The most important revisions and enhancements to our methodologies since the last SAB review include the following:

- 1) A tiered multipathway screening methodology that determines whether the potential for multipathway risk from persistent and bioaccumulative HAP (PB-HAP)<sup>5</sup>1 emitted from RTR source categories is low or whether more analysis is needed.
- 2) A tiered environmental screening methodology that determines whether the potential exists for adverse environmental effects from PB-HAP and the acid gases hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) emitted from RTR source categories.
- 3) The potential use of a new multipathway exposure scenario that can be used to estimate ingestion risk for members of urban or rural households who consume contaminated homegrown fruits and vegetables.
- 4) Enhancements to our previously reviewed inhalation risk assessment that allow us to more accurately model air concentrations where populations actually reside and to better characterize the dispersion of the air in the vicinity of sources.

**Charge questions for the Panel’s consideration:**

There are eight charge questions for this peer review, each of which has been placed in a box below. These eight questions concern three topic areas that cover the most important revisions and enhancements to our methodology since the last SAB review.

***Multipathway Human Health Risk Screening Methodology (Chapters 2 and 3):***

In RTR assessments, EPA considers ingestion risks using a multipathway approach, in which we model the dispersion, transport, and fate of HAPs emitted from facilities in specific source categories in the environment and estimate human health risks resulting from the ingestion of HAPs from food products, such as vegetables, fruit, meat, and fish.

Since the 2009 SAB review of RTR methods, we refined our original one-tier multipathway screen to include a three-tiered multipathway screening approach that progressively replaces health-protective default assumptions with location-specific data. Since full-scale facility-specific multipathway assessments are time consuming and expensive, the tiered screening approach “screens out” low-risk facilities for which no additional analysis is needed, so that only facilities with potentially higher risk remain in the pool for further analysis.

Chapter 2 of the report provides an overview of the tiered multipathway screening methodology, including a brief description of each multipathway screening tier. The technical detail on each tier of the multipathway screen is laid out in Chapter 3 of the report.

Charge Question 1: Does the SAB find that the three-tiered multipathway risk screening approach appropriately eliminates from further consideration those facilities unlikely to emit PB-HAP in concentrations resulting in appreciable multipathway risk and identifies those facilities where additional multipathway analysis may be warranted? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement of the risk screening methodology?

***Tier 1***

The multipathway screen previously reviewed by SAB did not account for differences in environmental fate and transport among POM or dioxin congeners (i.e., all POM congeners were assumed to move, partition, and degrade in the environment as BaP does, and all dioxins were assumed to exhibit the same fate and transport as 2,3,7,8-TCDD). Section 3.1.2 of the Report describes the new risk equivalency factor (REF) approach that includes an exposure-equivalency factor (EEF) that reflects an individual chemical’s fate and transport relative to the index chemical for each group (BaP for POM and 2,3,7,8-TCDD for dioxin).

Charge Question 2: Does the SAB find that the risk equivalency factor methodology appropriately accounts for differences in the environmental fate and transport among polycyclic organic matter (POM) and dioxin congeners?

### Tier 2

Section 3.2 of the report describes the Tier 2 multipathway screening scenario, in which some of the health-protective assumptions in the Tier 1 screen are replaced with more site-specific information. Specifically, in the Tier 2 assessment, site-specific information is used for the locations of potentially fishable lakes and meteorology. In addition, the Tier 2 assessment includes:

- A screening configuration that assesses the fisher and farmer exposure scenarios separately (see Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3).
- An estimation of lake productivity (see Section 3.2.2.2).
- The consideration that a fisher might catch and consume fish from more than one nearby contaminated lake, because more than one lake might be needed to catch enough fish for subsistence living (see Section 3.2.2.3).
- An approach that accounts for PB-HAP deposition into a lake from multiple facilities in the same RTR source category (see Section 3.2.2.3).

Charge Question 3: Does the SAB find that the assumptions for human fishing behavior used in the refined fisher scenario, the assumptions about PB-HAP deposition to lakes, and the assumptions on the ability of ponds and lakes to sustain populations of fish are appropriate?

### Tier 3

The Tier 3 screening approach described in Section 3.3 of the report consists of three individual refinements to Tier 2 that are conducted in a step-wise fashion. These refinements include:

- Further analysis of the affected lakes identified in the Tier 2 screen (Section 3.3.1).
- Analysis of plume rise resulting in PB-HAPs lost to the upper atmosphere (Section 3.3.2).
- The use of time-series meteorology and effective release heights (Section 3.3.3).

Section 3.4 of the report describes a gardening exposure scenario we are considering adding to the Tier 3 multipathway screen. The gardening exposure scenario could help us to better characterize multipathway risk in some instances, especially in locations where the presence of a subsistence farm is either unlikely (e.g., in urban areas) or difficult to confirm based on the characterization of land use surrounding a facility.

Charge Question 4: Does the SAB find the methods used for evaluations of (1) lake data, (2) plume rise, and (3) time-series meteorological and time-series plume-rise data are appropriate?

Charge Question 5: Does the SAB find the assumptions and approaches laid out for application in the gardener scenario to be appropriate? Does the SAB find that adding the gardener scenario to Tier 3 would improve our ability to characterize ingestion risks for urban and rural environments?

***Environmental Risk Screening Methodology (Chapter 4):***

Chapter 4 of the report describes the environmental risk screen that was developed to provide a systematic, scientifically defensible, and efficient approach that EPA can use to screen for potential adverse environmental effects associated with emissions of HAPs from facilities in RTR source categories. The screen can be run quickly and with minimal additional data gathering by drawing on existing data, models, and modeling results, including those developed for the human health multipathway risk screen.

The revised environmental risk screen presented in the report builds on and enhances the methods the SAB reviewed in 2009 as follows:

- Modeled environmental concentrations are compared to ecological benchmarks, not human health thresholds, for all pollutants included in the screen.
- A systematic evaluation of HAPs for potential inclusion in the screen was conducted.
- The environmental risk screen was expanded to include the following additional environmental HAPs: cadmium, hydrogen fluoride, lead, arsenic, and additional POMs.
- The number of ecological endpoints and effect levels that we evaluate was expanded.
- A comprehensive literature review was conducted to identify the most up-to-date ecological benchmarks.
- Tiers were added to the environmental risk screen for PB-HAP that are parallel to the tiers in the multipathway screen.

Charge Question 6: Does the SAB find that the environmental risk screening approach is appropriate for identifying facilities whose PB-HAP emissions may have the potential to cause adverse environmental effects? Specifically, does the SAB find that the pollutants (Section 4.2.1), ecological assessment endpoints (Section 4.2.2), and benchmarks (Section 4.3) that are included in the environmental risk screen are appropriate? Does the SAB have specific suggestions for improvement with regard to any aspect of this environmental risk screening methodology?

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***Inhalation Risk Assessment Enhancements (Chapter 5):***

*Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection Tool*

In previous chronic inhalation risk assessments, we assumed the land surrounding each facility was rural. Since the most recent SAB review in 2009, we developed an urban/rural enhancement to the chronic inhalation risk assessment that allows us to account for the urban/rural characteristics of the land surrounding each evaluated facility, and therefore, to better characterize the dispersion of pollutants near sources (Section 5.1).

Charge Question 7: Does the SAB find that the Urban/Rural Dispersion Selection Enhancement Tool is an appropriate procedure for identifying facilities to be modeled using the urban option in AERMOD?

*Census Block Receptor Check Tool*

In its 2009 review, the SAB noted that census block centroids might not always be an appropriate surrogate for residential locations. For example, when the census block centroid is located on industrial property (“on-site”), or when a census block is large and the centroid is far from where populations actually reside, using the centroid may not be appropriate.

Since 2009, we developed the census block receptor enhancement (Section 5.2) that allows us to model air concentrations more accurately where populations actually reside.

Specifically, the new enhancement automatically identifies census block centroids that might be located on facility, and census blocks that are very large. When onsite or large blocks are identified, we add new receptors, delete census block centroids, or move census block centroids to represent residential locations more accurately.

Charge Question 8: Does the SAB find that the Census Block Receptor Check Tool and associated enhancements are an appropriate method for identifying and adjusting model receptors to ensure the receptors are representative of residential locations?