UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON D.C. 20460

November 3, 2003

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Note to the Reader:

The attached draft report of the Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis Special Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis (COUNCIL) is still undergoing discussion and review. Once discussed by the COUNCIL at a public session, and after approval, it will be transmitted to the EPA Administrator and become available to the interested public as a final report.

This draft has been released for general information to members of the interested public and to EPA staff. The reader should remember that this is an unapproved working draft and that the document should not be used to represent official EPA or Council views or advice. Draft documents at this stage of the process often undergo significant revisions before the final version is approved and published.

The SAB is not soliciting comments on the advice contained herein. However, as a courtesy to the EPA Program Office that is the subject of the review, we have asked the Program Office to respond to the issues listed below. Consistent with SAB policy on this matter, the Council is not obligated to address any responses it receives.

1. Has the Committee adequately responded to the questions posed in the Charge?
2. Are any statements or responses made in the draft unclear?
3. Are there any technical errors?

For further information or to respond to the questions above, please contact:

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United States Environmental Protection Agency	EPA Science Advisory Board (1400A) Washington DC	EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-XXX-XX [date] *www.epa.gov/sab*

Interim Installment: REVIEW OF THE REVISED ANALYTICAL PLAN FOR EPA'S SECOND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS - BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990-2020

An Advisory by a Special Panel of the Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis

[Date]

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-01-004

Marianne Horinko
Acting Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460

Subject: Review of the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis - Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020: An Advisory by the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance Analysis

Dear Adminstrator Horinko:

The US EPA Science Advisory Board's Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance Analysis Special Panel (the Council) presents in this document a first installment on its review of the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis - Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020. While this review would ordinarily have been complete in a single document, we have elected to provide a phased review because portions of the Draft Analytical Plan were recalled by the Agency for revision after our review process had begun in May of 2003. In order to provide what advice we could on the unaffected portions of the Analytical Plan, the Council elected to move forward with the review process for some of the Charge Questions.

The Council's completed deliberations to date focus on portions of Charge Question 1 (CQ 1) concerning Project Goals and Analytical Sequence, as well as Charge Questions concerning Scenario Development (CQ 2), Cost Estimates (CQ 7), Computable General Equilibrium Modeling (CQ 8), Data Quality and Intermediate Data (CQ 32), and Results Aggregation and Reporting (CQ 33). Advice on these topics was either of relatively greater urgency for the Agency, or relatively unaffected by the partial recall. Similarly, the Council has discussed the report of its Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee on emissions and the Health Effects Subcommittee on the Agency's proposed approach to analyzing health effect impacts of implementing the CAA.

The Executive Summary of this Interim Installment itemizes in point form the main issues of concern to the Council. In this cover letter, we elect to emphasize just three key points:

(a.) The Council endorses enthusiastically the Agency's new strategy of seeking advice during the planning stages of an exercise as complex and comprehensive as the Second Prospective Analysis. Early intervention, and therefore the opportunity to influence the Agency's approach to this important project, is far more valuable than merely an ex post opportunity to criticize what was done.

(b.) The Agency's analysis is a massive undertaking, and even the 450 page Draft Analytical Plan is insufficient, in many cases, to reveal the exact methods that the Agency proposes to use. Official feedback from the Agency on initial drafts of our advice has been very helpful. However, the Council's advice could be better, and more timely, if more detail could be provided about many aspects of the planned analysis.

(c.) It is essential for the Agency to understand the "general equilibrium" consequences of CAAA regulations. Controls placed on one sector can spill over into other sectors and other regions through their effects on prices in markets for goods, labor, and capital. The Council stresses the importance of high-quality Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models in the Agency's toolkit for the Second Prospective Analysis.

We appreciate the opportunity to review the Analytical Plan and to provide you with advice on the design of the Agency's approach so that the resulting study would have the most validity and utility for the Agency and Congress. The Council would be pleased to expand on any of the findings described in this report and we look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Dr. Trudy Ann Cameron, Chair
Advisory Council on
Clean Air Compliance Analysis

NOTICE

This report has been written as part of the activities of the EPA Science Advisory Board, a public advisory group providing extramural scientific information and advice to the Administrator and other officials of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Board is structured to provide balanced, expert assessment of scientific matters related to problems facing the Agency. This report has not been reviewed for approval by the Agency and, hence, the contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor of other agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal government, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute a recommendation for use.

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Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis
Special Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis*

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout this first installment of the Council Special Panel's review, key points are summarized in bullet form at the end of each discussion. These key points are collected here, organized by each main topic. The Agency should be aware that these points do not necessarily constitute the Panel's last word, since we may revisit some of this material in our face-to-face meeting scheduled for November 5-6, 2003. These interim comments are offered in the interest of making timely advice available to the Agency.

Project Goals and Analytical Sequence

- Disaggregation is a very desirable strategy which should be pursued to the extent that analytical resources permit, subject to the constraints imposed by nonlinearities and general equilibrium effects. The Council supports EPA's plans to report costs and benefits disaggregated by major economic sectors as an important addition for the Second Prospective study.
- Chapter 1 of the 812 study should address the pervasiveness of uncertainty in cost and benefit estimates, but then identify the methods EPA will use to identify the most important areas of uncertainty. Those elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results should be the focus of sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis needs to be an iterative process to identify and assess the significance of key uncertainties in each step of the assessment. Only a selected set of the most influential uncertainties should be quantitatively followed all the way through to the final results.

Scenario Development

- The evolving baseline assumptions for the 812 Analysis need to be carefully benchmarked against realized values of key forecasts from previous editions of the analysis, and sensitivity analysis with respect to key assumptions will be important.
- Care must be taken to ensure that key assumptions affecting different components of the overall 812 Analysis (discount rates, income growth projections, substitutability) are consistent across all the models used in the analysis.
- The "with CAAA" and "without CAAA" scenarios are neither observable nor likely to materialize exactly as described. They are artificial constructs. However, they should at least be internally consistent.
- The agency should make it very clear to the audience for the 812 analysis to what extent the post-2000 benefits of the CAAA are expected to stem from the prevention of deterioration in air quality versus absolute improvements from 1990 conditions.
- The evolutionary nature of regulations pursuant to the CAAA means that is difficult to forecast future benefits and costs based solely on knowledge of the

shape of current regulations. EPA needs to be clearer about how feedback and regulatory evolution will be modeled.

Cost Estimates

- Econometric models for abatement costs are limited by their incomplete coverage but they can sometimes offer insights not available from engineering estimates of compliance costs, in particular, with respect to the impacts of abatement activity on total factor productivity. Econometric models are one important source of the stylized facts about economic relationships that are used to calibrate CGE models.
- Indirect costs should be defined and itemized more clearly in the Analytical Plan.
- Comparison of the predicted and actual costs of air quality regulations will be important to the evolution of the ongoing Section 812 Analyses.
- Assumptions about the effect of learning on abatement costs need to be carefully thought-out and supported by the literature in this area. It is not clear that the "80% rule" is valid or even that it is an appropriate place-holder in the analysis. Learning effects are likely to be heterogeneous across sectors and processes and no consensus on their magnitude has yet emerged.
- The IPM exhibits a number of limitations for cost modeling (its lack of coverage, lack of regionality, assumptions of efficient pricing and possibly its assumptions about the initial allocation of emission allowances). All of these problems will need to be addressed carefully.
- Future conditions in energy markets may have strong implications for realized abatement costs. Sensitivity of the benefit-cost results to alternative assumptions about energy markets may be an important dimension of the 812 Analysis. Other concerns with respect to abatement costs include some caveats about comparisons with the Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) Survey data, the need for consistency in discounting assumptions, some questions about the use of ControlNet, the NAAQS and PACE data, and the relative cost of abatement via market-based instruments versus command and control.

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Computable General Equilibrium Modeling

- Incorporation of spillover costs of air quality regulations is important and these costs should continue to receive close attention.
- CGE models have the capability to reveal spillovers of air quality regulations into unregulated sectors, not just to better estimate the direct costs of regulation on regulated sectors. The current Analytical Plan describes CGE methods only for "post-processing" and relegates them to secondary status. General equilibrium modeling should enjoy similar status to direct cost calculations.
- Each of the main CGE models which are proposed for use in the 812 Analysis has some limitations. The JHW model has a longer track record and has been more extensively reviewed. The extent of substitutability in the AMIGA model

represents a cause for concern to the Council. The topic of the AMIGA model may be revisited by the Council after further discussion.

- The Council advocates a serious effort to accommodate the consequences of possible tax interactions in the 812 Analysis. Considerable sensitivity analysis is indicated, however, since simple formulas for the magnitudes of tax interactions for regulations imposed on particular sectors have not yet been identified.
- CGE models and econometric models for costs are not competing methods, but complementary methods. Econometric results, where available and appropriate, are generally more desirable than expert judgment for calibrating the parameters of CGE models. However, where no econometric estimates exist for key parameters, expert judgment is essential.

Data Quality and Intermediate Data Products

- The validation exercises described in Chapter 10 of the Draft Plan are necessary and appropriate, but a number of pitfalls, limitations and qualifications are noted.
- The revised Analytical Plan, by itself, is insufficiently clear about what it envisions as "meta-data" for public dissemination. It is not necessarily raw data, but pre-processed data that can be used to replicate intermediate results. The Agency needs clearer guidelines concerning the type and scope of information that will be made public during the course of the analysis and what will be provided only when the analysis is complete.
- Preliminary release of raw data, intermediate data, intermediate models, and other analytical components will certainly improve the transparency of the benefit-cost exercise, but may result in substantial costs to the Agency. The Council supports contemporaneous release along with the final Analysis (or even ex post release of intermediate data and models) as a tool to inform future Prospective Analyses, but not necessarily the current analysis.
- In considering the future of the Section 812 analytical process and the sharing of intermediate data and models with outside researchers, the Agency may wish to consider more fully some alternative mechanisms for engaging third-party researchers in validation exercises. Peer review of requests for data or models, focused calls for external activity, and collaboration or other formalized interactions with external researchers might be considered.
- The outlined activities in the Intermediate Data Products section are, in many cases, simply too terse to permit thorough evaluation by the Council. More examples of useful intermediate and related data might have been suggested, such as the Adventist Health Study and the Dublin coal ban study.
- The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum offers a potential useful approach for evaluating analytical strategies that could be adapted to the needs of the Agency in future Prospective Analyses.
- It is difficult to evaluate the Agency's plans for Intermediate Data Products with respect to Scenario Development because the range of proposed scenarios seems still to be evolving.
- Obviously, consistency checking is important throughout the Analysis, not just ex post. It is also important for the Analytical Plan to be clearer about what is to be

compared in consistency checks and how big a difference would be enough to worry about.

- Before comparing the intermediate results of the Second Prospective Analysis with other sources of similar information, it will be important that there be some theoretical basis for expecting similarities. Comparisons based on the out-of-sample extensions of models estimated in very different contexts should be subjected to particular scrutiny.
- Along with a careful accounting of differences between the Second Prospective Analysis and other analyses, there must be an effort to understand the most likely sources of any differences.
- The Agency may have the resources or the authority to assemble intermediate data that would also be valuable to other researchers but is not presently generally available. In the process of encouraging external consistency checking, the Agency could create public goods of great value to the external research community.
- In future Prospective Analyses, consistency checks might be expanded to include assessments of the degree of correspondence between model predictions and other major sources of data about economic activity, emissions profiles, predicted trends in morbidity and mortality, and other estimates of health and ecosystem benefits.

Results Aggregation and Reporting

- Reporting of central and alternative cases should be associated with likelihoods of these cases, and any provision of a "low" alternative estimate should be balanced by a corresponding "high" alternative estimate. Pivotal assumptions should be clearly identified and the need for additional research on these issues should be emphasized.
- The Council urges the Agency to dispense with benefit-cost ratios and focus attention on net benefits estimates as the appropriate summary measure in Benefit-Cost analysis.
- The Council understands the Agency's current reluctance to take the somewhat heroic steps necessary to process the time profiles of benefits and costs into net present value (NPV) estimates. However, the Council urges to Agency to persist in its efforts toward this important goal. In the meantime, the Agency must more clearly explain its rationale for annualizing costs but not calculating present discounted values of net benefits.
- As problematic as disaggregation may be, the Agency should anticipate strong demand for this type of information by policy-makers and stakeholders.
- There is insufficient information in Chapter 11 to permit a thorough review of the Agency's plans to disaggregate net benefits by sector.
- Spatial disaggregation is problematic, in general, because of all the connections among markets that give rise to general equilibrium consequences from the regulation of any one plant or industry. The Agency is advised to proceed very cautiously in terms of spatial disaggregation, and only in special cases.

- A more through explanation of the inadvisability of further disaggregation by title of the CAAA would help readers understand why no such further disaggregation is planned.
- Comprehensive discussion of Uncertainty (the contents of Chapter 9) has yet to be undertaken. The Council's general sympathy for a move toward formal probability analysis is tempered by the realization that the strategies of the First Prospective Analysis will continue to be useful in the Second Prospective Analysis.

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background

The purpose of this Advisory is to continue the Council's advice to the Agency in developing the third in a series of statutorily mandated comprehensive analyses of the total costs and total benefits of programs implemented pursuant to the CAA. Section 812 of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1990 requires the EPA periodically to assess the effects of the 1990 CAA on the "public health, economy and the environment of the United States" and to report the findings and results of the assessments to Congress. Section 812 also established the Council and gave it the following mission: "to review the data and methodology used to develop the 812 Study and to advise the EPA Administrator concerning the utility and relevance of the Study." EPA has, to date, completed two assessments and received the advice of the Council on them: *The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1970 to 1990* (published 1997) and *The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990 to 2010* (published 1999).

In this document, a special panel of the Council provides an initial installment of its review or the May 12, 2003 *Analytical Plan* for the study, and revisions to that plan dated July 8, 2003. The *Analytical Plan* is more formally titled *Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990-2020: Revised Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis*. It reflects earlier advice that the Council provided in September 2001 in its earlier Advisory concerning a draft version of the *Analytical Plan* (EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-01-004).

In the course of the review of this revised document, the Council will review the Agency's major goals, objectives, methodologies, and analytical choices for the Section 812 Study before it is implemented. In its review of the analytical plan, the Council and its panel and subcommittees are guided by the charge questions as identified in the CAA of 1990,[1]

a) Are the input data used for each component of the analysis sufficiently valid and reliable for the intended analytical purpose?
b) Are the models, and the methodologies they employ, used for each component of the analysis sufficiently valid and reliable for the intended analytical purpose?
c) If the answer to either of the two questions above is negative, what specific alternative assumptions, data or methodologies does the Council recommend the Agency consider using for the second prospective analysis?

[1] Specifically, subsection (g) of CAA §312 (as amended by §812 of the amendments) states: "*(g) The Council shall -- (1) review the data to be used for any analysis required under this section and make recommendations to the Administrator on the use of such data, (2) review the methodology used to analyze such data and make recommendations to the Administrator on the use of such methodology; and (3) prior to issuance of a report required under subsection (d) or (e), review the findings of such report, and make recommendations to the Administrator concerning the validity and utility of such findings.*"

The Agency provided the Council with additional detailed charge questions for its consideration. These detailed charge questions were initially provided to the Council in May 2003 and then revised and resubmitted in July. The final set of 37 charge questions is included in Appendix A.

2.2 Process for Developing this Advisory

To address the charge questions identified by the Agency regarding the Analytical Plan, the SAB Staff Office, with the advice of the Council Chair, formed a Special Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis to provide the Council with additional expertise in the areas of expert elicitation, uncertainty analysis and statistical and subjective probability. The Staff Office also issued a call for new membership on the Council's Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee (AQMS) and its Health Effects Subcommittee (HES).

The Council Special Panel held a public teleconference on May 28, 2003 to plan its approach for providing advice. Those members participating in the teleconference voted to cancel a planned face-to-face meeting during June 11-13, 2003, pending more information about those portions of the Analytical Plan that were to be revised. The majority of these revisions were completed and submitted to the council on July 8. The Council held one teleconference on July 11 and another on July 15, where a subset of the charge questions considered most urgent by the Agency were addressed. Those charge questions were 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Teleconferences on September 23 and September 24 continued this discussion and also addressed charge questions 32 and 33. A teleconference on October 23 reviewed the draft report on discussion to that point. Discussion of question 1 (Project Goals and Analytical Sequence), question 3 (Alternative Pathways) and question 9 (Discounting) raised the need for additional information from the Agency, so this Advisory does not include the Council's last word on these topics. The remaining questions of the initial eight are addressed in this Interim Installment of the Council's Advisory.

In addition to the advice provided in this document, the Council's AQMS has met to address issues concerning the Agency's plans for estimating emissions and the HES has met to address the Agency's plan to assess health effects. The advice developed by these Council Subcommittees will be provided in separate reports.

3 PROJECT GOALS AND ANALYTICAL SEQUENCE

In its first two substantive teleconferences, the Council did not discuss the Analytical Plan in its entirety. The Council's initial discussion of a number of points will be summarized in this document, so that this advice can be provided in a timely fashion. The Council does not anticipate any changes to the specific points made here, but additional points may emerge as the remainder of the Analytical Plan is discussed in detail.

3.1 Charge Question 1

Does the Council support the study goals, general analytical framework, disaggregation plan, analytical sequence, and general analytical refinements defined in chapter 1? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternatives the Council recommends?

3.2 Disaggregation

The Council applauds the Agency's willingness to disaggregate, something that the Council has recommended for some time. In an ideal world, the disaggregation would be at the level of individual regulatory decisions so that the Agency, Congress, and society would know whether each regulation should be tightened or loosened. Effort toward disaggregation to the level of individual sectors is an important step.The next steps beyond sectoral disaggregation might be limited regulation-by-regulation disaggregation and/or some cautious region-by-region disaggregation (although this is likely to be more feasible for selected benefits than for costs)

There remain some important constraints on the task of disaggregation. The Council understands that it is often impossible to separate the benefits or costs of abating one pollutant versus another. Analytical resource constraints must also be accommodated. The Council also warns that the benefits and/or the costs associated with different sectors, regulations, or regions may not be additively separable because of nonlinearity or interaction effects among the disaggregated entities. In addition, general-equilibrium adjustments may shift incidence among sectors and regions. These complications make the process of disaggregating benefits and costs more difficult. However, decision makers often are interested in sectoral and regional effects. Providing disaggregated estimates wherever possible will increase the usefulness of the analysis in policy making.

- **Disaggregation is a very desirable strategy which should be pursued to the extent that analytical resources permit, subject to the constraints imposed by**

nonlinearities and general equilibrium effects. The Council supports EPA's plans to report costs and benefits disaggregated by major economic sectors as an important addition for the Second Prospective study.

3.3 Air Toxics

The Council Special Panel elected to postpone finalizing their advice on Air Toxics until after its first face-to-face meeting on November 5-6, 2003.

3.4 Non-health benefits

The Council Special Panel also elected to postpone finalizing their advice on Non-health Benefits, including visibility and morbidity, until after its first face-to-face meeting on November 5-6, 2003.

3.5 Uncertainty

Uncertainty will be addressed much more comprehensively in the Council's discussion of Chapter 9 of the Analytical Plan. However, with respect to the overview of the Agency's goals in Chapter 1, it would be helpful to see more attention to the pervasiveness of the problem of uncertainty, especially where linearity assumptions are crucial and tenuous. Uncertainty analysis is something that needs to be ongoing throughout the assessment process. Informed judgments need to be made about what might be the key sources of uncertainty, and the potential consequences of this uncertainty, in each step of the assessment.

However, this does not mean that every alternative model and alternative assumption needs to be tracked all the way through the assessment to the bottom line. The Council does not wish to lead the Agency down an intractable path of including so many alternative models and alternative assumptions that the assessment loses its focus and coherence. For example, it is vitally important that the electric utility cost analysts do some assessment of how sensitive the cost results are to different assumptions about the future price of natural gas on general economic growth, and some discussion of this exploration should be reported in the Second Prospective Analysis. However, only those elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results need to remain at center stage throughout the formal uncertainty analysis.

- **Chapter 1 of the 812 study should address the pervasiveness of uncertainty in cost and benefit estimates, but then identify the methods EPA will use to identify the most important areas of uncertainty. Those elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results should be the focus of sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis needs to be an iterative process to identify and assess the significance of key uncertainties in each step of the assessment. Only a selected set of the most influential**

uncertainties should be quantitatively followed all the way through to the final results.

4 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Charge Question 2

Does the Council support the choices for analytical scenarios defined in Chapter 2? Are there alternative or additional scenarios the Council recommends EPA consider for inclusion in the analysis?

4.2 Benchmarking and sensitivity analysis

First, the Council recommends changing the description of the different scenarios from "pre-CAAA and post-CAAA" to "with CAAA and without CAAA." This simple change will eliminate confusion between differences over time and counterfactual differences over alternative scenarios, which is the intended distinction.

To evaluate the implications of the proposed update of the 1990 Baseline Emissions assumptions, it would be helpful to have an explicit comparison of how the proposed update to the 1990 baseline differs from the earlier 1990 baseline. The Second Prospective Report should compare the ambient pollution concentrations implied by the 1990 baseline used in the First Prospective Report versus the new baseline, and each ambient concentration should be compared with the 1990 actual monitored values for each pollutant. This could be done for targeted metropolitan areas (e.g., the Los Angeles air basin).

The description in the First Prospective Report suggests that a scaling factor was used to adjust the projected ambient quality in 2000, and 2010. This scaling factor was apparently derived by taking the ratio of modeled target year to modeled base year, and applying this ratio to scale base year concentrations (whether monitored directly or estimated using e-VNA) to get the projected target year concentration. This type of benchmarking, of backcasted simulations to actual observed outcomes in 1990 and 2000, should be possible in the Second Prospective Analysis. It would help policy-makers understand the sensitivity of the results from air quality models to changes in the emissions profiles used in the analysis.

- **The evolving baseline assumptions for the 812 Analysis need to be carefully benchmarked against realized values of key forecasts from previous editions of the analysis, and sensitivity analysis with respect to key assumptions will be important.**

4.3 Consistency: economic activity and incomes

At the time the analysis was done for the First Prospective Report, our expectations for economic activity were completely different than the realities experienced between 1999 and 2003. There is no discussion of how the recent slowdown in economic activity is being incorporated into the projections for 2000, 2010, and 2020. *There must be some discussion of this linkage*. A component of the uncertainty analysis will have to consider the status of the aggregate economy, including any assumptions about when there may be a return to a more robust growth pattern. Otherwise, the exercise might seem foolish.

There should be some explicit discussion of the connections between assumptions about economic activity at aggregate level and the corresponding assumptions about household income growth that underlie the benefit measures. These assumptions should be consistent throughout the analysis. The Agency needs to make its "central case" economic assumptions perfectly clear, although the Council notes that there will continue to be considerable uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between economic activity and emission rates. Even a well-defined central case assumption about future levels of economic activity will not lead to an unambiguous forecast about pollutant emissions.

There is a need for sensitivity analysis concerning any assumptions about the baseline level of overall macroeconomic growth. However, the need to understand uncertainty about baseline growth rates for the economy as a whole is distinct from the need to understand the uncertainty about any differences in growth rates across individual sectors of the economy. It is possible that assessments of the behavior of particular sectors are excessively dependent upon the predictions of just a small set of models. These models are, in general, rather highly aggregated and have been developed for different purposes than those for which they are being used in the Second Prospective analysis. The Agency should use alternative models and solicit expert judgment on these issues, perhaps via a workshop. Rather than starting with the predictions of these models, it is important to step back and evaluate each model's assumptions and the sensitivity of its predictions to these assumptions.

Consistency is also an important issue in several other places in the Analytical Plan. For example, there is some discussion of meta-analysis with respect to the value of a statistical life to be used in the analysis. In the context of this discussion, there is mention of the prospect of making adjustments to VSL estimates to account for differences in income levels. How do these proposed income adjustments correspond to the income changes that are part of the general equilibrium consequences of the effects of air quality regulations on costs of production and therefore upon factor demands?

Finally, the underlying assumptions of different types of models used in the Analysis must be compatible. Most procedures for benefits assessment based on revealed

preferences of individuals hinge crucially upon non-separability between pollution levels and observable behaviors. It is highly inconsistent to *require* non-separability in support of the valuation portion of the analysis that supports the benefits estimates, yet to *preclude* it in the general equilibrium assessment of cost estimates. How are the insights from Williams (2002, 2003) concerning health effects and optimal environmental policy to be incorporated as adjustments? Will there be scenarios to test the sensitivity of the cost estimates to these adjustments?

- **Care must be taken to ensure that key assumptions affecting different components of the overall 812 Analysis (discount rates, income growth projections, substitutability) are consistent across all the models used in the analysis.**

4.4 Artificiality of scenarios

In the First Prospective Report, none of the emissions scenarios are "real" in the sense of being based on actual conditions or even a forecast of actual conditions. The baseline "without CAAA" scenario has not been observed and neither will the "with CAAA" scenario actually materialize. For example, some non-attainment areas will remain out of attainment. It is also difficult to fully anticipate all of the general equilibrium consequences of the CAAA regulations. Both the Baseline and the Control are based on hypothetical scenarios defined to meet the specific mandates of the CAAA. Neither the baseline nor the control scenarios would be interpreted as a necessarily credible forecast of real conditions. As a result it is not clear, from the description of the different scenarios, how a couple of important issues are to be addressed:

1. If firms are currently minimizing costs, increased emission controls imply higher costs and, under the assumptions of most CGE models, higher prices. These price increases will change the distribution of economic activities by sector and the resulting levels of emissions from each sector. How are these general equilibrium consequences of emissions controls to be handled? Shouldn't there be comparisons that allow uncertainties in aggregate economic activity and technical change to be described, especially as one attempts to forecast activity levels and emissions further into the future (e.g., beyond 2010)?

2. What is the nature of the feedback loop to measure changes in household incomes in response to these policies? At a minimum, one should be able to deal with Hazilla-Kopp, Jorgenson-Wilcoxen type computations of the effects of policy on their measures of costs. The price vectors derived from these models include wages and returns to capital, so it should be possible to evaluate the implied changes in household incomes. This type of interconnectedness is very relevant to the process of scenario development. It is not clear in the Analytical Plan whether there are inconsistencies across components in the different assumptions about how economic activity affects the outcomes.

- **The "with CAAA" and "without CAAA" scenarios are neither observable nor likely to materialize exactly as described. They are artificial constructs. However, they should at least be internally consistent.**

4.5 Trajectories after 2000: preventing deterioration

The Council now understands that the shapes of the time profiles in Exhibit 2-1 are not factual, and that the diagram is merely a schematic designed to identify the different reference periods. However, the "without-CAAA" and "with-CAAA" trajectories in this diagram, if at all realistic, suggest to readers that for 2010 and 2020, the benefits of the CAAA may result to a significant degree from how high emissions would have risen without it. It will be important to communicate to policy makers that a significant share of the benefits that the Second Prospective analysis is likely to identify for 2010 and 2020 stem from the prevention of air quality deterioration that would otherwise have occurred.

- **The agency should make it very clear to the audience for the 812 analysis to what extent the post-2000 benefits of the CAAA are expected to stem from the prevention of deterioration in air quality versus absolute improvements from 1990 conditions.**

4.6 The moving target problem

The inventory of new regulations and changes since the first prospective study (pages 2-9 and 2-10) highlights the fact that the Clean Air Act was designed to be an evolving regulatory process (e.g., with periodic reviews of the NAAQS). This adaptive evolution allows for adjustments and/or additions to the arsenal of regulations and emission control strategies in response to new scientific or engineering knowledge and technological innovations.

Some previous regulations have precipitated technological innovations (e.g. as with automobile emission controls) that have allowed the achievement of greater emissions reductions, at lower costs, than were originally expected. At the same time, most standards have been held the same or tightened due to new information that some of the human health and environmental effects of air pollution are worse than originally thought. All this means that assessing the future costs and benefits of the CAAA is like trying to hit a moving target. There is no remedy for this, but it remains a limitation of the entire assessment exercise that should be emphasized to policy-makers.

The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are a complication in forecasting scenarios for the Section 812 Analysis. Are the emission controls currently in place and those expected to come on line in the future, under the CAAA, going to be sufficient to meet the NAAQS? If not, then more emissions limits or control requirements

will presumably have to be implemented. These modifications will be driven (or constrained) by NAAQS attainment schedules and SIP schedules.

The discussion on page 1-3 of the Analytical Plan seems to imply that there will be some mechanism in the analytical process to periodically assess progress toward meeting the NAAQS under a particular scenario. If the growth in emissions is larger than anticipated, this assessment could potentially trigger feedback in the form of additional emissions reductions requirements (with their associated costs and benefits). However, it is not as clear in Chapter 2 of the Analytical Plan that this feedback will be incorporated.

One of the most important scenarios may be the "additional controls" scenario (i.e. going beyond current CAAA requirements). This scenario is likely to be more relevant than the alternative pathways scenarios suggested in the current Plan. It is listed as a scenario in the current Plan, but little detail is provided (Chapter 2). This scenario seems important because it may stimulate discussion about what the alternatives may be for different emissions source categories, and may suggest least-cost directions for future policy.

- **The evolutionary nature of regulations pursuant to the CAAA means that is difficult to forecast future benefits and costs based solely on knowledge of the shape of current regulations. EPA needs to be clearer about how feedback and regulatory evolution will be modeled.**

4.7 Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) Programs

The alternate pathways scenarios as outlined in Chapter 2 of the Analytical Plan include enhanced I/M programs as a major control in smaller urban areas around the country. If these areas are already in attainment of air quality standards, this will result in very little benefit in terms of attainment, although nationwide emissions will fall. However, the Agency assume no threshold in health effects from particulate matter, so there may still be benefits in terms of improved health outcomes.

Also, modifications to the MOBILE model in version 6 reflect the fact that post-2000 vehicles are very clean and much more likely to stay clean over their lifetimes, resulting in small emissions reductions from enhanced I/M, at least for light duty vehicles (heavy duty vehicles are not currently tested in most regions, and some type of monitoring of their compliance might be more interesting).

It would seem important in this scenario to look at additional reductions from mobile sources in non-attainment areas that are likely to result in additional emissions reductions. The Council believes that EPA should consider other policies, as is suggested on Page 2-15. A set of alternative mobile source reduction strategies (costs and emissions reductions) is also an important part of looking at the costs of meeting the NAAQS.

5 ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS

5.1 Charge Question 3

Does the Council support the alternative compliance pathway estimation and comparison methodology described in chapter 2, including the specification of alternative compliance pathways which may not reflect precisely constant emissions or air quality outcomes between scenarios due (primarily) to the non-continuous nature and interaction effects of emission control options?

The Council Special Panel decided during its October 23, 2003 teleconference, to defer its advice on this topic until after the face-to-face meeting of November 5-6, 2003.

6 COST ESTIMATES

6.1 Charge Question 7

Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting compliance costs described in chapter 4? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

6.2 Econometric models and costs

Econometric models allow the researcher, in principle, to get at indirect effects and behavioral responses to changes in regulations. These models can be used to 1) suggest the magnitude of additional costs beyond direct pollution abatement expenditures, and 2) provide parameters and functions for use in CGE models.

The econometric methods section in the Analytical Plan looks at several different cost studies of specific industries that have tried to isolate the full incremental costs to these industries from abatement activities. EPA's current method for estimating industry costs focuses on the direct cost of abatement equipment as required by the regulations. The value of these econometric studies is that they can suggest the magnitude of the additional costs (or savings) to firms as a result of the direct abatement expenditures. Hence, they suggest whether these indirect effects are important enough that the Agency should worry about capturing them in the 812 analyses.

One type of indirect cost stems from the impacts of abatement activity on total factor productivity. Barbera and McConnell (1990) find some evidence of reductions in total factor productivity in five industries as a result of abatement equipment, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small. Gray and Shadbegian (1994) and Joshi, Lave, Shih and McMichael (1997) also find evidence of effects on total factor productivity. The estimated effects are relative large for the steel industry.

The other industry study described in Chapter 4 of the analytical plan is that by Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (2001). This study examines the extent to which a dollar of abatement expenditure can be expected to result in more or less than $1 of expenditure on other non-environmental factors of production in four polluting industries (i.e. are direct abatement expenditures strongly complementary with other inputs, such as specialized labor?). They do not find strong evidence that direct abatement expenditures either over or under-estimate the total costs associated with controls. If anything, there is some indication that abatement expenditures may overstate full costs for some industries.

On net, there is mixed evidence about whether estimating abatement costs by just calculating direct abatement expenditures through engineering cost functions will result in under- or over-estimates of costs in individual industries. It is important to at least review the evidence from this literature, and make a judgment about whether to do any adjustment to forecast of future costs on the basis of the empirical evidence.

The limitations of econometric cost estimation raised on page 4-7 of the Analytical Plan apply with equal force to engineering estimates of future compliance costs, because similar assumptions must be made about factor prices, levels of output produced, and so on. These estimates must be made just as far into the future for engineering cost models as for econometric models. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the described limitations are a particular disadvantage for econometric cost forecasting models as opposed to other types of cost forecasting models. Because these types of assumptions must also be made for the CGE modeling, how will these separate estimates be reconciled? This issue is not well explained in the Analytical Plan.

In areas where new control technology is needed or costs are highly uncertain, econometric techniques are not a good substitute for uncertainty analysis, relying as they do on observed choices by firms. When no empirical data exist concerning new technologies, expert judgment may be the only available source for information about likely costs.

- **Econometric models for abatement costs are limited by their incomplete coverage but they can sometimes offer insights not available from engineering estimates of compliance costs, in particular, with respect to the impacts of abatement activity on total factor productivity. Econometric models are one important source of the stylized facts about economic relationships that are used to calibrate CGE models.**

6.3 Direct costs versus broader definitions of costs

In the Second Prospective Analysis, the major thrust of the effort to estimate costs is still to forecast the direct abatement costs associated with the CAAA. However, the Analytical Plan does make a number of attempts at capturing broader, more complete estimates of costs. But indirect costs, in the context of the Analytical Plan, are not presently defined very clearly. Whatever the Agency has in mind when it refers to "indirect costs" needs to be spelled out explicitly. It is important to identify what these more-complete measures of cost include and how different they might be from narrowly defined engineering cost estimates.

Some of the relevant indirect costs include costs borne within industries, but other costs stem from productivity effects. Econometric studies can shed some light on how important these additional costs might be. Other relevant indirect costs stem from

process changes. Treatment of the effect of learning on costs is addressed in detail below.

Other indirect costs stem from price changes and their effects on consumer behavior in the good market and in the labor market. Regulations change prices which can change behavior. For example, in emissions inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs, significant emissions-related repair costs appear to be inducing some drivers to sell their vehicles outside of the Inspection/Maintenance (I/M) area. This has both costs and benefits beyond the direct effects usually measured for the program.

- **Indirect costs should be defined and itemized more clearly in the Analytical Plan.**

6.4 Validation against realized historical costs

Earlier comments by the Committee have emphasized that it is important to try to validate the assumptions underlying key scenarios in the 812 Analysis. A major refinement in the Second Prospective Analysis will be to enhance validation of the cost forecasts by comparison with historical data and with the results from models which are alternatives to those used in the analysis. This task is very important and the Council applauds the Agency's attempts to do more of this. Earlier ex ante cost (and emissions reductions) forecasts should be compared, where possible, with ex post measurement of these costs in subsequent prospective studies.

CAAA regulations are in many cases designed to encourage innovations and technological advancement to reduce emissions at lower costs. Market based regulations are explicitly designed to do so, but other regulations have also done this—for example, automobile emission limits. It is a huge success story for the CAA that we are enjoying reduced emissions at lower costs than were originally expected. Comparisons with ex post costs are not just a matter of validating previous forecasts, but is also an indication of the effectiveness of the CAA and a potentially important part of the story concerning the costs and benefits of the CAA.

Of course, it will be important to assess whether technologies or processes have changed compared to what was expected when the ex ante forecasts were made. Ex post assessments of the success of prior cost forecasts must be made for the same regulatory program as was assumed in the ex ante prediction exercise, and the same baseline must be used. The predictive model in general may perform well if it is run using the right assumptions, even though it predicts less well if the forecasted determinants of its predictions are less accurate. Predicting the future is never an easy task.

- **Comparison of the predicted and actual costs of air quality regulations will be important to the evolution of the ongoing Section 812 Analyses.**

6.5 Learning

Oversimplification of 80% rule. The effect of "learning" on compliance costs received much emphasis in the document, but the 80% rule for all sectors for a doubling of cumulative production is a gross oversimplification, even though it is an improvement over entirely failing to acknowledge the effect of the learning process on costs. It is hard to come up with a better suggestion than the rule of thumb, but there has been growing experience with compliance costs over the last three decades and it will be important to do the analysis that will allow the rule to be refined.

Across different sectors, there is great variance in the extent to which "learning" can be assumed to decrease compliance costs. The opportunities for reducing costs by learning differ across sectors. There is likely to be extensive heterogeneity.

Alternative conceptualizations of learning. Learning is not carefully enough defined in the Analytical Plan. Does the analysis propose to account for measured "learning curves" in the sense of observed empirical relationships that support the contention that productivity or unit costs are related to cumulative experience with new machinery or processes? (See Argote and Epple (1990).) In an economic context, there has been only a conceptual treatment of this notion of learning (Auerswald et al. (2000)).

Alternatively, does the learning process envisioned by the Agency relate to the learning-by-doing phenomenon that has been suggested to accompany technological innovations? These two perspectives on learning and its effects on costs are related, but formal economic models have been developed for the latter.

Should learning be captured via the discount rate?. A comment was made during the Council's deliberations that the RFF HAIKU model accommodates learning via assumptions about technological change and the Oak Ridge AMIGA model finesses learning through adjustments of the discount rate. It is not at all clear how learning can, or why it should, be incorporated via adjustments to discount rates.

Econometrics of scale effects and learning. The Agency should consider the econometrics of doubling outputs and the empirical evidence about scale economies. The sophistication of these models varies widely across applications. Some models consider a pure learning effect in the form of technical change, while others consider differences in the scale of production and changes in the mix of inputs. It is not even clear that a pure "learning effect" can be empirically isolated.

Meta-analysis. Peretto and Smith (2001) conducted a 48-study meta-analysis of the effects of learning on compliance costs. A PDF file for a recent final report to the U.S. Department of Energy has been provided to the Agency. In that report, pp. 20-25 and Tables 2-9 summarize the database and a preliminary analysis that was conducted for all learning curve studies that the authors could identify, including published and unpublished research.

As the tables in Peretto and Smith document, a diverse set of industries is covered. Unfortunately, none of the studies in the meta-analysis adopted a framework that would be consistent with conventional neoclassical models. While the work of Peretto and Smith remains at an early stage for a meta-analysis, the tables certainly document a simple inventory of what is known. The evidence one can glean from these tables is unfortunately at odds with the contentions of the literature that claims there is empirical support for the 80% rule.

The preliminary results of the Peretto and Smith meta-analysis can thus be characterized as "pretty grim." One would like to identify a range of alternative values by sector for learning effects, but the extant studies vary greatly in terms of their quality. This meta-analysis focused only on energy industries. The central tendency of the magnitude of estimated learning effects suggested by the meta-analysis depends on how the research elects to impose quality control. The distinction between learning via changes in process versus learning related to "management technique" matters, especially in the service sector.

Additional considerations. The assortment of published models that yield markedly different point estimates for learning effects are frequently inconsistent with neoclassical economics in terms of the use of factor inputs. To be deemed admissible, it would also be desirable for a study to meet higher standards in terms of accounting for technical change.

For cost-savings due to learning, there is a potentially very important question of whether firms enjoy advantages, or suffer penalties, for early implementation of technologies. Being a "first mover" may limit opportunities for learning from the experiences of other firms.

It is not clear that cumulative output is the sole, or best, indicator of learning effects on the eventual costs of abatement activities. The time horizon over which cost reductions due to learning will be exhausted is also not clear. Costs just a few months out may differ substantially from the cost levels that can be attained in the long-term steady-state, even when cumulative production is identical. Eighteen months out, costs can be a little lower, or a lot lower, than the level to which they may fall with early learning.

Process versus industry-specific. It should be emphasized in the 812 analysis that the 80% rule of thumb for learning effects is a gross oversimplification. For example, the effect of learning on compliance costs is more likely to be process-specific, rather than industry specific. Thus it may be inappropriate just to make different assumptions across industries. Instead, the correct "representative" learning effect may depend upon the mix of processes used in each industry.

Desirability/attainability of one number for learning. Despite the preliminary results of the meta-analysis and the absence of any real weight-of-the-evidence conclusions concerning learning effects, it would still be helpful to come up with a best estimate to use for assumptions about cost reductions from experience with compliance

technologies. It would be easiest if it were safe to assume a single "learning effect" in the form of an unbiased estimate, neither too high nor too low. However, the effect of learning on costs is likely to display considerable systematic heterogeneity across pollutants and technologies. There is unlikely to be a single "one-size-fits-all" number that is satisfactory for all contexts.

Is it preferable to make an inaccurate adjustment for learning (e.g., when it is not known whether the adjustment should be 10% or 20%) rather than make no adjustment at all, which is known definitely to be incorrect (i.e., there need to be some downward adjustment to costs as a result of learning, but the appropriate magnitude of this adjustment is unclear)? The question of just how much must be known before the Agency is warranted in making a quantitative adjustment permeates many aspects of the Analytical Plan, not just the learning issue, and merits more thought and discussion. In principle, what is desired is the best unbiased estimate, but where is the threshold of empirical evidence needed to decide upon the appropriate magnitude of that quantitative adjustment?

For example, in its review of the Draft Analytical Plan, two years ago, a majority on the Council agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support using for ecosystem benefits a particular percentage of the Costanza et al. (1998) estimates of total value of the earth's ecosystems. This conclusion was reached in part because there was not sufficient evidence to determine the appropriate percentage of these ecosystems values that would have been lost or reduced without the CAAA.

The Council feels it would be inappropriate to endorse adjustments that have minimal empirical verification as to their specific quantitative values. The cumulative effect of too many such adjustments puts the entire assessment process at risk of losing objective credibility and becoming more a product of subjectivity and political negotiation. The Council encourages the Agency to explore the likely consequences of adjustments that are within the realm of possibility, but not to build in any specific unsupported value for specific adjustments.

Uncertainty analysis. As research into learning effects matures, uncertainty analysis needs to be incorporated to insulate the bottom line from any vulnerability to this problem. There will be deviations from the 80% rule for cost savings. These are likely to differ not just across industries or sectors, but across processes (for example, taking NOx out of coal and gas combustion). These cost savings may be an important issue, but capturing them may require that the corrections to all the way to the process level, not just to the industry level.

The "learning rule" for costs will be refined and tailored to different contexts with the emergence of additional credible research. Until then, and the Agency cannot afford to pursue the same level of detail everywhere, since identifying process- and sector-specific estimates will be very labor-intensive. It would seem most appropriate to tailor the level of detail to the significance of the sector. (McConnell) For example, it will be

important to evaluate carefully how the Agency plans to handle learning for the EGU sector.

Miscellaneous. Assumed learning effects depend upon forecasts of cumulative production in each sector. How are these forecasts to be generated? Will cumulative output forecasts be consistent with the CGE models employed elsewhere in the analysis? Page 4-14 of the Analytical Plan is not clear on this point.

The learning in paragraph 2 of mobile sources is completely different than learning [discussed elsewhere] – 80% rule which is on cumulative production. This decrease in annual abatement cost, which is then reduced again??

- **Assumptions about the effect of learning on abatement costs need to be carefully thought-out and supported by the literature in this area. It is not clear that the "80% rule" is valid or even that it is an appropriate place-holder in the analysis. Learning effects are likely to be heterogeneous across sectors and processes and no consensus on their magnitude has yet emerged.**

6.6 IPM versus HAIKU models for cost estimates

The industrial sector is not completely treated in the proposed analysis. The IPM model focuses on EGUs. ERCAM got at VOC and NOx costs, but nothing else. Fortunately, ControlNet, to be used in the Second Prospective Analysis, covers more than just VOC and NOx. Unfortunately, it is not clear where the rest of the sectors are being treated in this analysis.

The Draft Analytical Plan states that the IPM will be used for utility cost estimates. The IPM model is apparently national in scope, but involves 26 modeling regions for the US power market. In many regions there is, and will continue to be, fairly stringent economic regulation of the utility sector. Thus, a capability to do some analysis of EGU environmental regulation at the regional level will continue to be important. For future analyses, the Agency may wish to compare the results from the IPM model with the predictions of other models, such as the RFF HAIKU. While regional impacts are certainly policy relevant, the Council re-affirms its concerns about the general equilibrium consequences of regulation and the difficulty of distinguishing regional effects because of cost spillovers via product, labor, and capital markets.

In addition, the RFF HAIKU model incorporates estimates of consumer and producer surplus (social costs). The relevant question concerns how to account for both industry private costs and social costs.

The IPM model does appear to take account of utility purchase and sale of emission allowances. The initial allocation of those allowances can be very important for the outcome in terms of the final allocation of control responsibility and the resulting costs of control, especially if allowance markets are thin or if unequal market power rests

in the hands of some traders. There should be some provision in the proposed analysis for how these allowances are to be allocated initially. Is it assumed they will be auctioned or given away according to some grandfathering formula, or some combination of these two allocation strategies?

- **The IPM exhibits a number of limitations for cost modeling (its lack of coverage, lack of regionality, assumptions of efficient pricing and possibly its assumptions about the initial allocation of emission allowances). All of these problems will need to be addressed carefully.**

6.7 Uncertain future energy demand conditions

Relative prices of natural gas, and assumptions about their future trajectories, will be very important to the forecasting of future costs of the CAAA. The Analytical Plan is not clear about how assumptions about natural gas prices will be made and supported. These assumptions have direct implications for the calculated costs of the CAAA. If the price of natural gas, a cleaner fuel, is much higher than initial estimates, then more of other dirtier fuels will be substituted, and more air quality controls will be needed. Future natural gas prices are a major source of uncertainty in cost forecasts, and sensitivity analysis with respect to different assumptions about these prices will likely be an important part of the uncertainty section of the Second Prospective Analysis.

It will also be important for the Agency to be clear about how demand is determined for the electricity produced by EGUs, and how these demands are regionalized in the models used for cost estimation. Will energy demand models be integrated with the CGE model? In general, fuel prices, energy demand conditions, the competitiveness of different regional (energy) markets, and technical progress assumptions are key ingredients in the forecasting of costs for the utility sector.

- **Future conditions in energy markets may have strong implications for realized abatement costs. Sensitivity of the benefit-cost results to alternative assumptions about energy markets may be an important dimension of the 812 Analysis.**

6.8 Competing risks due to higher energy prices

The Council's report must acknowledge that one Council Special Panel member has drawn attention to the suggestion that the Agency's benefit-cost analysis should not ignore the impact upon health, including both mortality and morbidity for adults and children, from increased energy costs due to air quality regulations (specifically, higher electricity prices). The low-income elderly appear to be especially vulnerable to higher energy costs. This subgroup also appears to be at high health risk for PM exposure. There was a question as to whether it is relevant to compare the direct health risk to the elderly

from PM with the indirect health risks stemming from higher energy prices operating through, for example, lesser ability to pay for air conditioning during heat waves or adequate heating during severely cold weather.

It could also be argued that the Agency should consider the health impact of increased prices from air pollution emission controls in other sectors of the economy, such as transportation. There are tradeoffs between fuel economy (and its air quality effects) and vehicle weight (and its safety implications) that may be equally important in determining competing risks to be considered in formulating air quality regulations. These tradeoffs are considered in the literature on "risk-risk analysis." Other considerations are related to the "richer is safer" literature (also called "health-health analysis," where risks are mediated through changes in disposable incomes). There is also a literature that tries to quantify how regulatory (or other) costs can simultaneously reduce health for some populations, in addition to improving it for others, in ways that might not be fully anticipated. For example, regulation may also reduce vehicle miles traveled and thereby reduce the risk of highway accident deaths.

The "health-health" approach is useful in policy comparison settings where one looks only at the beneficial health effects of an intervention and ignores the costs. The Council notes that this approach is not as useful, however, in the context of the 812 studies where both health effects and costs are explicitly considered. Such a benefits-only approach would be a new strategy. Since benefit-cost analysis accounts for the costs directly, there is a risk of double counting when the analysis includes both costs and foregone benefits. By foregone benefits is meant the specific goods, such as better health that people give up when they incur regulatory costs, through the richer-is-safer pathway. If the adverse health consequences of higher prices are to be considered for inclusion in the 812 analysis, there will need to be a careful justification for why these costs are not captured directly by the decreases in incomes that are already likely to be part of the explicit costs. This can happen, in principle, when there are externalities involved, but the literature on the existence of such externalities is insufficiently developed. There is also a risk when undertaking a piecemeal accounting of selected general equilibrium effects without considering others. Some secondary effects will be harmful to health, but others will be beneficial. If it is appropriate to address some secondary effects, it is appropriate to consider all of them.

A further difficulty in the richer-is-safer literature is that the empirical estimates are difficult because of the problem of sorting out causality. Income and health are likely to be jointly endogenous. Higher income is likely to promote health, but health may also promote income, and additional factors may contribute to both. The most useful papers in the richer-is-safer literature probably include Chapman and Hariharan (1994, 1996), Keeney (1990, 1997), Lindahl (2002), Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999), Ruhm (2000, 2003), Smith (1999), and Viscusi (1994).

6.9 Miscellaneous

Problems with Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) Survey data comparisons. Some of the problems with the PACE data on costs of air pollution control for utilities (identified on page 4-5 of the Analytical Plan) will also afflict direct engineering cost estimates. Neither approach to the calculation of control costs includes process changes or integration of abatement with other firm activities, nor do they include insurance costs. It is important to determine how previous cost forecasts might not be expected to match realized reported PACE costs. Has the Agency determined whether there are any other unique or specialized opportunities to examine data on actual costs or expenditures on air pollution control by electric utilities besides the PACE data? If so, it will be important to take advantage of any reasonable opportunity to validate cost assumptions.

Consistency in interest rate assumptions. Throughout the 812 analysis, there is a need to enforce consistency in key assumptions. For example, is the interest rate being used to annualize costs consistent across sectors and models, and the consistent with the discount rates being used to compare benefits across different time periods? A 5% interest rate is used in the cost analysis. The plan is to convert fixed capital costs to a real capital cost and then to annualize using this interest rate. If 5% is used here, it should also be used elsewhere in the analysis when the same types of time tradeoffs are at stake.

Use of ControlNet. In general, there needs to be more explanation of how ControlNet will be used to develop costs of alternative scenarios. Under certain of the scenarios that will be developed (either the current "alternative pathways" proposed in the Analytical Plan or some revision to those), sectors will require either more or fewer controls depending on the assumptions of the scenario. How are these reallocations of abatement responsibility to be implemented with the ControlNet model? There are many options for control. How is it decided which controls will be used? Even under command and control regulations, there can be various possible ways of achieving goals. How will forecasts be generated concerning how firms will choose between different compliance strategies?

The model used to evaluate some of the scenarios will need to allow for the impacts of changing factor prices. Does ControlNet allow for changes in factor prices? Page 4-6 of the Analytical Plan says it does, but the document is not clear about how. Is it necessary to make specific assumptions about a variety of elasticities, for example? Does ControlNet allow process changes to be built into cost scenarios for alternative pathways (top of page 4-11)? How?

Consideration of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The approach to construction of cost estimates seems to include too little consideration of the relevance of NAAQS attainment requirements. It appears that the process models do not take into account specific regulations put in place for ambient standards. There is some scope to supplement this analysis with an examination of the PACE data to produce

additional checks on the process models. Addressing the same costs using several different approaches will give a better sense of the validity of the cost estimates.

Market Based Incentives (MBI) lower-cost than command and control. In an interesting paper on costs of pollution control, Harrington, Morgenstern and Nelson (2000)[2] found that MBI as pollution control policies have tended to have both lower costs and greater emissions reductions than predicted. This implies that regulations that allow market based solutions should be treated differently in terms of cost estimates. Is this being accounted for in the analysis?

- **Other concerns with respect to abatement costs include some caveats about comparisons with the PACE data, the need for consistency in discounting assumptions, some questions about the use of ControlNet, the NAAQS and PACE data, and the relative cost of abatement via market-based instruments versus command and control.**

[2] Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson. 2000. "On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 19, No.2, pp. 297-322.

7 COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING

7.1 Charge Question 8

EPA seeks advice from the Council concerning the choice of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which EPA intends to use as a post-processor to gauge the general equilibrium effects of the various control scenarios. In the first 812 study –the retrospective– EPA used the Jorgenson/Wilcoxen model to gauge the general equilibrium effects of returning to the economy the reported compliance expenditures which formed the basis of the retrospective study direct cost estimates. This model has since been refined in many ways, and EPA considers both the Jorgenson/Wilcoxen/Ho and AMIGA to be acceptable tools. Although a final decision on model choice can be deferred until later in the analysis, EPA has tentative plans to use the AMIGA model because of its greater sectoral disaggregation, better industrial sector matching with CAA-affected industries, richer representation of relevant production and consumption technologies, and better model validation opportunities due to its use of open code. However, AMIGA is limited given its inability to deal with dynamics over time. Does the Council support the current, tentative plan to use the AMIGA model for this purpose? If not, are there alternative model choices or selection criteria the Council recommends?

7.2 Costs outside the regulated market

Theory and empirical work suggest that some of the most important cost-impacts of environmental regulations occur outside of the regulated market. In some circumstances these impacts are of greater magnitude that the impacts in the targeted sector or industry. Thus it seems important for the Agency to consider these impacts in its assessment. The Council commends the Agency for its commitment to addressing these impacts.

- **Incorporation of spillover costs of air quality regulations is important and these costs should continue to receive close attention.**

7.3 Post-processing, or emissions projections too?

It is not clear how the CGE cost estimates will be linked to CGE models.

The Analytical Plan needs to be clear about whether a.) CGE modeling will be done as a "post-processing" exercise with the sole objective of producing more-

comprehensive estimates of overall costs, or b.) CGE models will also be used to help clarify emissions projections.

The existing text of the Analytical Plan suggests that the CGE modeling would serve largely as a check on the direct cost estimates from the engineering and sector studies. This suggests that the CGE analysis largely covers the same impacts as the other models, and it implies a subordinate role for the CGE modeling. This characterization does not to convey the main purpose or significance of the CGE modeling

While CGE models can indeed give information on the direct costs, they are especially important in capturing indirect cost-impacts that cannot be considered by the other analyses. For such impacts, there seems to be no substitute for CGE models. Thus, the discussion of the purpose of CGE analysis should be modified.

CGE models can track the spillovers of air quality management measures into other sectors that are not directly regulated. However, they can also track how emissions regulation will directly affect output and prices in the regulated sectors, and therefore how they will also *indirectly* affect demand and supply conditions in related sectors and thus emissions levels in those sectors.

These secondary general equilibrium effects have the potential to significantly affect overall emissions levels. The Analytical Plan emphasizes the use of CGE models on the cost side, but the Agency must recognize the importance of consistency throughout the set of models used in the analysis. Will there be big changes in emissions in industries that are not being directly regulated, due to shifts in relative prices of inputs and the mix of outputs?

The document should be clear on the relative importance of CGE compared to other analyses of costs. The most crucial aspect of CGE modeling is that it provides information on indirect costs, which may be substantial. General equilibrium effects of regulations are not captured in any of the direct cost calculations. What the Analytical Plan currently describes is NOT the emphasis that is appropriate.

- **CGE models have the capability to reveal spillovers of air quality regulations into unregulated sectors, not just to better estimate the direct costs of regulation on regulated sectors. The current Analytical Plan describes CGE methods only for "post-processing" and relegates them to secondary status. General equilibrium modeling should enjoy similar status to direct cost calculations.**

7.4 Competing CGE models

Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxen (JGW) model track record. The Analytical Plan recommends the use of the (JGW model for the CGE analysis. This model has

continually improved over the years and has a long history of peer review. Its most important virtues are:

(1) attention to margins of substitution among factors, inputs, and goods which seem most important *a priori*,
(2) a serious empirical (econometric) basis for its parameters,
(3) careful modeling of saving behavior, capital demands and technological change,
(4) significant degree of sectoral disaggregation, and
(5) incorporation of pre-existing distortionary taxes. (The significance of this last feature is discussed below.)

Like all models, this model also has some limitations. These include an overly optimistic specification of the sectoral mobility of capital (it is assumed to be perfectly mobile), excessively elastic savings behavior, and the absence of explicit modeling of natural resource stocks and associated extraction-cost implications. However, for the purpose of gauging the general equilibrium cost impacts, this model is, overall, probably a good choice.

It will be important to explain further the choice of CGE model, even if it to be used only for the "post-processing" tasks. The Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxen model and the AMIGA model are the current contenders. The JHW model has many antecedents in the literature, and while it is not perfect, it does capture a lot of processes that are crucial to our understanding of the responses of the economy to air quality regulations. It incorporates an elastic treatment of capital and has a good representation of savings behavior. However, its treatment of natural resource stocks is rudimentary and issues of exhaustibility of domestic petroleum stocks are not adequately represented. One attractive feature of the JHW model is that is has been extensively peer-reviewed and is "about as good as it gets" among the class of thoroughly vetted models.

AMIGA model; validation. The Analytical Plan also refers to the AMIGA model as a possible vehicle for CGE analysis. As of the present point in this review process, few members of the Council are sufficiently familiar with the details of this model. It is important for the Council to examine this model carefully during the review process before making any suggestions about its suitability. The Agency has provided supplementary review materials.

In contrast to the Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxen model, the AMIGA model has no track record in peer-reviewed journals. It is a "new entrant." There is one paper forthcoming. It will be necessary for the Agency to examine the model very closely to compensate for the lack of peer review. It will be important to assess the relationship between current conditions and the prediction of the AMIGA model based on earlier conditions, to see how well the AMIGA model can predict realized historical outcomes. This needs to be done to reinforce our confidence in how well the AMIGA model might perform in predicting future developments.

On pages 4-23, the document describes a number of what are described as "minor concerns". The last is described as follows: "…for consumption of goods other than transportation and housing-related services, the *model's implicit assumption of zero substitutability may not be supported empirically"* (emphasis added). The Analytical Plan does not contain sufficient information about the AMIGA model for the reader to understand this comment. If it implies that the AMIGA model assumes that all commodities except housing and transportation are consumed in fixed proportions, then this is a very restrictive assumption.

During the October 23, 2003 teleconference of the Council Special Panel, the Council was provided with additional information about AMIGA indicating that the model does feature substitutability in that it embodies price elasticities for all goods and services relevant to households, and there is labor, capital and energy substitutability among producers. However, despite the presence of own-price elasticities in these models, the Council remains concerned about the extent of cross-price elasticities.

The "deadweight losses" due to taxation occur because these taxes drive a wedge between buyer's gross prices and the seller's net prices of a variety of goods. If demands for some goods are unresponsive to the prices of other goods, quantities traded of these goods will not change when these other goods are taxed and the analysis may not be able to capture these deadweight losses fully. It may be the case, however, that the description of this aspect of the model in the Analytical Plan is just prone to misinterpretation.

The Council wishes to emphasize that use of the AMIGA model, if it does indeed embody limited substitutability assumptions, would be inconsistent with the objective of a CGE analysis. That objective is to reflect inter-sectoral substitution effects of the costs that arise from environmental policies. If AMIGA is limited in terms of cross-price elasticities, a choice to use AMIGA by the Agency would reduce the standing of the CGE analysis in relationship to other cost analyses.

- **Each of the main CGE models which are proposed for use in the 812 Analysis has some limitations. The JHW model has a longer track record and has been more extensively reviewed. The extent of substitutability in the AMIGA model represents a cause for concern to the Council. The topic of the AMIGA model may be revisited by the Council after further discussion.**

7.5 The tax-interaction effect

Two years ago, in its preliminary review of the Draft Analytical Plan, the Council was disappointed about the Agency's treatment of the tax interaction effect. The literature indicates that the tax interaction effect is not just a second-order effect, but a first-order effect, and it therefore needs greater status in the analysis. The Council endorses the Agency's commitment to attend to this effect in its current study.

Overview. The tax-interaction effect stems from the impact of environmental regulations on relative prices. In particular, to the extent that regulations raise costs and lead to higher output prices, they raise the prices of goods in general. This effectively lowers the real returns to factors of production (e.g., the real wage). To the extent that pre-existing taxes have already reduced factor supplies below the efficient level, the further reduction in factor returns stemming from higher goods prices produces a first-order efficiency loss. This is the tax-interaction effect. In several studies, this effect involves a greater cost than the direct cost or compliance cost in the regulated market.

The Analytical Plan's characterization of the tax-interaction effect still has some problems. The Plan correctly points out that there is uncertainty surrounding the magnitude and sign of the tax-interaction effect. However, it incorrectly concludes from this that the central case estimates should assume that this effect is zero. It is more appropriate to use a best estimate of the mean of the tax-interaction effect.

Both theoretical and empirical studies consistently indicate that, in realistic settings, the tax-interaction effect involves a positive cost. Moreover, for environmental regulations that do not raise revenue – for example, performance standards, technology mandates, or freely allocated emissions permits – there is no "revenue-recycling effect" to offset the tax-interaction effect. For these regulations, if the required emissions reduction is a small percent of baseline emissions, the tax-interaction effect can be several times larger than the direct costs.

The tax-interaction effect will be smaller to the extent that the regulated commodity is an especially strong complement to leisure. However, even in this case this effect will generally imply an extra cost rather than a reduction in cost. The regulated commodity would have to be an extremely strong leisure complement to switch the sign of the tax-interaction effect.

Benefits-side tax-interaction effect. The general equilibrium effects of compliance costs are critical, but so may be the general equilibrium effects of beneficial health changes. Abatement of air pollution by the CAAA is intended to create positive health effects. It is just as important that the analysis not overlook the general equilibrium consequences of improved health status on labor availability and productivity, and therefore on the cost of labor, and on the costs of health care. Morbidity certainly has indirect effects on productivity that need to be recognized. General health consequences of changes in the ambient levels of pollutants need to be considered, not just mortality.

The impact of regulations on labor productivity and the associated "benefit-side" tax-interaction effect is indeed an important issue, and has been analyzed specifically by Williams (2002, 2003). This beneficial effect offsets the adverse tax-interaction effect described in the previous section. However, Williams's work indicates that, in general, this offset is not likely to be large enough to entirely offset the adverse tax-interaction effect. Thus it seems appropriate to assume in the central case that the tax-interaction effect does raise costs.

On page 4-26, the Analytical Plan suggests that: "Improvements in CGE models that the Agency is considering for this analysis have made it possible to account for tax interaction effects more precisely." The Council assumes that this comment pertains only to indirect effects on the cost side of the analysis, not the benefits. Part of the tax interaction effect can be addressed in CGE models, but no existing CGE model will capture all of it. At a minimum the Williams' (2002, 2003) adjustments for the productivity-enhancing consequences of health improvements due to environmental regulations need to be considered.

However, there are in fact a number of citations concerning the health benefits of emissions controls for labor productivity and their spillovers into less-regulated sectors. The Council is aware of several papers on this topic. Some of these papers (e.g. Espinosa and Smith, 1995) demonstrate how non-separability between pollutants and private goods, a prerequisite for such beneficial spillovers, can be incorporated into CGE models.

Two of the already-published papers in this literature are Espinosa and Smith (1995) and Smith and Espinosa (1996).[3] These papers use an updated version of the Harrison-Rutherford-Wooton model that includes measures of particulate matter, sulfur dioxides, and nitrogen oxides as non-separable influences on consumer preferences. The model includes eleven regions and six goods and three factors in each region. International trade and transboundary pollution are included. There is a simple air diffusion model between the different countries in Europe. The model relies on the concentration response functions presented in Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf (1998) and uses estimates of willingness to pay that are adjusted for each country. A newer paper that addresses the tax interaction effects, Espinosa and Smith (2000) is under review for publication.

The Committee endorses a balanced approach to CGE modeling, so that indirect *benefits* as well as indirect costs are considered.

Tax-interactions should be explicit. The tax interaction effect should be an explicit dimension of the presentation of costs. The precise methods for including tax interaction considerations in the Second Prospective Analysis are not adequately described in the current Analytical Plan. The Council could be more confident in its advice on this matter if the Analytical Plan included more-specific details on these issues, including a description of how engineering cost estimates will be linked to the CGE models for the analysis of tax interaction effects.

It should be noted that the Analytical Plan's suggestion of a 25-35% increase in costs due to the tax interaction effect in the current document may be a result of miscommunication in, or misinterpretation of, the earlier Council review of the Draft Analytical Plan. The indirect cost consequences of the tax interaction effect can differ by orders of magnitude, and can be vastly larger when regulations actually result in little

[3] The fifth one is in *Environmental and Resource Economics*; I have not located my copy. It is a conceptual paper Schwartz and Repetto (2000)

abatement and when there is no revenue recycling. For the SO2 emissions covered by Title IV, it may be appropriate to make the assumption of a 25-30% increase in costs, but such an assumption is unlikely to be universally appropriate.

The question thus remains as to how large a cost-impact the Agency might assume for tax interactions. The Agency could address this issue two ways. First, it can employ its commissioned CGE model or models to evaluate the costs of specific regulations. The tax-interaction effect should be embodied in the aggregate cost-impacts obtained from such models. Second, the Agency should consult results from other, prior CGE studies of particular regulations. This second step will be useful as a cross-check on the results from the Agency's commissioned model or models. Moreover, this second step may be necessary to obtain general equilibrium cost-estimates in some instances, since there will surely be some particular regulations that the commissioned model or models cannot capture.

Given the uncertainties surrounding the magnitude of the tax-interaction effect and of cost-impacts in general, it is very important that the Agency require considerable sensitivity analysis in its CGE assessments. Past applications of the Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxen model have tended to skimp on sensitivity analysis.

- **The Council advocates a serious effort to accommodate the consequences of possible tax interactions in the 812 Analysis. Considerable sensitivity analysis is indicated, however, since simple formulas for the magnitudes of tax interactions for regulations imposed on particular sectors have not yet been identified.**

7.6 Tension between CGE, econometric models

The Analytical Plan rejects econometric methods for developing cost estimates but accepts CGE models. This sort of top-down approach in the cost calculations, embracing CGE models, is puzzling. The Council feels that both types of models should be informative. Their implications should be convergent, and a plurality of methods is desirable. However, it is possible that the implications of the different approaches will not be convergent. If this is the case, then there is a clear need for more basic research to resolve the conflicts.

One way or another, the analysis needs to attend to general equilibrium effects. In terms of first-order effects, however, it is likely that most of the cost impacts on other markets are likely to work through their interactions with electricity markets.

Are CGE models sufficiently comprehensive? Some members of the Council have voiced a concern about whether even the largest CGE models are large enough? These are based on empirical studies of individual industries, but more coverage is certainly needed. There is not presently enough coverage by empirical studies to permit reliance on econometric models exclusively. CGE models are calibrated on a selection of

empirical results and researchers can then rely upon plausible assumptions, informed by expert opinion, to fill in for missing information.

There could, however, be more use of engineering and expert judgment when empirical results from econometric models are absent. The analysis could proceed based on expert judgments, using an engineering "bottom-up" strategy. For example, assumptions about the availability of natural gas will be critical to forecasts. Even the experts do not know enough about the determinants of availability of natural gas to base the modeling assumptions on existing empirical results, so the analysis may need to rely more heavily on engineering expert judgment.

- **CGE models and econometric models for costs are not competing methods, but complementary methods. Econometric results, where available and appropriate, are generally more desirable than expert judgment for calibrating the parameters of CGE models. However, where no econometric estimates exist for key parameters, expert judgment is essential.**

8 DISCOUNTING

8.1 Charge Question 9:

In the two previous 812 studies, the primary cost estimates reflected use of a 5 percent real discount rate, which an earlier Council endorsed as a reasonable compromise between a 3 percent real rate considered by EPA to be an appropriate estimate of the consumption rate of interest or rate of social time preference and a 7 percent rate, OMB's estimate of the opportunity cost of capital. Limited sensitivity testing was also conducted in the previous 812 studies by substituting 3 and 7 percent rates to annualize the benefit and cost streams. EPA's new Economics Guidelines (peer-reviewed by the SAB EEAC) call for using both a 3 and a 7 percent rate. A recent draft of new OMB economic guidelines suggests providing results based on both 3 and 7 percent discount rates, while also acknowledging the need for further efforts to refine analytical policies for discounting methods and rates. EPA plans on following both sets of Guideline documents by using both 3 and 7 percent in our core analyses. It is true that this will require presentation of two sets of results – one based on each rate. This may not be necessary given the expected insensitivity of the overall results to the discount rate assumption. Does the Council support this approach? If not, are there alternative rates, discounting concepts, methods, or results presentation approaches the Council recommends?

During its October 23, 2003 teleconference, the Council Special Panel agreed to defer its advice concerning discounting until it had been briefed at the November 5-6, 2003 face-to-face meeting concerning the exact approach taken concerning discounting in different parts of the Analytical Plan.

9 DATA QUALITY AND INTERMEDIATE DATA PRODUCTS

9.1 Charge Question 32:

Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 10 for evaluating the quality of data inputs and analytical outputs associated with this study, including the planned publication of intermediate data products and comparison of intermediate and final results with other data or estimates? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, intermediate data products, data or model comparisons, or other data quality criteria the Council recommends? Please consider EPA's Information Quality Guidelines in this regard.

9.2 General

The Council's teleconference discussion of Charge Question 32 was officially divided into separate considerations of costs and benefits. The primary discussants in each case tended to range across both topics, recognizing commonalities among issues on both fronts. Thus, this write-up combines both topics where appropriate.

The Agency plans to rely upon two methods for enhancing data quality:

> (a.) publishing detailed model outputs to expose the data to scrutiny by third parties (Intermediate Data Products); and
>
> (b.) comparing certain "produced data" (eg, model output) with counterpart real data (Consistency Checks).

These are both good ideas and will clearly strengthen the findings of the Second Prospective Analysis. Given the time constraints faced by the Agency in meeting the mandated schedule for Section 812 Analyses, the Council supports these two methods. Over the longer term, however, and looking toward future Analyses, a relevant question, however, is whether the planned validation exercises will continue to be sufficient. In the Council's view, these current strategies constitute an appropriate approach to validation under time and resource constraints, but more could potentially be done in each of these two categories in future Analyses.

The discussion that follows reflects the thoughts of Council members concerning the general task of "validation." The Council recognizes that the term validation means something very specific to the agency. We use it here in the more general sense. The Council does not intend that the Agency should immediately comply with all of these suggestions. Instead, the Council's intent is to provide some reflections on the Agency's current strategy and where it might lead (as information technologies evolve and if sufficient resources could be made available).

With respect to the first of the two validation approaches (i.e., publishing detailed model outputs, termed Intermediate Data Products), many third parties will be interested in more than just model output. One reasonable objective is to enhance confidence in the main results by validating the computations used in various modeling components. For instance, to ascertain whether a CGE model is producing reliable results, validation involves examining far more than just the outputs – one needs to "look under the hood." Third parties will be interested not only in data inputs, but in the algorithms used in intermediate calculations. For instance, abatement cost curves may be important inputs into a cost model and their assumed or estimated nature will be of significant relevance to validation exercises. The Council suggests that the Agency keep in mind the broader research value of making available to outside researchers, where possible, not just the data articulated in Figure 10-1, but the key intermediate data used in the sequence of models and the algorithms used to process it..

The second of the two approaches: consistency checks--comparing produced data with counterpart real data--is a great idea a priori. However, this endeavor is limited by the availability of appropriate real data. In the case of direct costs and CGE results, it is suggested that comparisons will be made with the PACE data. Although this is a lofty goal, it is unclear exactly how this will be accomplished. The devil is in the details. How will data on expenditures specifically for pollution control be compared to abatement costs under a counterfactual scenario, let alone the data for total economic costs? In principle, this is a worthwhile undertaking, but the Council strongly encourages that these proposed methods be fleshed out in greater detail.

- **The validation exercises described in Chapter 10 of the Draft Plan are necessary and appropriate, but a number of pitfalls, limitations and qualifications are noted.**

9.3 Intermediate data products

The Council's September 24, 2003, teleconference discussion was broadly general but concentrated on Scenario Development, Direct Cost Estimation, Economic Valuation of Benefits, and Computable General Equilibrium Results in any specific comments. The topics of Emissions Profile Development, Air Quality Modeling, and Physical Effects are more the province of the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee (AQMS) and the Health Effects Subcommittee (HES), although further integrative discussion of these topics may take place at the first face-to-face meeting of the Council in November.

Meta-data for validation

In general, the Council supports the Agency's efforts to post, to an accessible web-site, the "meta data" associated with the Benefit-Cost Analysis of the CAAA. The stated

rationale is to enable outside researchers to use and quality-check the data employed in the Second Prospective Analysis.

The Council, like the Health Effects Subcommittee, would have preferred a clearer presentation of just what intermediate data products and models the Agency plans to release to outside researchers, either during the course of the analysis, or ex post. The Council expressed its need for a clearer understanding of what will constitute "meta-data" in order to react to this suggestion. In the Council Special Panel teleconference of September 24, 2003, the Agency clarified that the elementary data, such as the emissions data used in developing the forecasting scenarios, is voluminous and unwieldy. The files are huge. For smaller samples of data that are well-documented, the original data and any non-proprietary models used to process it should be made available to competent researchers and stakeholders so that they may conduct their own analyses and validations.

Questions put to the Agency during the Council's teleconferences revealed that the Agency does not plan to post data to the Web before it has been thoroughly reviewed and vetted. In the course of the October 23, 2003 teleconference, it was made clear to the Council that public release of selected meta-data and modeling information is intended to encourage feedback on the strategies used in the Second Prospective Analysis that will inform future Prospective Analyses. The mandated schedule for the Second Prospective Analysis is simply too tight to allow the Agency to wait for additional outside analysis and corresponding feedback prior to finalizing the Second Prospective Analysis. The Council concurs that access to modeling inputs by interested parties can help ensure another layer of independent review.

The Council acknowledges that the enabling legislation for the 812 process specifically designates whom the Agency should consult in preparing its Analyses. Broad stakeholder input is apparently not intended. In this light, the Council agrees that it is important to recognize that publicly released details of the Analytical Plan will be of great interest to at least two different constituencies: policy-makers and research analysts. Members of each group will have different abilities to take advantage of any posted data and will have different interests in terms of what is made available. It will be challenging for the Agency to deal effectively with both types of consumers.

- **The revised Analytical Plan, by itself, is insufficiently clear about what it envisions as "meta-data" for public dissemination. It is not necessarily raw data, but pre-processed data that can be used to replicate intermediate results. The Agency needs clearer guidelines concerning the type and scope of information that will be made public during the course of the analysis and what will be provided only when the analysis is complete.**

Possible unanticipated costs of public meta-data

The Agency must be aware that providing the enormous amount of information listed in Chapter 10 of the Revised Analytical Plan, developing adequate documentation for these

data, and supporting access and use by outsiders is a potentially costly and time-consuming undertaking, even if these data are to be made available only ex post with respect to the Second Prospective Analysis. In some cases, the relevant databases are available to the public elsewhere. In other cases, complete provision will be hampered by the proprietary nature of some of the data or models.

If the goal behind public release of these data is to allow other researcher to quality-check Agency result, it is unclear how researchers can accomplish this without access to extensive model documentation and the models themselves. For example, intermediate data products may involve modeling outputs such as CGE results, rather than raw data. In particular, as EPA notes elsewhere, aggregate valuation summaries require careful discussion of assumptions and caveats to avoid misinterpretation. These explanations presumably will not be available in full until the Second Prospective Analysis is finalized. This lack of preliminary documentation could make any preliminary release of data or models less useful to outside researchers and/or more costly for the Agency to support. The Council's concerns on this dimension are lessened by the new information that preliminary release is not the Agency's intention. This was not clear from the Revised Analytical Plan.

Finally, there is always the risk that intermediate results will take on a life of their own. Stakeholders may overreact to preliminary estimates, diverting additional staff resources to manage subsequent public-relations problems. There is a tradeoff between the social value of improved transparency and the resource costs of achieving it.

- **Preliminary release of raw data, intermediate data, intermediate models, and other analytical components will certainly improve the transparency of the benefit-cost exercise, but may result in substantial costs to the Agency. The Council supports contemporaneous release along with the final Analysis (or even ex post release of intermediate data and models) as a tool to inform future Prospective Analyses, but not necessarily the current analysis.**

Proposal for problem-oriented meta-data provision

The Council feels, nevertheless, that the Agency's interest in involving outside researchers in the analysis is admirable as a guiding principle for future Prospective Analyses. The Council considered a number of speculative proposals about how this process could potentially evolve. The following proposals should not be construed as direct advice to the Agency, but as the product of the Council's brainstorming concerning some of the issues raised in the Draft Analytical Plan.

One approach to the external validation process might be to use the project's web site to pose specific problems and proposed solutions. Where appropriate, data and preliminary analysis related to a particular problem could be provided to encourage involvement and suggestions from outside experts.

It might be constructive to explore the feasibility of engaging outside researchers specifically to address mission-critical research questions. This could be accomplished by inviting peer-reviewed requests for original data and access to non-proprietary models so that these outside researchers can coordinate their own, possibly regional, analytical interest with the Agency's need for different types of validation exercises. There might be specific opportunities for these outside researchers to identify the types of data to which they would most like to gain access. An Agency workshop might be a suitable vehicle to bring together Agency modeling needs and researchers with expertise in the relevant area.

The Agency's comparative advantage in assembling key data from diverse sources could facilitate third-party research by making these data available. For example, one Council member has indicated that it would be desirable to provide some mechanism for requesting the data developed in the detailed runs of air diffusion models for selected areas, such as the South Coast Air Basin in California. This would allow researchers who are working with regional models that have the spatial resolution to accommodate these data the opportunity to use them.

External research on issues relevant to the Second Prospective Analysis would also be aided by availability of morbidity and mortality data at a level of spatial resolution finer than the county-level information available in the Compressed Mortality Files from the National Center for Health Statistics. For example, deaths from potentially air-pollution-related causes on a five-kilometer grid scale would be greatly valuable, but individual researchers have difficulty gaining access to this type of information..

- **In considering the future of the Section 812 analytical process and the sharing of intermediate data and models with outside researchers, the Agency may wish to consider more fully some alternative mechanisms for engaging third-party researchers in validation exercises. Peer review of requests for data or models, focused calls for external activity, and collaboration or other formalized interactions with external researchers might be considered.**

Itemized limitations in data review

Members of the Council feel that there are some limitations in the plans for data review:

(a.) The benefits analysis information as outlined briefly in Chapter 10, page 10-2, is inadequate. Results are described as being produced at the state level and by pollutant-endpoint combination. The outline identifies "some of the uncertainties inherent in projections of state-level results ten or twenty years into the future" as the focus of likely meta-data validation exercises.

(b.) Detailed input information and assumptions embodied in the CGE analysis are essential to evaluating the outputs of that analysis.

(c.) The Council will defer to the Health Effects Subcommittee in evaluating the Agency's approach to morbidity and mortality estimates. However, the Council encourages the Agency to stay on top of any emerging or future opportunities to assemble health statistics on related (actual) health conditions that might be associated with morbidity or mortality rates due to air quality. The science suggests increases in mortality via lung cancer and heart disease. It is reasonable to expect new cases in areas with high pollution. These new cases of disease should be known, depending upon the stage of the disease at which patients present to their health care practitioners. The Council acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to attribute these new cases directly to air pollution since incidence is confounded by latency and residential mobility. However, it is possible that higher regional rates of diseases understood by the public to be related to air quality can affect willingness to pay for air quality improvements and therefore the benefits associated with cleaner air.

The HES appears to be confident that the Agency is aware of the most significant and relevant health studies concerning air quality. Economic benefits, however, can depend upon how serious the public perceives different health risks to be. Subjective health risks, as well as objective risks, figure into the public's willingness to incur the costs of air quality improvement. Various prospective cohort studies may be a valuable resource in determining disease incidence, and there is a great need to assemble all available health status databases and panels to identify the incidence of different diseases for areas that are particularly polluted. Benefit-cost analysis of air quality improvements can be aided even by relatively crude quantification of the information set available to the public, in terms of the number of victims of each potentially air-quality-related disease that each individual may encounter (or hear about) in their neighborhood or community.

One potentially valuable source of information might be the Adventist Health Study II, which recruits every member of the church to complete a health questionnaire as part of a research project of Loma Linda University funded by the National Institutes of Health.

Another relevant study would be the project conducted jointly by the Harvard School of Public Health, Trinity College and the Dublin Institute of Technology in Dublin, Ireland (Clancy et al., 2002). Funded in part by the Agency, these researchers examined the effect of a 1990 ban on coal sales and coal burning in Dublin on death rates in the city for six years before and after the ban went into effect. They found that black smoke concentrations and non-trauma death rates were substantially reduced by the decrease in coal burning.

There are at least three other studies that document changes in health outcomes resulting from discrete economic or policy changes. One showed the impacts of a change in sulfur content on fuel oil for power generation and road transportation in Hong Kong (Hedley et al., 2002). Specifically, it showed a decline in disease-specific mortality after the sulfur restrictions took place. Pope (1989, 1991) showed reductions in several health outcomes

associated with a temporary shutdown of a steel mill in the Utah Valley. Finally, Friedman et al. (2001) report on the effects of changes in transportation during the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta on air quality and childhood asthma.

- **The outlined activities in the Intermediate Data Products section are, in many cases, simply too terse to permit thorough evaluation by the Council. More examples of useful intermediate and related data might have been suggested, such as the Adventist Health Study and the Dublin coal ban study.**

Stanford Energy Modeling Forum Analogy

The Council notes that the ongoing Section 812 Prospective Analyses represent a potentially valuable laboratory for understanding the methods used for constructing a comprehensive benefit-cost of environmental regulation. While it is probably not feasible for the Second Prospective Analysis, the Agency might begin to plan for a process for evaluating the models being used and for learning from these evaluations. A possible approach, broached by the Council in 2001, is to examine formally several models that purport to address the same issue. This is how the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) compares different models. The Agency could target key databases or key modeling steps with specific analytical issues in mind, and invite internal and external researchers to address these issues using competing approaches.

- **The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum offers a potential useful approach for evaluating analytical strategies that could be adapted to the needs of the Agency in future Prospective Analyses.**

Scenario development

On the specific topic of Intermediate Data Products to do with Scenario Development, the Council notes that the different scenarios to be examined in the Second Prospective Analysis are still being determined by the EPA. The Council has already discussed and suggested some changes to the scenarios outlined in Chapter 2 of the Draft Analytical Plan, and other scenarios are still under review. One important scenario (or set of scenarios) should look at additional controls beyond current Clean Air Act provisions. EPA is still in the process of defining these, but assumptions about how controls will be tightened and the data and methods used to assess these adjustments will be important to provide to outside experts on an interim basis. These scenarios are particularly important because they may suggest potential directions for future regulations. An advance understanding of the likely consequences of these regulations would be desirable.

- **It is difficult to evaluate the Agency's plans for Intermediate Data Products with respect to Scenario Development because the range of proposed scenarios seems still to be evolving.**

9.4 Consistency Checks

When, what, and how much of a discrepancy?

Chapter 10 also outlines EPA's plans for internal consistency checks. This summary appears to treat consistency checking as something that happens after models have been constructed and populated with the necessary parameters. In fact, calibration is a necessary and integral feature of model development. Given the numerous assumptions and simplifications required to build models, it is always necessary to check model performance against known, observed values, and make necessary adjustments to improve accuracy. The Council hopes that ongoing consistency checking is standard practice in the Section 812 Analyses.

What is to be compared in making consistency checks? Comparing one model's predictions with another model's predictions, rather than with observational data, is more problematic. Different models use different inputs and employ different analytical structures. Thus it often is unclear whether prediction differences are a result of differences in the input data or differences in the models themselves. (EPA refers to differences in scenarios and differences in modeling approach.) Sometimes it is possible to use one model's data with another model's structure and vice versa to isolate the cause of the discrepancy.

Inevitably, researchers will have to cope with the question of how to resolve inconsistencies. It often is unclear how big the inconsistencies have to be to raise concerns, given inherent modeling uncertainties and measurement error in the data. How much of a discrepancy is a big discrepancy? The public problem-solving procedure facilitated by publicly available data might be useful in developing a professional consensus about how to resolve or explain discrepancies.

- **Obviously, consistency checking is important throughout the Analysis, not just ex post. It is also important for the Analytical Plan to be clearer about what is to be compared in consistency checks and how big a difference would be enough to worry about.**

Comparing apples and oranges

There is actually only a modest possibility of doing consistency checks. The Agency must keep in mind that only one of the "with" and "without" scenarios can actually be

observed. Scenarios involving recent years (e.g. 2000) allow us to observe what happened under the "with" case. In the future, both "with" and "without" become projections. Existing surveys such as the PACE refer to regulations that were imposed, not regulations that are projected to be imposed. Thus, even the PACE data do not support ceteris paribus comparisons. It is particularly difficult to do plausibility checks when two different projections are being compared, since either projection could be questionable. In the usual context for comparison in benefit-cost analyses, we know either a baseline or a change. That is, in the retrospective study, we knew actual conditions and projected what happened if we did nothing further to regulate beyond 1970. In the prospective studies, both the baseline and the regulated cases are projected. Thus, there is not a known reference or baseline.

Using models to project expected quantities out-of-sample, when non-overlapping data has been used to estimate each model, can be risky. For example, transfer of models from US cities to Mexico City predicted so many deaths from air pollution that the number would have amounted to between one-third and one-half of all deaths in that city, a prediction that is implausible. The challenge lies in how to extrapolate the results of studies outside their ranges. Linear extrapolation is clearly not reliable. Nonlinear estimation may offer improvements, but any outside forecasting needs to be subjected to plausibility tests.

EPA mentions several specific consistency checks. In particular, they plan to compare BenMAP model predictions to actual incidence data. The model predicts changes based on regulatory changes relative to the baseline scenario. EPA notes the inconsistency of trying to compare marginal changes with absolute levels for 2000, but suggests no strategy for checking BenMAP predictions against observational data. Ideally, one would look for a natural experiment where exposures changed, then replicate this change in exposure in the context of the Section 812 models to check predicted marginal changes from these models against observed marginal changes in the natural experiment

EPA's statement about economic valuation consistency checks is similarly ambiguous. They suggest comparing unit willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates with cost-of-illness (COI) values. Again, these generally are not congruent measures. Depending on how WTP is obtained, it may only measure pain and suffering, or it may include some components of lost productivity and cost of treatment. Estimated COI values often include only a relatively easily observed subset of the components of the social cost of illness. Moreover, COI estimates often rely on average wage and treatment costs rather than marginal values. Thus the problem of comparing marginal changes with observed averages may crop up in this context, as well.

- **Before comparing the intermediate results of the Second Prospective Analysis with other sources of similar information, it will be important that there be some theoretical basis for expecting similarities. Comparisons based on the out-of-sample extensions of models estimated in very different contexts should be subjected to particular scrutiny.**

Understanding sources of differences

A full understanding of the sources of differences in the costs and benefits results by title, provision, and source between the First and Second Prospective studies is critical for interpreting the results of the Second Prospective Analysis. The EPA appears to be considering a number of possible ways to make those comparisons. Comparison of outcomes at the most disaggregated levels is important. An Appendix is suggested on p. 10-4 of the revised Analytical Plan. At what level of detail would the comparison of results be provided in this Appendix?

Because this prospective study will be undertaking more disaggregated analyses, with results by source category and even by provision in some cases, there may be possibilities to compare the results, particularly for the 2000 time frame, to other studies that have been done. Are the results consistent with those from other studies? There could be some attempt to suggest what might give rise to the differences.

- **Along with a careful accounting of differences between the Second Prospective Analysis and other analyses, there must be an effort to understand the most likely sources of any differences.**

Intermediate outcomes and consistency checking

Any component of the Section 812 Prospective Analyses that leads up to the calculation of final costs and benefits is an "intermediate product" of the analysis. Many of these intermediate products summarize relationships that are used to reach the eventual benefit and cost calculations. These estimated or assumed relationships afford many opportunities for benchmarking the analysis against other studies or against real data. For example, there may be future opportunities to examine the incidence of lung disease by industrial sector for workers, or lung disease against census tracts or zip codes for place of residence. Morbidity information is naturally more difficult to pin down than mortality, since most illnesses are not reportable, whereas the causes of death are. However, assembling whatever information is available on morbidity stemming from air-quality-related disease could be extremely valuable. Public perceptions of air-quality-related health risks will influence the perceived benefits of air quality management and thus individual willingness to pay the costs incurred due to regulation.

- **The Agency may have the resources or the authority to assemble intermediate data that would also be valuable to other researchers but is not presently generally available. In the process of encouraging external consistency checking, the Agency could create public goods of great value to the external research community.**

Additional specific recommendations

If not for the current Analysis, then potentially for future Analyses, the Council suggests that some of the following activities might be considered as candidates for addition to the Agency's consistency-checking regimen:

a.) There does not appear to be a plan to make public the economic projections underlying the emissions estimates and to reference these emissions estimates to actual levels of economic activity in sectoral, regional, or aggregate terms. Levels of economic activity are critically important determinants of emissions and it will be important for these assumptions to be scrutinized as the Agency moves into producing subsequent Prospective Analyses.

b.) Results at the state level and by pollutant-endpoint combination should be matched to other economic data at the same spatial resolution to offer future opportunities for cross checks. For example, there should be adequate consideration of Census economic information on household income.

c.) There might be comparisons of the assumptions about future economic activity embodied in the Second Prospective Analysis to actual levels of economic activity by sector and region in actual years covered and with independent national projects. For example, this task could employ regional Federal Reserve Bank statistics and forecasts, or forecasts prepared by other federal sources.

d.) The analysis might include more-explicit consideration of time profiles of emissions prior to 2000 (actual ambient readings) in comparison to the levels and time profiles projected for future policy effects.

e.) There might be more attention in future Analyses to the morbidity states that may precede mortality outcomes. What do the available epidemiological results suggest for the incidence of new serious lung and heart conditions? Whether or not these can be proven to be related to air quality, they can influence public perceptions concerning the urgency of air quality management.

f.) The analysis might be accompanied by comparison of benefits estimates to household income and to WTP estimates for air quality improvements from current hedonic or random utility models for specific areas. This practice has historical precedents and can be used as a gauge of plausibility for the benefits estimates incorporated in the analysis.

- **In future Prospective Analyses, consistency checks might be expanded to include assessments of the degree of correspondence between model predictions and other major sources of data about economic activity, emissions profiles, and estimates of health and ecosystem benefits.**

10 RESULTS AGGREGATION AND REPORTING

10.1 Charge Question 33:

Does the Council support the plans described in Chapter 11 for the aggregation and presentation of analytical results from this study? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, aggregation methods, results presentation techniques, or other tools the Council recommends?

10.2 General Observations

The Council's discussion of this Charge Question was separated rather artificially into a segment on costs and a separate segment on benefits. In this write-up, elements of the discussion that are relevant to both topics have been combined.

The Council notes that the strategy of reporting a "primary" estimate and an "alternative" can be misleading to the public if the alternative estimate combines conservative assumptions on several dimensions and results in a "low" estimate of net benefits. At the very least, if a "low" alternative is offered, so should be a "high" alternative, so readers are not left with the impression that the "true" case is half-way between the primary estimate and the low alternative. Providing only a low alternative invites biased inferences. Computational challenges preclude a full continuous distribution for the range of possible outcomes, for which standard confidence intervals could be constructed. However, information about the full distribution of possible results should be a goal to which the Agency aspires.

If the Agency continues to present sensitivity analyses concerning alternative scenarios, it is essential to associate with each of these alternatives some sense of their relative likelihood. Failure to do so encourages readers to employ a uniform distribution, which is almost certainly inappropriate.

Even at the intermediate data level, there should be more effort to explain how probability weights will be used to combine alternative point estimates of the magnitudes of key relationships. For example, with the ozone/mortality association, suppose there are three credible estimates. If all three estimates are close, then their average could be used. But what if one estimate is very different? The Second Prospective Analysis central case will presumably use the "best estimate" of this relationship. How will that value be determined?

In reporting its main results, the Council encourages the Agency to give particular prominence to the key assumptions and methodological choices that may be driving the results. Clear identification of these pivotal aspects of the analysis will emphasize the need for additional research on these topics and help focus the research community upon finding solutions.

- **Reporting of central and alternative cases should be associated with likelihoods of these cases, and any provision of a "low" alternative estimate should be balanced by a corresponding "high" alternative estimate. Pivotal assumptions should be clearly identified and the need for additional research on these issues should be emphasized.**

10.3 Primary Results

Benefit-cost ratios versus net benefits

The revised Draft Analytical Plan proposes some changes relative to procedures used in the first prospective study. For example, EPA acknowledges previous SAB comments about reporting benefit-cost (B/C) ratios. They plan to report B/C ratios in this study, but de-emphasize them relative to net-benefit estimates. The role of "appropriate explanation" is important to help readers avoid well-known problems with using B/C ratios for decision making.

However, the Council does not favor ANY use of benefit-cost ratios. This concept does not have a consistent economic interpretation. Consequently, these ratios do not offer new information. If there is a concern that some portion of the constituency for the analysis will be more comfortable thinking in terms of benefit-cost ratios, the calculated benefit-cost ratio should be no more prominent than being mentioned in a footnote. The Agency should take a lead in shifting the emphasis to net benefits information, as opposed to benefit-cost ratios.

It is true that any policy or project with positive net benefits will also have a benefit-cost ratio greater than one, if both benefits and costs were known with certainty. However, in ranking projects with net benefits greater than zero (or less than zero) the net benefits and benefit-cost criteria can give conflicting rankings. Also, given greater attention to uncertainty, the net benefits approach has much to recommend it. The variance of a difference in two random variables is generally easier to calculate than the distribution of a ratio of two random variables. An emphasis on benefit-cost ratios would require consideration of how the variance in the ratio of two random variables (uncertain benefits over uncertain costs) was derived. There are approaches (e.g. Goodman and Hartley (1958), Goodman (1960, 1962), and Bohrnstedt and Goldberger, 1969) but this seems to add needless complexity.

- **The Council urges the Agency to dispense with benefit-cost ratios and focus attention on net benefits estimates as the appropriate summary measure in Benefit-Cost analysis.**

10.4 Future forecasts and present value calculations

In the Second Prospective Analysis, the cumulative or present discounted value of costs, benefits, and net benefits will not be presented. The reason given in the Draft Analytical Plan is that the time paths of costs and benefits are not linear. An example provided is which there may be high up-front costs, with benefits in later years. Analogous problems can afflict benefits estimates, since multi-period chronic health effects must also be accounted for.

Part of this problem is dealt with, implicitly, in the so-called "annual" estimates. For example, the annual costs in each reported year (2000, 2010, and 2020) are average annual costs. If there are up-front capital costs, these are annualized (capitalized forward using an assumed interest rate) to get the annual estimates for the target years. The Council accepts the Agency's plans, for the Second Prospective Analysis, not to report cumulative estimates in the form of present discounted values, but recommends that the nature of the annual estimates should be made clearer and they should be called "forecasted average annualized costs and benefits."

The Analytical Plan states that changing the discount rate will have little effect on the results, because no net present value estimates are calculated. However, changing the discount rate does affect the annualized results in various ways, including the cost estimates if capital costs have been capitalized forwards to produce estimates of average annual costs. The Plan should be more clear about the specific (private?) interest rates used to annualize costs, as opposed to the appropriate (social?) discount rates needed to compute the present value of net benefits.

Some members of the Council agree with the proposal to delete discussion of the approximate present value of net benefits given the current quality of the components available to calculate it. The practices that will be used to estimate the time profiles of costs and benefits (in particular, the lack of good techniques for interpolation between discrete forecasting years) make these time profiles difficult to rely upon. Further effort to calculate present values would not really be justified on the basis of the underlying quality of these time profiles. Any present value calculations would exaggerate the precision with which these time profiles can be calculated.

Nevertheless, other members of the Council expresses considerable unease about the fact that present discounted net benefits are, in principle, the criterion upon which judgments are based (prior to the introduction of distributional considerations). When benefits and costs are distributed unevenly over time, it is necessary to determine whether overall present discounted net benefits are positive. By neglecting net present value (NPV) calculations, the Analysis does not provide what is needed to inform policy-makers.

The Council is troubled by the Agency's explanation that it has decided not to provide annual interpolations of net-benefit estimates between target years because of the difficulty of quantifying uncertainties related to interpolation. Different strategies for interpolation could be used and the sensitivity of the NPV calculations to these

differences could be assessed. If the Agency reports carefully upon the methods used to fill in the intervening years (latency of benefits, durability of costs), then the resulting NPV calculations would be suitably qualified.

The Agency explained to the Council that the exorbitant data requirements for air quality modeling for the intervening years in the main forecasts were the rate-determining factor in filling in trajectories of costs and benefits for intervening years over the forecasting horizon. However, there would seem to be some prospect of improving upon simple linear interpolation by taking advantage of the richness of emissions trends. The Council urges the Agency to continue to grapple with possible alternative techniques for interpolating the disparate time patterns of benefits and costs and working towards plausible NPV results in future Prospective Analyses.

As an aside, the Plan suggests that the Agency may produce annual estimates for future years, beyond the main target years, because future annual estimates at a temporal resolution finer than a decade "can be more reliably estimated." Although such estimates would not involve interpolation, it is not at all clear that the errors inherent in predicting outcomes farther in the future are necessarily smaller than the errors of interpolating between more accurate measures. Any such forecasts should be heavily qualified.

- **The Council understands the Agency's current reluctance to take the somewhat heroic steps necessary to process the time profiles of benefits and costs into net present value (NPV) estimates. However, the Council urges to Agency to persist in its efforts toward this important goal in planning for future Analyses. In the meantime, the Agency must more clearly explain its rationale for annualizing costs but not calculating present discounted values of net benefits. The Council may revisit this topic in subsequent discussion.**

10.5 Disaggregation

Chapter 11 of the revised Analytical Plan is advertised to concern "Results Aggregation and Reporting," although its subject matter could more informatively be termed "Results Disaggregation and Reporting." The central issue is the extent to which costs and/or benefits should be disaggregated spatially (e.g., by state), by CAAA Title, or by sector.

EPA notes some potential problems with sectoral and spatial disaggregation, attributed to factors such as nonlinearities, jointness, and incidence dispersion through markets. These problems can result in subadditivity or superadditivity when aggregating up from component estimates or disaggregating down from total estimates. However, because sectoral and geographic incidence is of considerable interest to policy makers, it may be necessary to plan for adding evaluation of alternative disaggregation schemes to the already long list of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses that this study, or perhaps future Prospective Analyses, will require.

- **As problematic as disaggregation may be, the Agency should anticipate strong demand for this type of information by policy-makers and stakeholders.**

Sectoral disaggregation

Any attempts at sectoral decomposition of benefits and costs must be compared and reconciled with sectoral analyses from the CGE models to be used in this enterprise. Explanations for any anticipated or realized discrepancies between sectoral and aggregated analyses should be clarified. The current description refers to "non-linearities" as the source of potential discrepancies, but this explanation needs to be clearer. In the discussion of sectoral reporting, it is not clear what sectoral breakdown will be used.

- **There is insufficient information in Chapter 11 to permit a thorough review of the Agency's plans to disaggregate net benefits by sector.**

Spatial disaggregation

The Council, in its previous review, argued strongly against spatial disaggregation of the costs of the CAAA. The general equilibrium consequences of air quality interventions are propagated widely throughout the economy, acting as they do through goods markets, labor markets, and capital markets. In its 2001 review, due to these issues of incidence, the Council advised against spatial disaggregation of costs, The Analytical Plan adopts that suggestion with a nicely phrased argument and explanation.

However, some types of air quality regulations that affect only local or regional air quality, rather than broader areas, may have sufficiently localized benefits that it is reasonable to address spatially disaggregated benefits estimates. Stratospheric ozone concentrations or the effect of carbon emissions on world climate clearly do not fall into this category. Spatial disaggregation of benefits should be contemplated only when the Agency has access to spatially delineated projections for ambient concentrations of pollution. This could offer opportunity for local or regional estimates of benefits derived from hedonic property value and hedonic wage studies.

Although there are many regulations for which it makes no sense to spatially disaggregate costs, for the general equilibrium reasons mentioned in the last paragraph, there may still be a few exceptions. It must be acknowledged that there will occasionally be vocal demands for spatial disaggregation by policy makers. It may be important for the Agency to anticipate demands for it to examine costs and benefits by geographical area for some provisions of the CAAA, for some sources.

For example, additional local controls to meet NAAQS may have costs and benefits that are borne primarily, although not entirely, within the region. Certain future policies may make sense in some regions, and not in others. State-by-state costs and benefits probably will not capture the right geographic areas, but it seems important to consider regional disaggregation for some cases.

Even judicious spatial disaggregation of benefits is not without potential complications, however. The example in the Plan of the geographic dispersion of cost incidence from power plant emission-control investments in Indiana may also apply to benefits in a general-equilibrium analysis. Improved health that improves worker productivity may benefit a firm's shareholders and customers in distant locations. EPA's example of how to allocate visibility benefits accruing to visitors to a national park is a good illustration of where problems may arise. The physical improvement occurs at the national park, but the beneficiaries are park visitors who live elsewhere. Should their benefits be associated with the location of the park, or the location of their residence? In many cases, geographical disaggregation will involves arbitrary judgments that may be difficult to defend.

- **Spatial disaggregation is problematic, in general, because of all the connections among markets that give rise to general equilibrium consequences from the regulation of any one plant or industry. The Agency is advised to proceed very cautiously in terms of spatial disaggregation, and only in special cases.**

Disaggregation by Title

The Council also urged previously that the Agency should pursue disaggregating costs by Title. Although this is not explicitly treated in the text of Chapter 11, Table 11-2 suggests that costs will be aggregated over Titles I through IV. The Council would a priori prefer more disaggregation by Title and suggests that the Plan present reasons why this is not possible or desirable. The 2001 Council review of the first Draft Analytical Plan clarified some of the reasons for limiting disaggregation by title, but too few of these reasons appear in the revised Draft Analytical Plan. To a certain extent, presenting costs by major sector, as planned, will involve generating the kind of data needed to pursue title-by-title disaggregation.

- **A more through explanation of the inadvisability of further disaggregation by title of the CAAA would help readers understand why no such further disaggregation is planned.**

Cost-effectiveness and disaggregation

The Analytical Plan focuses on monetized benefits and costs. Chapter 11 does not describe any planned reporting of cost-effectiveness measures in the Second Prospective

Analysis. The First Prospective Study provided some auxiliary cost- per-life-saved measures. Given that the results from the Second Prospective Analysis are to be calculated and reported on a more disaggregated basis, there may be some cases where these cost-effectiveness estimates can be provided and would be helpful to the constituency's understanding of the effects of the CAAA. The Council acknowledges, however, that when policies provide benefits that are broader than simply improvements in human health, cost-per-life-saved measures can be misleading (e.g. when there may be substantial ecosystem benefits).

10.6 Primary estimates, alternative estimates, and uncertainty

The Council will address issues of uncertainty more generally in a subsequent installment of this advice when it considers the contents of Chapter 9 of the Draft Analytical Plan. In addressing Charge Question 33 and Chapter 11, however, the Council has a few preliminary observations. EPA's primary estimates are based on a set of assumptions the study staff finds most plausible or defensible. In the past, providing sensitivity analysis in the form of estimates based on different assumptions or methods has been their primary method of uncertainty analysis. EPA anticipates eventually using a more sophisticated, formal probability analysis to characterize uncertainty, but will continue to include sensitivity analysis in the meantime.

Ideally, uncertainty analysis should consider variations in key elements of scenarios as well as Monte Carlo simulation for variation in parameter estimates.

It is doubtful that formal probability analysis ever will completely supplant exploration of alternative assumptions and methods. For example, there appears to be no way to characterize the relative uncertainty of QALY-based measures of cost-effectiveness versus Cost-per-Life-Saved measures of cost effectiveness. These two approaches embody different social judgments about what the maximand should be in the objective function for public health and safety policies. They also involve different professional judgments about the reliability and validity of different methods, not their uncertainty, per se. The Council advocates that EPA should gradually replace simple sensitivity analysis around uncertain estimates with improved probabilistic analysis, but continue to provide alternative estimates to reflect the different outcomes that may arise from different assumptions and methods that require methodological and value judgments.

- **Comprehensive discussion of Uncertainty (the contents of Chapter 9) has yet to be undertaken. The Council's general sympathy for a move toward formal probability analysis is tempered by the realization that the strategies of the First Prospective Analysis will continue to be useful in the Second Prospective Analysis.**

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Appendix A

SAB Review Charge Questions

July 3, 2003 – REVISED

This document conveys a set of specific charge questions which EPA respectfully requests that the SAB Council consider during its review of the draft analytical blueprint for the upcoming section 812 benefit-cost study of the Clean Air Act. The charge questions are organized by blueprint chapter or appendix. The first question posed for each chapter or appendix is intended to serve as a general charge question consistent with the statutory criteria for Council review of the section 812 studies. Additional, more detailed charge questions are also conveyed for most chapters and appendices. These supplemental charge questions reflect EPA's desire to obtain specific and detailed advice from the Council on particular analytical issues. **[Charge questions addressed, in part or in full, in this interim review document are shown in bold-face – Council]**

Chapter 1: Project Goals and Analytical Sequence

1. Does the Council support the study goals, general analytical framework, disaggregation plan, analytical sequence, and general analytical refinements defined in chapter 1? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternatives the Council recommends?

Chapter 2: Scenario Development

2. Does the Council support the choices for analytical scenarios defined in chapter 2? Are there alternative or additional scenarios the Council recommends EPA consider for inclusion in the analysis?

3. Does the Council support the alternative compliance pathway estimation and comparison methodology described in chapter 2, including the specification of alternative compliance pathways which may not reflect precisely constant emissions or air quality outcomes between scenarios due (primarily) to the non-continuous nature and interaction effects of emission control options?

Chapter 3: Emissions Estimation

4. Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting emissions changes as defined in chapter 3? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

5. Chapter 3 of the analytical plan describes several alternative approaches considered by EPA for estimating non-EGU emissions growth rates. These options reflect different relative emphasis between two conflicting analytical objectives: (1) extensive refinement of the geographically differentiated, source-

specific economic activity growth estimates embedded in EGAS 4.0, and (2) maintaining the current project schedule and budget. EPA plans to use "approach #4", a compromise option which targets the most important source categories for potential refinement. Does the Council support the initial plan to use "approach #4"? If the Council does not support the use of approach #4, are there other approaches –including either the approaches described in chapter 3 or others identified by the Council– which the Council suggests EPA consider?

6. Some state-supplied emissions data incorporated in the 1999 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) –the core emissions inventory for this analysis– incorporate different emissions factors from those used in MOBILE6, the mobile source emissions model EPA plans to use for estimating emissions changes between scenarios. Of particular importance, some of the emissions factors embedded in California's EMFAC model may be significantly different from factors used in MOBILE6. EPA considered three options for estimating emissions changes in California, which are described in chapter 3. EPA plans to implement option #3 based on the belief that the emission factors embedded by California in its EMFAC model may be more accurate for their particular state than the factors incorporated in MOBILE6. Does the Council support the plan to implement option #3? If the Council does not support the adoption of option #3, are there other options –including either the options described in chapter 3 or others identified by the Council– which the Council suggests EPA consider?

Chapter 4: Cost Estimates

7. Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting compliance costs described in chapter 4? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

8. EPA seeks advice from the Council concerning the choice of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which EPA intends to use as a post-processor to gauge the general equilibrium effects of the various control scenarios. In the first 812 study –the retrospective– EPA used the Jorgenson/Wilcoxen model to gauge the general equilibrium effects of returning to the economy the reported compliance expenditures which formed the basis of the retrospective study direct cost estimates. This model has since been refined in many ways, and EPA considers both the Jorgenson/Wilcoxen/Ho and AMIGA to be acceptable tools. Although a final decision on model choice can be deferred until later in the analysis, EPA has tentative plans to use the AMIGA model because of its greater sectoral disaggregation, better industrial sector matching with CAA-affected industries, richer representation of relevant production and consumption technologies, and better model validation opportunities due to its use of open code. However, AMIGA is limited given its inability to deal with dynamics over time. Does the Council support the current, tentative plan to use the

AMIGA model for this purpose? If not, are there alternative model choices or selection criteria the Council recommends?

9. In the two previous 812 studies, the primary cost estimates reflected use of a 5 percent real discount rate, which an earlier Council endorsed as a reasonable compromise between a 3 percent real rate considered by EPA to be an appropriate estimate of the consumption rate of interest or rate of social time preference and a 7 percent rate, OMB's estimate of the opportunity cost of capital. Limited sensitivity testing was also conducted in the previous 812 studies by substituting 3 and 7 percent rates to annualize the benefit and cost streams. EPA's new Economics Guidelines (peer-reviewed by the SAB EEAC) call for using both a 3 and a 7 percent rate. A recent draft of new OMB economic guidelines suggests providing results based on both 3 and 7 percent discount rates, while also acknowledging the need for further efforts to refine analytical policies for discounting methods and rates. EPA plans on following both sets of Guideline documents by using both 3 and 7 percent in our core analyses. It is true that this will require presentation of two sets of results – one based on each rate. This may not be necessary given the expected insensitivity of the overall results to the discount rate assumption. Does the Council support this approach? If not, are there alternative rates, discounting concepts, methods, or results presentation approaches the Council recommends?

Chapter 5: Air Quality Modeling

10. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 5 for estimating, evaluating, and reporting air quality changes associated with the analytical scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

Chapter 6: Human Health Effects Estimation

11. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 6 for estimating, evaluating, and reporting changes in health effect outcomes between scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

12. EPA seeks advice from the Council regarding the technical and scientific merits of incorporating several new or revised endpoint treatments in the current analysis. These health effect endpoints include:
    a. Premature mortality from particulate matter in adults 30 and over, PM (Krewski et al., 2000);
    b. A PM premature mortality supplemental calculation for adults 30 and over using the Pope 2002 ACS follow-up study with regional controls;
    c. Hospital admissions for all cardiovascular causes in adults 20-64, PM (Moolgavkar et al., 2000);

d. ER visits for asthma in children 0-18, PM (Norris et al., 1999);
e. Non-fatal heart attacks, adults over 30, PM (Peters et al., 2001);
f. School loss days, Ozone (Gilliland et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2000);
g. Hospital admissions for all respiratory causes in children under 2, Ozone (Burnett et al., 2001); and,
h. Revised sources for concentration-response functions for hospital admission for pneumonia, COPD, and total cardiovascular: Samet et al., 2000 (a PM10 study), to Lippmann et al., 2000 and Moolgavkar, 2000 (PM2.5 studies).

13. EPA seeks advice from the Council regarding the merits of applying updated data for baseline health effect incidences, prevalence rates, and other population characteristics as described in chapter 6. These updated incidence/prevalence data include:
    a. Updated county-level mortality rates (all-cause, non-accidental, cardiopulmonary, lung cancer, COPD) from 1994-1996 to 1996-1998 using the CDC Wonder Database;
    b. Updated hospitalization rates from 1994 to 1999 and switched from national rates to regional rates using 1999 National Hospital Discharge Survey results;
    c. Developed regional emergency room visit rates using results of the 2000 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey;
    d. Updated prevalence of asthma and chronic bronchitis to 1999 using results of the National Health Interview Survey (HIS), as reported by the American Lung Association (ALA), 2002;
    e. Developed non-fatal heart attack incidence rates based on National Hospital Discharge Survey results;
    f. Updated the national acute bronchitis incidence rate using HIS data as reported in ALA, 2002, Table 11;
    g. Updated the work loss days rate using the 1996 HIS data, as reported in Adams, et al. 1999, Table 41;
    h. Developed school absence rates using data from the National Center for Education Statistics and the 1996 HIS, as reported in Adams, et al., 1999, Table 46.
    1. Developed baseline incidence rates for respiratory symptoms in asthmatics, based on epidemiological studies (Ostro et al. 2001; Vedal et al. 1998; Yu et al; 2000; McConnell et al., 1999; Pope et al., 1991).

14. EPA plans to initiate an expert elicitation process to develop a probability-based method for estimating changes in incidence of PM-related premature mortality. Plans for this expert elicitation are described in chapter 9 of this blueprint, and a separate charge question below requests advice from the Council pertaining to the merits of the design of this expert elicitation. EPA recognizes, however, the possibility that this expert elicitation process may not be fully successful and/or may not be completed in time to support the current 812 analysis. Therefore, in

order to facilitate effective planning and execution of the early analytical steps which provide inputs to the concentration-response calculations, EPA seeks advice from the Council regarding the scientific merits of alternative methods for estimating the incidences of PM-related premature mortality, including advice pertaining to the most scientifically defensible choices for the following specific factors:

a. Use of cohort mortality studies, daily mortality studies, or some combination of the two types of studies
b. Selection of specific studies for estimating long-term and/or short-term mortality effects
c. Methods for addressing –either quantitatively or qualitatively– uncertain factors associated with the relevant concentration-response function(s), including
    i. Shape of the PM mortality C-R function (e.g., existence of a threshold),
    ii. PM causality,
    iii. PM component relative toxicity, and
    iv. PM mortality effect cessation lag structure
    v. Cause of death and underlying health conditions for individuals dying prematurely due to chronic and/or short term exposures to particulate matter
    vi. The use of ambient measures of exposure for estimating chronic health effects, given recent research reviewed in the NAS (2002) report that questions the implications of using ambient measures in cohort studies

15. EPA estimates of benefit from particulate control may underestimate the impact of nonfatal cardiopulmonary events on premature mortality and life expectancy. For the base analyses, which rely on cohort evidence, the limited follow-up periods for the cohorts may not fully capture the impacts of nonfatal cardiovascular events on premature mortality later in life. For the alternative analyses –including cost-effectiveness analyses– which rely more on acute studies and life-expectancy loss, the years of life are estimated only for fatal events. Yet nonfatal events such as myocardial infarction reduce a person's life expectancy by a substantial percentage.

a. Do you agree that EPA, in the 812 analyses, should adjust benefit estimates to account for the mortality effects of non-fatal cardiovascular and respiratory events?
b. What medical studies and mathematical models of disease might be useful to review or use if EPA moves in this direction?
c. When the nonfatal events are valued in economic terms, should EPA assume that the published unit values for morbidity already account for the life-expectancy loss or should an explicit effort be made to monetize the resulting longevity losses?

16. In recent EPA rulemakings, EPA's "base estimate" of benefit from PM control has been based on cohort epidemiological studies that characterize the chronic effects of pollution exposure on premature death as well as capturing a fraction of acute premature mortality effects. If these chronic effects occur only after repeated, long-term exposures, there could be a substantial latency period and associated cessation lag. As such, a proper benefits analysis must consider any time delay between reductions in exposure and reductions in mortality rates. For the acute effects, such as those considered in EPA's alternative benefit analyses, the delays between elevated exposure and death are short (less than two months), and thus time-preference adjustments are not necessary.

    a. In the previous 812 analysis and in recent rulemakings, EPA assumed a weighted 5-year time course of benefits in which 25% of the PM-related mortality benefits were assumed to occur in the first and second year, and 16.7% were assumed to occur in each of the remaining 3 years. Although this procedure was endorsed by SAB, the recent NAS report (2002) found "little justification" for a 5-year time course and recommended that a range of assumptions be made with associated probabilities for their plausibility. Do you agree with the NAS report that EPA should no longer use the deterministic, 5-year time course?

    b. One alternative EPA is considering is to use a range of lag structures from 0 to 20-30 years, with the latter mentioned by NAS in reference to the Nyberg et al PM lung cancer study, with 10 or 15 years selected as the mid-point value until more definitive information becomes available. If this simple approach is used, should it be applied to the entire mortality association characterized in the cohort studies, or only to the difference between the larger mortality effect characterized in the cohort studies and the somewhat smaller effect found in the time series studies of acute exposure? Should judgmental probabilities be applied to different lags, as suggested by NAS?

    c. Another option under consideration is to construct a 3-parameter Weibull probability distribution for the population mean duration of the PM mortality cessation lag. The Weibull distribution is commonly used to represent probabilities based on expert judgment, with the 3-parameter version allowing the shaping of the probability density function to match expected low, most likely, and expected high values. EPA is still considering appropriate values for the low, most likely, and expected high values –and therefore for the Weibull shape and location parameters– and EPA is interested in any advice the Council wishes to provide pertaining to the merits of this approach and/or reasonable values for the probability distribution.

17. In support of Clear Skies and several recent rule makings the Agency has presented an Alternative Estimate of benefits as well as the Base Estimate. EPA developed the Alternative Estimate as an interim approach until the Agency completes a formal probabilistic analysis of benefits. NAS (2002) reinforced the need for a probabilistic analysis. The Alternative Estimate is not intended as a

substitute method and needs to be considered in conjunction with the Base Estimate. Presentation of Base and Alternative estimates in the 812 Report may not be necessary if the probability analysis planned for the 812 Report is successful. While the Base Estimate assumes that acute and chronic mortality effects are causally related to pollution exposure, the Alternative Estimate assumes only acute effects occur or that any chronic effects are smaller in size than assumed in the Base Estimate. The Council's advice is sought on the following matters:

a. It has been noted by some particle scientists that the size of estimates based on time series studies that incorporate a distributed lag model, accounting for effects of 30 to 60 days after elevated exposure, may be similar in size to some interpretations of the results from the cohort studies. Does the Council agree that it is a reasonable alternative to use an estimate of the concentration-response function consistent with this view? If the Council agrees with the assumption, can it suggest an improved approach for use in an Alternative Estimate? The agency also seeks advice on appropriate bounds for a sensitivity analysis of the mortality estimate to be used in support of the Alternative Estimate.

b. An assumption that a specific proportion of the PM-related premature mortality incidences are incurred by people with pre-existing Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and that these incidences are associated with a loss of six months of life, regardless of age at death. If these values are not valid, what values would be more appropriate? Do you recommend a sensitivity analysis of 1 to 14 years (with the latter based on standard life tables), as included in the draft regulatory impact analysis of the proposed Nonroad diesel rule?

c. An assumption that the non-COPD incidences of PM-related premature mortality are associated with a loss of five years of life, regardless of age at death. If these values are not valid, what values would be more appropriate? Do you recommend a sensitivity analysis of 1 to 14 years (with the latter based on standard life tables), as included in the draft regulatory impact analysis of the proposed Nonroad diesel rule?

d. Additional quantified and/or monetized effects are those presented as sensitivity analyses to the primary estimates or in addition to the primary estimates, but not included in the primary estimate of total monetized benefits. While no causal mechanism has been identified for chronic asthma and ozone exposure, there is suggestive epidemiological evidence.

    i. Two studies suggest a statistical association between ozone and new onset asthma for two specific groups: children who spend a lot of time exercising outdoors and non-smoking men. We seek SAB comment on our approach to quantifying new onset asthma in the sensitivity analyses.

    ii. Premature mortality associated with ozone is not currently separately included in the primary analysis because the epidemiological evidence is not consistent. We seek SAB

comment on our approach to quantifying ozone mortality in the sensitivity analyses.

iii. Does the Council agree that there is enough data to support a separate set of health impacts assessment for asthmatics? If so, does the approach proposed by the Agency address the uncertainty in the literature?

Chapter 7: Ecological Effects

18. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 7 for (a) qualitative characterization of the ecological effects of Clean Air Act-related air pollutants, (b) an expanded literature review, and (c) a quantitative, ecosystem-level case study of ecological service flow benefits? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

19. Initial plans described in chapter 7 reflect a preliminary EPA decision to base the ecological benefits case study on Waquoit Bay in Massachusetts. Does the Council support these plans? If the Council does not support these specific plans, are there alternative case study designs the Council recommends?

20. Does the Council support the plan for a feasibility analysis for a hedonic property study for valuing the effects of nitrogen deposition/eutrophication effects in the Chesapeake Bay region, with the idea that these results might complement the Waquoit Bay analysis?

Chapter 8: Economic Valuation

21. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 8 for economic valuation of changes in outcomes between the scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

22. EPA's current analytic blueprint calls for an expert-judgment project on VSL determination that would produce a probability distribution over the range of possible VSL values for use in the 812 project. EPA is not sure how much priority to give to this project. A much simpler alternative would be for EPA to specify a plausible range of VSL values. One option would be to use a range bounded by $1 million (based roughly on the lower bound of the interquartile range from the Mrozek-Taylor meta-analysis) and $10 million (based roughly on the upper bound of the interquartile range of the Viscusi- Aldy meta-analysis. This range would match that reflected in EPA's sensitivity analysis of the alternative benefit estimate for the off-road diesel rulemaking. The range would then be characterized using a normal, half-cosine, uniform or triangular distribution over that range of VSL values. EPA would then ask this Committee to review this distribution. This approach could be done relatively quickly, based on the reviews

and meta-analyses commissioned to date, and would allow a formal probability analysis to proceed, without suggesting that the Agency is trying to bring more precision to this issue than is warranted by the available science.

23. Pursuant to SAB Council advice from the review of the first draft analytical blueprint, EPA reviewed a number of meta-analyses –either completed or underway– developed to provide estimates for the value of statistical life (VSL) to be applied in the current study. EPA plans to consult with the Council (and coordinate this consultation with the EEAC) on how best to incorporate information from the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other published meta-analyses [Mrozek and Taylor and Viscusi and Aldy], and recent published research to develop estimates of VSL for use in this study. In addition, EPA plans to implement two particular adjustments to the core VSL values: discounting of lagged effects and longitudinal adjustment to reflect changes in aggregate income. Does the Council support these plans, including the specific plans for the adjustments described in chapter 8? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

24. For the 812 Report, EPA has decided to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis of the Clean Air Act provisions using quality-adjusted life years as the measure of effectiveness. This is the standard approach used in medicine and public health and this type of analysis has previously been recommended by the SAB. Moreover, the recent NAS Report (2002) on benefits analysis discussed how this method could be applied to the health gains from air pollution control.
    a. Do you agree that QALYs are the most appropriate measure of effectiveness for this type of analysis? Would you suggest any alternative measures to replace or supplement the QALY measure? (This question relates to effectiveness measures, not monetary benefit measures as used in benefit-cost analysis).
    b. OMB has suggested that EPA plan a workshop with clinicians, social scientists, decision analysts and economists to examine how the specific diseases and health effects in the 812 Report should be handled with respect to longevity impact and health-related preference. Participants would have knowledge of the relevant clinical conditions, the related health preference studies, and the stated-preference literature in economics. The recent RFF conference has laid the groundwork for this type of workshop. Is there a superior approach to making sure that the CEAQALY project is executed in a technically competent fashion and that the details of the work receive in-depth technical input in addition to the broad oversight provided by this Committee?
    c. Does the Council support the specific plans for QALY-based cost-effectiveness described in the current draft blueprint? If the Council does not support specific elements of these plans, are the alternative data, methods, or results presentation approaches which the Council recommends?

25. EPA plans to use updated unit values for a number of morbidity effects, as described in chapter 8. Of particular note, EPA plans to rely on a study by Dickie and Ulery (2002) to provide heretofore unavailable estimates of parental willingness to pay to avoid respiratory symptoms in their children. This study is not yet published and has limitations concerning response rate and sample representativeness; however, EPA expects the study to be published prior to completion of the economic valuation phase of this analysis. Does the Council support the application of unit values from this study, contingent on its acceptance for publication in a peer-reviewed journal? If the Council does not support reliance on this study, are there other data or methods for valuation of respiratory symptoms in children which the Council recommends?

Chapter 9: Uncertainty Analysis

26. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for estimating and reporting uncertainty associated with the benefit and cost estimates developed for this study? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

27. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to develop probability-based estimates for uncertainty in the compliance cost estimates? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying uncertainty in cost estimates for this analysis which the Council recommends?

28. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to develop probability-based estimates for uncertainty in the emissions and air quality modeling estimates? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying uncertainty in emissions and/or air quality concentration estimates for this analysis which the Council recommends?

29. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the expert elicitation pilot project to develop a probability-based PM2.5 C-R function for premature mortality, including in particular the elicitation process design? If the Council does not support the expert elicitation pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches the Council recommends for estimating PM-related mortality benefits for this analysis, including in particular a probabilistic distribution for the C-R function to reflect uncertainty in the overall C-R function and/or its components?

30. EPA plans to develop estimates of an independent mortality effect associated with ozone, as described in chapter 9. Does the Council support the use of the most recent literature on the relationship between short-term ozone exposure and daily death rates, specifically that portion of the literature describing models which

control for potential confounding by PM2.5? Does the Council agree with the use of that literature as the basis for deriving quantified estimates of an independent mortality impact associated with ozone, especially in scenarios where short-term PM2.5 mortality estimates are used as the basis for quantifying PM mortality related benefits? Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to use this literature to develop estimates of the ozone related premature mortality C-R function using the three alternative meta-analytic approaches? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying ozone-related premature mortality which the Council recommends?

31. EPA plans to work with the Council and the EEAC to develop revised guidance on appropriate VSL measures. We hope to include the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other recent meta-analysis, recent publications, and the 3 literature reviews sponsored by EPA.(a separate charge question pertaining to this element of EPA's VSL plan is presented below). In addition, EPA plans to conduct a follow-on meta-regression analysis of the existing VSL literature to provide insight into the systematic impacts of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population attributes on the mean and variance of VSL. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for conducting this meta-regression analysis? If the Council does not support this analysis or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches which the Council recommends for quantifying the impact of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population attributes on the mean and variance of VSL?

Chapter 10: Data Quality and Intermediate Data Products

32. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 10 for evaluating the quality of data inputs and analytical outputs associated with this study, including the planned publication of intermediate data products and comparison of intermediate and final results with other data or estimates? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, intermediate data products, data or model comparisons, or other data quality criteria the Council reommends? Please consider EPA's Information Quality Guidelines in this regard.

Chapter 11: Results Aggregation and Reporting

33. Does the Council support the plans described in Chapter 11 for the aggregation and presentation of analytical results from this study? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, aggregation methods, results presentation techniques, or other tools the Council recommends?

Appendix D: Stratospheric Ozone Analysis

34. Does the Council support the plans describe in Appendix D for updating the estimated costs and benefits of Title VI programs? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

Appendix E: Air Toxics Case Study

35. Does the Council support the plans described in Appendix E for the benzene case study, including the planned specific data, models, and methods, and the ways in which these elements have been integrated? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

36. A cessation lag for benzene-induced leukemia is difficult to estimate and model precisely due to data limitations, and EPA plans to incorporate a five-year cessation lag as an approximation based on available data on the latency period of leukemia and on the exposure lags used in risk models for the Pliofilm cohort (Crump, 1994 and Silver et al., 2002). Does the SAB support adoption of this assumed cessation lag? If the Council does not support the assumed five-year cessation lag, are there alternative lag structures or approaches the Council recommends?

Appendix H: Meta-analysis of VSL

37. Does the Council support including the Kochi et al. (2002) meta-analysis as part of a the larger data base of studies to derive an estimate for the value of avoided premature mortality attributable to air pollution? Are there additional data, models, or studies the Council recommends? Does the SAB think that EPA should include Kochi et al. 2003 if not accepted for publication in a peer reviewed journal by the time the final 812 report is completed?